On Singular Propositions

References

• Almog , Joseph , Perry , John and Wettstein , Howard , eds. 1989 . Themes from Kaplan 135 – 64 . New York/Oxford : Oxford University Press . I rely here on David Kaplan, ‘Afterthoughts,’ in 565–614, at 569, where Kaplan quotes from a letter written by Kripke in clarification of earlier formulations. For these, see: Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1980) and ‘Identity and Necessity,’ in Milton K. Munitz, ed., Identity and Individuation (New York: New York University Press 1971)
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• The conditions are independent: ‘the actor Paul Newman’ satisfies the second but not the first, and ‘the x such that x = Paul Newman if he exists and x = 9 otherwise’ satisfies the first but not the second.
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• Naming and Necessity The schema is a modification of one given by Kripke. See 25 n 3.
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• 1990 . Descriptions Cambridge , Ma : MIT Press . For an explanation of the phrase, and of the associated view, see Stephen Neale, Chapter 2.
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• Naming and Necessity See 7–8. Kripke does allow that a terminology “according to which uses of phonetically the same sounds to name distinct objects count as distinct names. may have a great deal to recommend it for theoretical purposes,” even though it “certainly does not agree with the most common usage.”
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• Salmon , Nathan . 1981 . Reference and Essence 34 Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press .
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• Salmon , Compare . Reference and Essence , 35 where it is said that “singular terms formed from the variable-binding definite descriptions operator. can denote something with respect to a given possible world only if that thing exists in the given possible world.”
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• Smith , A. D. 1987 . ‘Semantical Considerations on Rigid Designation,’ . Mind , 96 See 83–92, at 86.
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• Hintikka , J. , Moravcsik , J. and Suppes , P. , eds. 1973 . Approaches to Natural Language Reidel : Dordrecht . Thus David Kaplan, ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice,’ in 490–518, at 503.
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• Naming and Necessity 78 – 9 . See
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• A System of Logic I, ii, 5
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• 140
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• 1903 . The Principles of Mathematics Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . See (2nd edn., London: Allen and Unwin 1937), esp. Appendix A; and The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, IV, Foundations of Logic: 1903–05, edited by Alasdair Urquhart, with the assistance of Albert C. Lewis (London and New York: Routledge 1994), Part III.
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• 1961 . Synthese , 13 : 5 – 23 . See her ‘Modalities and Intensional Languages,’ 303–30, reprinted in Modalities (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993)
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• 1975 . Journal of Philosophy , 78 ‘How to Russell a Frege-Church,’ 716–29. Reprinted in Michael J. Loux, ed., The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1979) 210–24. The passage is at 217 of Loux.
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• 1905 . Mind , 14 In ‘On Denoting,’ 479–93, Russell gave up the doctrine that proper names are purely designative, but continued to hold that there are singular propositions. Even after his abandonment of propositions, which occurred not much later, true singular propositions in effect remained in his ontology, in the guise of certain ‘facts,’ or ‘complexes.’
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• It might be said that the words ‘piece of chalk’ serve merely to aid in the identification of the object of reference and hence that the proposition asserted requires for its truth only that the object of reference, whether or not it is a piece of chalk, be white. I am inclined to disagree, on the ground that what is said cannot correctly be said to be unqualifiedly true unless the object referred to is a piece of chalk. But I doubt that much hangs on the point.
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• 1920 . The Concept of Nature Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Compare A.N. Whitehead, Chapter II.
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• McGuinness , B. , ed. 1979 . Posthumous Writings The form of expression discussed here is sufficiently hard to avoid that even enemies of singular propositions sometimes fall into its use. Frege, hardly a friend of singular propositions, lapses on a couple of occasions. Thus: “It is not necessary that the person who feels cold should himself give utterance to the thought that he feels cold. Another person can do this by using a name to designate the one who feels cold.” trans. Peter Long and Roger White, with the assistance of Raymond Hargreaves [Oxford: Blackwell], 134–5. My emphasis.) And: “Now everyone is presented to himself in a special and primitive way, in which he is presented to no one else. So, when Dr. Lauven has the thought that he was wounded.” (Collected Papers, trans. M. Black, et al. [Oxford: Blackwell 1984], 359. My emphasis.)
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• The Principles of Mathematics Russell did not use ‘prepositional function’ consistently, even within the confines of a single book. I follow the use described at 508–10 of though of course there are others in that book.
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• 1966 . Lectures on Philosophy 129 – 31 . London : Allen & Unwin . I think it is fair to attribute this view to Moore. See his Casimir Lewy, ed.
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• On this point I have benefited from discussions with Aviv Hoffman, though he is firmly opposed to the position toward which I am inclined.
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• 1962 . Commonplace Book London : Allen and Unwin . Compare G.E. Moore, Casimir Lewy, ed., 262.
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