References
- Weinberger , Caspar W. 1985 . “ ‘A Rational Approach to Nuclear Deterrence,’ in ” . In The Ethics of War and Nuclear Deterrence Edited by: Sterba , James P. 120 Belmont , CA : Wadsworth .
- 1983 . Living with Nuclear Weapons New York : Bantam Books . The Harvard Nuclear Study Group, 152
- Gray , Colin . 1977 . “ as quoted in Patrick Morgan ” . In Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis 130 Beverly Hills , CA : Sage Publications .
- Huntingdom , S. “ as quoted in P. Morgan ” . In Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis 130
- Martin , Laurence . 1979 . Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age 1 – 30 . Baltimore , MD : Johns Hopkins University Press .
- Talbott , Strobe . 1984 . Deadly Gambits 5 – 10 . New York : Knopf .
- Scoville , Herbert Jr. 1981 . MX: Prescription for Disaster Cambridge , Ma : MIT Press . See, for example,. Scoville refers to the ‘dismal outlook for designing a survivable ICBM system in the absence of long-term constraints on Soviet force levels’ (196) and recommends moving the strategic deterrent to sea.
- The threat is implicit in deployments and institutions; thus, considering its morality we are to appraise policies, not individuals making threats. I owe my appreciation of this point to Russell Hardin.
- This begins with the Manhattan project as a response to a possible German project, moves to the Russian atomic project as a response to German and American ones, and proceeds to American and Soviet thinking about the H-bomb, inter- ballistic missiles, satellites, civil defense, cruise missiles, ‘Star Wars,’ and virtually everything else.
- Though the action-reaction model does not completely explain the arms competition, it plays a key role in its public rationalization and thus contributes to the public support necessary to maintain the competition. Other causes include technological momentum, vested interests of technical and scientific personnel, and corporate and bureaucratic interests.
- The unpredictability of nuclear war, the lack of content in any concept of winning a global nuclear war, and the fact that the publicly expressed rationale for nuclear weapons is almost always that of deterrence rather than war-fighting are only some of the problems this line of justification will face.
- 1987 . Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation Netherlands : Dordrecht . I have said some things in defence of this view of moral theory in ‘Two Unreceived Views of Reasoning and Argument,’ a chapter in my forthcoming book on the theory of argument, (: Foris Publications.
- The issue of how to count future people in moral reasoning is extremely difficult for moral theory, as work by Derek Parfit and others has shown. Here I presume only that future people count for something; their interests should not be wholly neglected.
- The problem of universalizability here parallels that which arises for egoistic moral theories and for patriotism. The solution of positing competition as a kind of game where every player sincerely wills that all others equally do their best to ‘win’ is perhaps of some interest for egoism but is too remote from the risks and costs of ‘playing’ in international reality to be of any real significance here.
- This view, or something close to it, is occasionally expressed. If nuclear weapons really prevent nuclear and conventional war, we should spread them around and get some more of this benefit. Even on such an extremely pro-nuclear theory, however, people would not wish to universalize the pursuit of interests by nuclear means—only the prevention of war by such means.
- Schell , Jonathan . 1982 . The Fate of the Earth 264 New York : Knopf . David Luban has also discussed this dynamic in ‘Deterrence and Democracy,’ a paper presented at Simon Fraser University in October, 1984.
- 1979 . The New Tyranny: How Nuclear Power Enslaves Us New York : Warner Books . For an intense discussion of this theme, see Robert Jungk,.
- I assume here that many citizens would accept possession and improvement of nuclear weapons solely as means of preventing nuclear and conventional war. Indeed, citizens seem very ready to accept this rationale, which is the one most commonly offered by officials to the public. I do not wish to imply even that this limited rationale is morally acceptable, only that it is widely thought to be so and is less obviously evil than nuclear diplomacy, nuclear blackmail, or the waging of nuclear war.
- ‘Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe,’ . Foreign Affairs , 62 See the summary of the TTAPS study in Carl Sagan, 2 (Winter 1983/4) 257–92. Sagan reports that ‘A threshold exists at which the climatic catastrophe could be triggered, very roughly around 500–2000 strategic warheads.’ In 1985, the two major powers jointly possessed about 20,000 strategic nuclear weapons and about 60,000 nuclear weapons in total.
- Fuller , John G. 1984 . See, for instance, The Day We Bombed Utah (New York: New American Library for an account of effects of atomic testing on citizens in Utah and Nevada. In The Nuclear Barons (New York: Avon Books 1981), James Spigelman and Peter Pringle offer further information. See especially chapters 4, 12, and 19, and extensive documentation. There is absolutely no reason to think that other nuclear weapons states have been more careful of citizens' welfare than has the United States.
- 1983 . For instance, Admiral Carroll, who was for 2½ years in charge of the all the American nuclear weapons in Europe, told me in private conversation in the spring of that nuclear weapons could not defend Europe. They would destroy Europe.
- New York Review of Books This is, in effect, admitted by those who complain of the new power of Japan and West Germany, which has its source in economic and cultural factors. See, for example, Murray Sayle's article on American reactions to Japanese cultural resistance to American versions of free enterprise in ‘Japan Victorious,’ (March 28, 1985) 33–40. Many countries are concerned about the amazing strength of American pop culture, which seems to have incredible appeal nearly everywhere. While their foreign policy efforts and military efforts may fail, Americans see their culture effortlessly ‘win,’ as rock music, Coke, and jeans spread around the globe. A recent newspaper report predicts a hamburger stand outside the Ming Tomb.
- Jervis , Robert . ‘Deterrence and Perception,’ . International Security , 7 3 – 30 . 3 (Winter 1983–4)
- Herken , Gregg . 1982 . The Winning Weapon 48 New York : Vintage Books .
- Bundy , McGeorge . 1985 . “ The Myth of Atomic Diplomacy, as printed in ” . In Harper's 23 – 4 . (January
- 1984 . ‘Moral Skepticism and International Relations,’ . Philosophy and Public Affairs , 13 : 299 – 346 . An excellent analysis of this doctrine may be found in Marshall Cohen, 4 (Fall