References
- Hughes , G. E. 1982 . John Buridan on Self-Reference: Chapter eight of Buridan's Sophismata, with a translation, an introduction, and a philosophical commentary Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . (Paperback edition does not contain Latin text.)
- Scott , T. K. 1966 . John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts . (Hughes says his translation differs from Scott's on some points; Scott's, however, seems quite useable.)
- Prior , A. N. 1962 . ‘Some Problems of Self-Reference in John Buridan,’ . Proceedings of the British Academy , 48 : 241 – 59 . 281–96; reprinted in J.N. Findlay, ed., Studies in Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press 1966)
- Wahrheitsbegriff Tarski, in a footnote in the makes a bow to nominalism, suggesting that his syntactic axioms (which imply the existence of infinitely many formulas) may have a nominalistic interpretation if we are willing to count formula-shaped regions of space as formulas whether or not they are linked in (a suggestion taken up by Goodman and Quine a decade later, and already implicitly rejected a decade earlier by Hilbert because of its presuppositions about physical space).
- 1960 . I have known about this counterexample to Buridan's analysis since I was a student, in the late s. I would not be surprised to learn that it was originally advanced by one of Buridan's contemporaries.
- 1976 . ‘Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski’ . (Journal of Symbolic Logic , 41 : 222 – 62 . Church's [] 747–60; reprinted in R.L. Martin, ed., Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984] 289–306) gives an elegant introduction to the Russellian approach. Russell's own best statement is his widely reprinted ‘Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types,’ American Journal of Mathematics 30 (1908)
- Guenthner , F. and Gabbay , D. , eds. 1983 . Handbook of Philosophical Logic Reidel : Dordrecht . Most twentieth-century approaches can be thought of either as following Russell in distinguishing types (or levels of language, or some related notion), or as proposing a type-free theory based on a nonclassical logic. In the concluding section of my article ‘Predicative Logics’ (in vol. I [] 331–407), I suggested that some of Russell's own remarks could be seen as foreshadowing a theory of the latter sort.
- Burge , T. 1979 . ‘Semantical Paradox,’ . Journal of Philosophy , 76 : 83 – 117 . 169–98; reprinted in Martin
- 1974 . ‘The Liar Paradox,’ . Journal of Philosophical Logic , 3 Perhaps the most insightful recent essay on the topic is Charles Parsons's 381–412; reprinted in Martin, 7–45, and in Parsons's own Mathematics in Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983), 221–67. The ‘Postscript’ written for its reprinting in Mathematics in Philosophy contains, inter alia, a clearer exposition of Burge's view than Burge's own paper.