References
- Schell , Jonathan . 1983 . The Fate of the Earth 173 New York , N.Y. : Alfred A. Knopf .
- 1983 . ‘Nuclear Illusion and Individual Obligations,’ . Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 13 At least this is the familiar historical claim. For an insightful critical account see Trudy Govier, 475ff.
- Sommerville , John . 1981 . puts forward a gripping picture of the role of patriotism in the period following the Cuban missile crisis in ‘Patriotism and War,’ . Ethics , 91 : 568 – 78 .
- Walzer , Michael . 1977 . Just and Unjust Wars New York , N.Y. : Basic Books . 301f.; the idea of the realistic view is a normative notion, not an epistemological one. The suggestion of the realistic view is that we should be realistic— i.e. not severe— in judging the political acts of individuals when their government is at war.
- Ibid., 301
- Schell, 95, my emphasis
- Ibid., 221
- Ibid., 226
- I was reminded of this point in another context by Trudy Govier.
- Carnesale , Albert , Doty , Paul , Hoffman , Stanley , Huntington , Samuel P. , Joseph , S. Nye Jr. and Sagan , Scott D. 1983 . Living With Nuclear Weapons New York , NY : Bantam . Books
- 247 – 8 . Ibid.
- 1977 . ‘The Case That Milgram Makes,’ . Philosophical Review , 86 : 78 – 80 . For criticism of attempts to establish a moral difference on the basis of this knowingly/intentionally distinction in other contexts, see Steven C. Patten, 359–60 and James Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia,’ The New England Journal of Medicine 292 (1975)
- I have in mind, for example, unilateral modifications of alliance doctrine such as denial of first use and large scale partial disarmament such as that suggested as a unilateral step in the writings of George F. Kennan.
- 1983 . See ‘War, Nuclear War, and Nuclear Deterrence: Some Conceptual and Moral Issues,’ . Ethics , 95 : 424 – 44 . In ‘Moral Issues of the Nuclear Arms Race,’ unpublished manuscript, presented at a conference on Philosophy and Nuclear Deterrence at the University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, Fall (1985)
- ‘Moral Issues.’, 16
- Ibid., 14
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 16
- Ibid., 20
- Ibid., 16
- This formulation is due to Cheryl Misak.
- I follow others, especially Trudy Govier in ‘Nuclear Illusion and Individual Obligations,’ 484, in taking it to be obvious that a nuclear war would be immoral, irrespective of what we might say about threats and intentions to engage in such a conflict.
- The idea of the ‘strong case’ is explained below.
- Held , V. , Morgenbesser , S. and Nagel , T. , eds. 1974 . Philosophy, Morality and International Affairs London : Oxford University Press . This way of talking about certain forms of collective responsibility comes from Peter A. French, ‘Morally Blaming Whole Populations,’ in 282f.
- 1973 . ‘Responsibility for Crimes of War,’ . Philosophy and Public Affairs , 2 Quoted by Sanford Levinson, 254.
- Ibid.
- 1968 . ‘On the Morality of War: A Preliminary Inquiry,’ . Stanford Law Review , 21 What I refer to here as political innocence is the fourth sense of innocence outlined by Richard Wasserstrom in 1652. It is a notion of innocence that is ‘. concerned with culpability rather than causality per se’ (1652).
- Perry , T. L. Jr. , ed. 1983 . The Prevention of Nuclear War 229 – 30 . Vancouver , B.C. : Physicians for Social Responsibility, B.C. Chapter . This is the sort of view that motivates this kind of claim: ‘The Government leaders who are now talking about and planning for nuclear war are violating the principles of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals. Is there a way to try them as “war criminals”?’ Panel Discussion in 159; see also Schell
- Cheryl Misak pointed this out to me.
- Carnesale , Albert . 245
- 1984 . Earlier versions of this essay were read at the University of Prince Edward Island in August at the Conference on Philosophy and Nuclear Arms, University of Waterloo, September, 1984; and at An International Conference on Issues in Nuclear Deterrence, Inter-University Centre for Post Graduate Studies, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, June, 1985. Work on this paper was completed while assisted by a research fellowship to the Calgary Institute for the Humanities, University of Calgary. I have learned from the comments and criticisms of Maryann Ayim, David Copp, Philip Koch, Cheryl Misak, Robert Ware and Ron Yoshida. Trudy Govier, Leslie Wilson and Anne Williams patiently introduced me to the topic of individual responsibility for deterrence planning some time back. I am grateful to Sharon Prusky for a timely reminder about the importance of thinking about deterrence and especially to Mark Patten who was acting long before many of us were thinking about whether it was responsible to do so.