Can Philosophy Exist?

References

• Strawson and Grice . 1956 . “ ‘In Defence of a Dogma,’ ” . In Philosophical Review (
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• 1992 . Realism and Reason I owe the term to Mark Johnston, Objectivity Refigured,’ forthcoming in J. Haldane & C. Wright, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press
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• 1992 . Realism and Reason Iowe the term to Mark Johnston, ‘Objectivity Refigured,’ forthcoming in J. Haldane & C. Wright, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press
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• 1992 . Mind , 101 This argument finds forceful expression in Stephen Stich, ‘What is A Theory of Mental Representation?’
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• 1991 . Proceedings of the British Academy , 76 For an excellent diagnosis of this trend, see Edward Craig, ‘Advice to Philosophers: Three New Leaves to Turn Over,’ (265–81.
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• Hume , David . Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Human Understanding Section I
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• 1991 . Meaning Scepticism I was pleased to find an excellent statement of the position in Elizabeth Fricker's ‘Analyticity, Linguistic Practice, and Philosophical Method,’ in Klaus Puhl, ed. (New York: De Gruyter
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• 1993 . Essays in Quasi-Realism New York : Oxford University Press . I am not here suggesting that obviousness is in any way sufficient for a ‘folk’ verdict of ‘analytic.’ But it may be necessary. See ‘Morals and Modals,’ in my
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• 1966 . Kant's Analytic Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Jonathan Bennett defended the practice of Strawsonian metaphysics as the iteration of obvious steps to unobvious conclusions, for example in his (I do not pretend to refute the theoretical possibility here, but there is something Sorites-like about it in all the philosophical cases I know. As in a Sorites, outside mathematical and formal contexts it tends to be unobvious that you can agglomerate all the obvious steps.
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• Hereafter I shall talk of properties, to avoid repetition, but the points made apply, I believe, to philosophical searches for identity of states, events, things, and even kinds.
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• 1991 . Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 63 The phrase is Mark Johnston's; see his ‘Dispositional Theories of Value,’ Supplementary Volume (1989 139–74. See also Philip Pettit, ‘Realism and Response Dependence,’ Mind 100 and for an excellent treatment, see the papers in Response Dependent Concepts, Peter Menzies, ed. (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences 1991).
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• Rorty , Richard . 1982 . “ ‘Keeping Philosophy Pure,’ in ” . In Consequences of Pragmatism Minneapolis , MN : University of Minnesota Press . 34
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• 1988 . Contingencies of Value Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . This is one of the messages of Barbara Herrnstein Smith
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• 1989 . Doing What Comes Naturally Durham : Duke University Press . This is a point pressed by Stanley Fish in many essays: for example, ‘Consequences’ in
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• 1990 . Proceedings This rather enigmatic instruction is filled out in my ‘Enchanting Views,’ forthcoming in the of the St. Andrews Conference honoring Hilary Putnam.
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