Scientific Reduction and the Mind-Body Problem

References

• Munitz , Milton , ed. Identity and Individuation Kripke has recently argued that theoretical identities are necessary if true. If x=y, then necessarily x=y, provided ‘x’ and ‘y’ are rigid designators. If Kripke is right, then IT must be necessary if it is true at all. Kripke takes this to show that IT is (necessarily) false. Cf. Saul Kripke, “Identity and Necessity,” in by pp. 135–164. I have argued elsewhere that Kripke's principle does not entail that IT is false. Cf. my “On Kripke's Argument Against the Mind-Body Identity Theory,” Philosophia (forthcoming).
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• O'Connor , J. , ed. Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Brain Identity Smart considers a token of this type of objection. Cf. J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” in by p. 44.
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• 1972 . “Uniform Microreductions,” . Synthese , 25 : 176 – 218 . The presentation of the language of the theories here follows that provided by Robert L. Causey
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• 1972 . The Philosophical Forum 133 – 137 . Causey calls attention to this distinction (p. 183). I have called attention to it elsewhere in order to meet certain objections to the microreduction of psychology to neurology. Cf. my “Fodor on the Unity of Science,” 3, No. 1
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• 1964 . There are some cases where reduction is compatible with the derivation requirement. These cases typically involve theories established on the basis of a limited set of experiments reduced to a larger and similar theory. For example, a theory of the refraction of light in water can be reduced to a more general theory of the refraction of light in fluids, and this theory in turn is reducible to a general theory of the refraction of light in material media. For an analysis of derivational reductions, see Lawrence Sklar, “Inter-Theoretic Reduction in Natural Science” (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, pp. 73ff.
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• Causey, “Uniform Microreductions,” p. 176.
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• Sklar . 7 – 16 . Cf. “Inter-Theoretic Reduction in Natural Science,” pp.
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• Hempel , Carl G. “Aspects of Scientific Explanation,” in ” . In Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays Cf. p. 413. The discussion of understanding and the D-N model is indebted to Michael Friedman's discussion in “Explanation and Scientific Understanding” (forthcoming).
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• Hempel, “Aspects of Scientific Explanation,” p. 337.
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• Friedman's discussion contains an outline and criticism of several other accounts of explanation and understanding (Dray's familiarity view, Toulmin's ideals of natural order account, etc.).
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• Fodor , Jerry A. Psychological Explanation 112
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• Psychological Explanation Fodor, p. 111.
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• Cf. my “Fodor on the Unity of Science”; other issues connected with Fodor's account are discussed in my “Theoretical Reduction and Psycho-Neural Identity Statements” (in press).
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• Fodor , Jerry A. “Functional Explanation in Psychology,” in ” . In Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences Edited by: Brodbeck , M. 237 – 238 . Cf. by pp.
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• Psychological Explanation Fodor, p. 112.
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• Pribram , Karl . 1969 . “The Neurophysiology of Remembering,” . In Scientific American Edited by: Thompson , Richard F. 387 – 398 . Cf. (January, in Physiological Psychology, by pp.
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• NOUS Cf. my “Identity Thesis and Neuropsychology,” (forthcoming).
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• 1972 . “Uniform microreductions,” pp. 204–207. This point is made by N. J. Block in “Correlationism” (unpublished). My discussion of identity and correlation is indebted to Block's discussion and to that of R. Causey in “Attribute-Identities in Microreductions,” . Journal of Philosophy , 69 For an independent argument that reduction functions must be at least biconditionals see Causey, No. 14 (August 3,.
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• Kim , Jaegwon . “On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory,” in O'Connor, p. 199.
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• Rorty , Richard . 1970 . ” Journal of Philosophy , 67 “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental, No. 2 (June 25, 424.
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• Rorty, “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental,” p. 424.
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• Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’,” p. 461.
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• Brandt and Kim, “The Logic of the Identity Theory,” p. 230
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• Brandt and Kim, “The Logic of the Identity Theory,” p. 230
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• Block , N. J. “Correlationism.”
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• Ibid.
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• Bromberger , Sylvain . “Why-Questions,” in Brody p. 72.
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• Example from Baruch Brody.
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• Example from Robert Causey, “Attribute-Identities in Microreductions,” p. 418.
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