References
- 1his paper is a revised and expanded version of a talk given at the A.P.A. Western Division meeting, 1991, under the title ‘Knowledge as an Object of Theory.’ I would like to thank my co-symposiasts, Robert Audi and Mark Kaplan, as well as members of the audience, for a stimulating discussion. A much earlier version was presented at a conference on realism at the Forum fiir Philosophie Bad Homburg. A shortened version of that talk is to appear in German in an anthology edited by Wolfgang Kohler. For a full exposition and defense of the ideas sketched here, see my forthcoming book Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism (Oxford: Blackwell1992).
- Stroud , Barry . 1989 . “ Knowledge and Skepticism ” . In ‘Understanding Human Knowledge in General,’ Edited by: Clay , M. and Lehrer , K. Boulder , CO : Westview Press . in, eds., 32. Cited below as ‘Understanding.’
- Nagel , Thomas . 1986 . The View from Nowhere Oxford : Oxford University Press . 231. Cited below as View.
- 1989 . Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . 73f. Cited below as Contingency.
- Stroud , Barry . 1984 . The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism Oxford : Oxford University Press . 168. Cited below as Significance.
- Significance 209
- Significance 81 – 2 .
- 1982 . Consequences of Pragmatism Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press . See the introduction to Rorty's (See also Contingency, Ch. 1.
- Williams , Bernard . 1978 . Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry Harmondsworth : Pelican . 64
- View 71,92
- 1988 . Review of Metaphysics But maybe not in its ancient, Pyrrhonian form. See my ‘Skepticism without Theory,’
- 1977 . Groundless Belief Oxford : Blackwell . As I perhaps did in
- ‘Understanding,’ 32
- ‘Understanding,’ 49
- Grice , H. P. and Strawson , G. 1956 . “ ‘In Defense of a Dogma,’ ” . In Philosophical Review (Grice and Strawson over-estimated the degree of consensus which never extended beyond a narrow range of text-book examples.
- I am grateful to Simon Blackburn for this way of putting things.
- Gettier , Edmund . 1963 . “ ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ ” . In Analysis (
- Austin , J. L. 1961 . “ ‘Other Minds’ in ” . In Philosophical Papers 51 Oxford : Oxford University Press . 44–84. See esp.—7.
- Unnatural Doubts Formal foundationalism is sometimes thought to contrast with coherentist theories of knowledge justification. However, I am dubious about the traditional contrast between foundationalism and the coherence theory. See ch. 7.
- 1981 . Descarte s: Philosophical Letters This is what Descartes has in mind when he refers to ‘the order of reasons.’ He writes, ‘I do not follow the order of topics but the order of arguments… [In] orderly reasoning from easier matters to more difficult matters I make what deductions I can, first on one topic, then on another’ (Letter to Mersenne [24 December, 1640], quoted from Anthony Kenny ed., [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press ], 87).
- Wittgenstein , Ludwig . 1969 . On Certainty New York : Harper . ¶ 250. Cited below by OC and paragraph number.
- OC 53
- OC 88
- OC 163
- OC 235
- OC 341 – 3 .
- OC 318, emphasis in original. Cf. the metaphor of the river bed at 95–8.
- Unnatural Doubts I discuss the nature of philosophical reflection, particularly its connection with the setting aside of ‘practical’ considerations in ch. 5.