References
- This is a revised and expanded version of my ‘Care and Respect,’ in Susan Coultrap-McQuin and Eve Browning Cole, eds., Explorations in Feminist Ethics: Theory and Practice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press forthcoming). Ancestral versions of this paper were presented at the University of Minnesota-Duluth's Conference ‘Explorations in Feminist Ethics’; at the 1989 meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs; at the 1989 Central Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association; and at the Lehigh Valley Feminist Research Group. I have benefited greatly from the discussions in these sessions. I am especially grateful to Marilyn Friedman, my respondent at the APA Central Division session, for her insightful criticisms and suggestions. I have also benefited from comments by Edmund Abegg, Kurt Baier, Gordon Beam, Aaron Ben-Zeev, Ann Cudd, Janet Fleetwood, John Hare, Ralph Lindgren, and Jean Rumsey, and from discussions with Annette Baier, David Gauthier, and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
- Baier , Annette C. 1987 . “ ‘The Need For More Than Justice,’ in ” . In Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory Calgary : University of Calgary Press . !Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, (56
- Noddings , Nel . 1984 . Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education Berkeley , CA : University of California Press . (4
- Kant , Immanual . 1964 . The Doctrine of Virtue Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press . Mary Gregor, trans. (116
- Gilligan , Carol . 1982 . In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . and ‘Moral Orientation and Moral Development,’ in Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 1987) 19–33. Seyla Benhabib explicitly contrasts care and respect in ‘The Generalized and The Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory,’ in Women and Moral Theory 164.
- ‘mere Kant 134. A few sentences earlier Kant refers to them as duties of love.’
- The Doctrine of Virtue See ‘Conclusion of the Doctrine of Elements: The Union of Love and Respect in Friendship,’ in, 140–5.
- 1990 . Women and Moral Theory 101 – 8 . Such a view is suggested by, for example, Virginia Held, ‘Feminism and Moral Theory,’ in 111–28; Marilyn Friedman, ‘Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender,’ in Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory 109; Claudia Card, ‘Caring and Evil,’ Hypatia 5 Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine, and Alexandra Hewer, Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to Critics (Basel: S. Karger 1983), 220–1. For a discussion of Carol Gilligan's views on this issue, see Lawrence A. Blum, ‘Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,’ Ethics 98 (1988) 472–91.
- It might seem that not everything worth attending to has its own worth, not everything we respect is something we value. For we respect dangerous and fearsome things: the prudent sailor has a healthy respect for the sea, the tennis player has a healthy respect for her opponent's backhand, the lion tamer has a healthy respect for his animals. In each case, it is the dangerousness of the object that seems to call us to respect it, making respect akin to fear. However, this is not an adequate understanding of such cases, as David Gauthier pointed out to me. For in such cases the fearsome element of the object is part of what makes the object valuable to us. Thus the sailor respects the sea in part because of its power not only to give but also to take away; it is her powerful backhand that makes the tennis opponent a great player and a worthy opponent; and part of what attracts the lion tamer to her profession is the excitement of facing the danger her animals pose. Moreover, while there may be an element of fear in some forms of respect, we do not respect those fearsome things that we view as having no worth at all in virtue of their dangerousness, such as the AIDS virus or nuclear waste.
- ‘Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons,’ . American Philosophical Quarterly , 12 309 I draw here on Carl Cranor, (1975,–19
- Hudson , Stephen D. 1980 . ‘The Nature of Respect,’ . Social Theory and Practice , 6 : 69 – 90 .
- There may, however, be an appraisal behind the other varieties of respect. For example, institutional respect for a country's flag may involve viewing it as the symbol of a great country. Moreover, disrespect for such institutional symbols as flags, presidents, and judges is often an expression of our lack of evaluative respect for the institutions they represent. Similarly, directive-respecting a person's advice may involve having evaluative respect for her as an advice-giver. However, the institutional or directive respect itself does not consist in an appraisal of the relative quality of the flag or the advice; and we can respect the flag of a country we despise and respect advice we think is poor.
- Darwall , Stephen L. 1977 . ‘Two Kinds of Respect,’ . Ethics , 88 : 36 – 49 . Darwall does not distinguish varieties of his two kinds.
- but it cannot do this. (See, for example, Carl Cranor, ‘On Respecting Human Beings as Persons,’ . Journal of Value Inquiry , 17 103 One complaint that has been raised against the notion of a principle of respect for persons is that such a principle ought to tell us precisely how to treat persons, (1983,–17, and Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1990), 264–9.) One of the implications of my argument is that this view misconceives the function of the notion of respect for persons. The concept of respect does not contain the resources for telling us how to treat persons; its function is rather to keep in the forefront of moral consciousness the attitude of valuing persons for their own sake and so to remind us of the reasons why we should treat persons as morality obliges us to treat them. To place a principle of respect for persons at the heart of morality is to say that our moral attention ought in the first instance to be focused on persons in virtue of their fundamental worth, rather than, for example, on actions, consequences, rules, duties, or social cooperation.
