References
- That the scope of the expression “as being knowledge” is not just “infallible” will become evident, if it is not so already, from the closer analysis of 151E-152C which I present in the second section of this paper.
- Cf. footnote 1. There seems to me some difficulty about the Greek here. I suspect that “ὡς ἐπιoτήμη oὗσα” may be a later gloss. My argument however is not upset by this, as I hope will become clear.
- It may look as if I am adding an essential characteristic here. In fact I am including one which is presupposed or implicit in the thesis. The other two conditions are the ones that Socrates explicitly refers to.
- (i.e. being When I refer to the first and second part I mean the following. There is one main premise that Socrates uses in 184B-186E to argue that perception is not knowledge. This is that without a “grasp of being” there is no grasp of truth and so no knowledge. Given this common premise, Socrates has two ways of showing that perception does not grasp being and so is not knowledge. The first is one of the KOWά and we do not perceive the KOWά I refer to as the first part of Socrates' argument. The second way (perception is pre-reflective etc.) I call the second part of the argument.