References
- Stroll , A. , ed. 1967 . Epistemology 83 – 97 . On what I have to say in this regard, I owe a heavy debt to two of David Pears's essays: “Are Reasons for Actions Causes?” in (New York, pp. 204–228, and “Desires as Causes of Actions,” in The Human Agent: Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. I: 1966–1967 (Glasgow, 1968), pp.
- 1966 . Action and Purpose 109 – 114 . See, for example, R. Taylor, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., pp. 254–255, and A.I. Melden, Free Action (London, 1961), Chapter X, esp. pp.
- I use the terms ‘want’ and ‘desire’ interchangeably throughout.
- D It is perhaps worth pointing out that to speak of one description entailing another description is to use the notion of entailment in an extended way: for entailment is a relation that is normally considered to hold between statements. And as I shall frequently speak of one description entailing another in what follows, a word about what is meant by saying this would be in order. We may say that one description, 1, entails another description, D 2, if and only if D 1 can be predicated of a subject x to form a statement S 1 D 2 can be predicated of the same subject x to form a statement S 2 such that, of the two statements so formed out of this subject and these descriptions, S 1 entails S 2. Now to say that S 1 entails S 2 is to say that it is inconsistent to assert S 1 and yet to deny S 2. Thus to say that D 1 entails D 2 is to say that it is inconsistent to predicate D 1 of a subject and yet to refuse to predicate D 2 of that subject. Let me illustrate this. The descriptions ‘six feet tall’ and ‘less than ten feet tall’ can be predicated of a common subject, e.g., John, to yield the following two statements: ‘John is six feet tall’ and ‘John is less than ten feet tall.’ And since the former statement entails the latter one, we may say that the description ‘six feet tall’ entails the description ‘less than ten feet tall’; that it is inconsistent to predicate ‘six feet tall’ of a subject and yet refuse to predicate ‘less than ten feet tall’ of that subject. With these explanations, I hope that the extended use of the notion of entailment, as indicating a relation holding between descriptions, will create no problems.
- “Are Reasons for Actions Causes?” p. 212.
- Fodor , Jerry . 1968 . Psychological Explanation (New York, p. 35.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- ‘Specific’ here has the force of limiting the desires in question to those we can identify. Without this, or some equivalent, qualification, it would be false to claim that desires do not conceal their objects; for we can want something and yet not know what it is that we want.
- 1968 . Philosophical Review 1 – 7 . The argument that follows is adapted from one used in a different context by N. Malcolm, “The Conceivability of Mechanism,” LXXVII 45–72. See esp. sections
- It will be noticed that I have chosen simplified cases of explanations, viz., explanations just in terms of some desire of the agent's, to illustrate the two competing forms of explanations. More frequently, reason-explanations are not just in terms of some desire the agent has, but in terms of his desires and information (i.e., knowledge or beliefs). However, the point I shall now make concerning these two forms of explanations also applies to explanations in terms of the agent's desires and information.
- 1956 . British Journal of Psychology It would perhaps be in order here to state a limitation of the argument just produced. If sound, it will only show that volitional concepts such as wanting and intending cannot be identified with, by way of being reduced to, certain neural states. It will not show that other mental concepts such as consciousness, experience, sensation, and mental imagery are irreducible to, and unidentifiable with, neural states; for there are no a priori laws pertaining to these sorts of phenomena. So for all that has been shown, one could be a Reductive Identity Theorist about some mental concepts, viz., the last sort mentioned above. And some philosophers, e.g., U. T. Place (”Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” XLVII [], 44–50) and J.J.C. Smart (”Sensations and Brain Processes,” Philosophical Review, LXVIII [1959], 141–156) have held the theory in just this way.
- I am indebted to D. G. Brown, Warren Mullins, S. C. Coval, Howard Jackson, Richard Sikora, and Brian Davies for helpful criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper.