Methodological Individualism and Reductionism in Biology

References

• Feigl , H. , eds. 1958 . Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 2 , 3 – 36 . Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press . The ‘etc.’ here covers something of a difficulty, in that there are many more complex objects composed of molecules. One possible continuation continues with cells, multicellular organism, and social groups. See Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, ‘The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis,’ in
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• This brief account is oversimplified in several respects. First, I say nothing about the nature of laws except to treat them as constituents of theories. For purposes of this discussion, I am treating a theory as encompassing all the laws applicable to a particular level. Second, the derivations to which I refer will clearly require premises identifying objects at higher levels with structures of objects at lower levels, what are often referred to as ‘bridge principles.’ I say nothing about these here, though it will be clear from the discussion in the text that often these will not be available. Third, I am assuming that sub-atomic particles are the smallest parts of matter. But things might turn out to have no smallest parts and be infinitely and arbitrarily divisible. If this should prove to be the case, reductionism would require that a theory of some level of (small) objects be deducible merely from a theory of stuff.
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• 1993 . The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science 4 – 6 . Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . This argument against reductionism, with special emphasis on biological contexts, is developed in more detail in my book chs.
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• The Disorder of Things I treat this issue at length in chs. 1 and 2.
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• I am assuming in this discussion that we are considering only human hemoglobin. Of course, the term is normally also applied to functionally homologous substances in a wide variety of organisms. This extension would vastly increase the chemical diversity I have been describing.
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• Waters , C. K. 1990 . “ ‘Why the Anti-Reductionist Consensus Won't Survive: The Case of Classical Mendelian Genetics,’ in ” . In PSA 1990 Edited by: Fine , A. 125 – 39 . East Lansing , MI : Philosophy of Science Association .
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• 1982 . The Extended Phenotype 21 Oxford : Oxford University Press .
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• 1976 . The Selfish Gene Oxford : Oxford University Press . Notably in and in The Extended Phenotype.
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• The Disorder of Things A difficulty with this pluralistic conception of the levels at which entities can be causally efficacious comes from the assumption that there is some level (typically the microscopic) at which a totalizing causal account can, in principle, be given. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper, but I address them in part 3.
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• 1985 . The Nature of Selection Cambridge , MA : MIT Press . Such a pluralistic account has been developed in detail by Elliott Sober,. Unfortunately, I wholly disagree with the account of causality on which Sober bases this account. Indeed, I suspect that Sober's account is not even ultimately compatible with genuine pluralism of causally efficacious structural levels.
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• Kitcher , Philip . 1982 . ‘Genes,’ . British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 33 : 337 – 59 .
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