- Gruzalski , Bart . 1982 . Respect for Persons (Tulane Studies in Philosophy Edited by: Green , O. H. New Orleans : Tulane University Press . It is worth noting that although we don't usually think of utilitarianism as dealing in respect for persons, my account entails that utilitarians can in a sense rightly claim to respect persons by taking each into account in determining the overall good. That is to say, utilitarian respect for persons is yet another conception of recognition respect for persons. However, it is a conception of respect which may be seen to focus on treatment rather than attitude insofar as utilitarian reasons for moral conduct have to do with the intrinsic value of states of affairs rather than the intrinsic moral value of persons. That the worth of persons is not in the forefront of utilitarian concern may be what underlies the belief that utilitarianism does not have a respect-for-persons principle. For a discussion of utilitarian respect, see ‘Two Accounts of Our Obligations to Respect Persons,’ in 31 [] 77–89).
- Feinberg , Joel , ed. 1969 . Moral Concepts 153 – 71 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . I draw these elements primarily from the following: Bernard Williams, ‘The Idea of Equality,’ in Elizabeth Spelman, ‘On Treating Persons as Persons,’ Ethics 88 (1977) 150–61; R.S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, Respect for Persons (London: Allen and Unwin 1969); Elizabeth Maclaren, ‘Dignity,’ Journal of Medical Ethics 3 (1977) 40–1; and Lorraine Code, ‘Persons and Others,’ in Judith Genova, ed., Power, Gender, and Values (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing 1987) 143–61.
- 1986 . In a Different Voice 340 – 51 . I have relied primarily on the following: Carol Gilligan, and ‘Moral Orientation’; Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other’; Nel Noddings, Caring; Virginia Held, ‘Feminism and Moral Theory’; Marilyn Friedman, ‘Beyond Caring’; Sara Ruddick, ‘Maternal Thinking,’ in Marilyn Pearsall, ed., Women and Values (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Margaret Urban Walker, ‘Moral Understandings: An Alternative “Epistemology” for a Feminist Ethics,’ Hypatia 4 (1989) 15–28; and Lorraine Code, ‘Second Persons,’ in Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory 357–82.
- 1976 . The Identities of Persons 197 – 216 . Berkeley , CA : University of California Press . In addition to those mentioned in note 16, above, see Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality,’ in !Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 1981); Robert Paul Wolff, ‘There's Nobody Here But Us Persons,’ in Carol C. Gould and Marx Wartofsky, eds., Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation (New York: Perigee/Putnam 1976) 128–44; Edward Johnson, ‘Ignoring Persons’ in Respect for Persons 91–105; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1982).
- Rader , Melvin . 1964 . Ethics and the Human Community 157 New York : Holt, Rinehart, and Winston . quoted in John E. Atwell, ‘Kant's Notion of Respect for Persons,’ in Respect for Persons, 22
- Gilligan , Carol . 1984 . ‘The Conquistador and the Dark Continent: Reflections on the Psychology of Love,’ . Daedalus , 113 (77
- Meyers , Diana T. “ ‘The Socialized Individual and Individual Autonomy: An Intersection between Philosophy and Psychology,’ in ” . In Women and Moral Theory 146
- 1981 . Philosophical Explanations 452 – 7 . Cambridge , MA : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press . In what follows, I draw on Robert Nozick
- Murdoch , Iris . 1970 . The Sovereignty of Good London : Routledge & Kegan Paul . (See also Lawrence A. Blum, ‘Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral,’ Philosophical Studies 50 (1986) 343–67.
- Clarke , Stanley G. , ed. 1989 . “‘Finely Aware and Richly Responsible”: Literature and the Moral Imagination,’ in ” . In Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism 128 – 9 . Albany , NY : State University of New York Press . Martha Craven Nussbaum and Evan Simpson
- 1964 . Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 102 – 3 . See Kant's discussion of dignity and irreplaceability in, H.J. Paton, trans. (New York: Harper and Row
- Journal of Social Philosophy , 20 91 Marilyn Friedman raised this objection in her commentary on an earlier version of this paper. Alison Jaggar has also articulated this concern in ‘Feminist Ethics: Some Issues for the Nineties,’ (1989,–107
- See also Lorraine Code's illuminating discussion in ‘Persons and Others.’
- Maclagan , W. G. 1960 . ‘Respect for Persons as a Moral Principle— I,’ . Philosophy , 35 : 193 – 217 . and ‘Respect for Persons as a Moral Principle— II,’ Philosophy 351960 289–305
- Blum , Lawrence A. See ‘Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral.’
- Two related worries lurk here: first, that care respect seems to entail an obligation to help others to promote even their morally heinous ends; and second, that care respect, like care, seems not only to demand too much, impossibly much, from us, but also to call for self-destructive self-sacrifice of care-takers and care-respecters. For taking care of the very many needy others and improving the well-bring of the innumerably many whose lives call for improvement would leave us with few resources for pursuing our own ends. More significantly, the other-centeredness of both care and care respect seems to deny intrinsic worth to the care-givers and care-respecter: we have value, it seems, only insofar as we contribute to others. But while this second concern may be a real problem in the conception of care, it is not so in the case of care respect. For respect is not other-focused, it is person-focused; and its vision encompasses oneself equally with others. I require my own care respect; and the demand to respect myself and maintain my self-respect constrains the demands which care respect for others can make of me. Further, because care respect regards all persons as equally valuable, equally worthy of care and of protection from harm, it cannot countenance sacrificing the well-being of one for the sake of another. Care respect for one is thus constrained by the demand to care respect all.
- I owe this point to Ralph Lindgren.