References
- 1963 . Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics New York : Doubleday . The numbers in parentheses, in this and succeeding references, denote pages in P. F. Strawson,. Citations of other works will be placed in the footnotes.
- We shall not raise the question whether the sceptical position might be stated in a form which would not lend itself to Strawson's transcendental deduction. Strawson himself does not seem to deny such a possibility (pp. 105–106).
- This reconstruction remains true to Strawson's talk of ascribing “predicates” to “individuals” and of individuals as “possessing” predicates. This way of speaking, which mixes the logical order of subjects and predicates with the ontological order of individuals and characteristics, is reproduced here despite my own scruples.
- Ayer , A. J. 1963 . The Concept of a Person 100 – 101 . New York : St. Martin's .
- Malcolm , Norman . 1954 . “Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations,” . In The Philosophical Review LXIII, No. 4 (October.
- The reader may want to object at this point that we are being unfair to Strawson when we speak of depression as a state of consciousness. Such an attempted rescue only pushes Strawson off the edge: It shows that the plausibility of his statement rests on an ambiguity in his position. Does Strawson really hold that we can observe states of consciousness or not? If he says that we can, then he is guilty of the alleged contradiction. But if he says that we cannot, then he fails in his attempt to block the “logical wedge” between behaviour (which is observable) and states of consciousness (which are not), and he is left without the supplementary argument which is necessary to complete the task his transcendental deduction begins.
- Kant , Immanuel . 1961 . Critique of Pure Reason New York : St. Martin's . trans. Norman Kemp Smith A 84, p. 120. See the gloss in Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 89.
- Ayer . 98 – 99 . op. cit., pp.