References
- Kanigel , Robert . 1997 . The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency New York : Viking . Cf. reviewed by George F. Will in the New York Times Book Review, June 15, 1997.
- 1976 . MW: The Middle Works, 1899–1924 Carbondale , IL : Southern Illinois University Press . I employ the following abbreviations in citing Dewey, often citing both a popular edition and the collected works: !Jo Ann Boydston (–83) LW: The Later Works, 1925–1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981–91) HNC: Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1930) Logic: Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Irvington, 1982 [1938]) PP: The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt, 1927) PW: John Dewey: The Political Writings, ed. Debra Morris and Ian Shapiro (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993) TOV: The Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) The quotation in the text is from Dewey, “The Need for Recovery of Philosophy” (1917) in PW 6–7. See also HNC 198, MW 14:138.
- MW , 14 Cf. HNC 277,189.
- 1994 . The Promise of Pragmatism Chicago : University of Chicago Press . On Lippmann and his relation to Dewey on this issue, see John Patrick Diggins, Chapter 8.
- PP 202 – 3 . Dewey, See p. 208 for the proviso about informed experts.
- PP 45
- See, e.g., Dewey, “The Logic of Judgments of Practice,” M W 8:47.
- TOV , 41 Dewey, MW 13:228. Cf. Logic 175–76, LW 12:179.
- Anton , J. P. and Preus , A. , eds. 1991 . Logic, LW Vol. 12 , Albany , NY : SUNY Press . Dewey, “The Logic of Judgments of Practice,” MW 8:38. Cf.17: “Rationality as an abstract conception is precisely the generalized idea of the means-consequence relation as such.” It does seem clear that Aristotle's bouleusis, normally translated as “deliberation,” is limited to the selection of means (including constitutive means) to given ends: cf. Thomas Tuozzo, “Aristotelian Deliberation Is Not of Ends,” in Essays on Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 4: Aristotle's Ethics. The question, however, is whether Aristotle would allow for practical reasoning about final ends.
- MW , 14 146
- TOV , 49 “Growth”: MW 14:194. “The cultivation of interests”: LW 7:208. “Coordination or unified organization”: LW 13:234.
- 1968 . Wertrationalität 24 – 26 . I refer to Weber's contrast between Zweckrationalität in Economy and Society 1.2 (Berkeley: University of California Press
- 1992 . Aufgeklärtes Eigeninteresse Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp . In n. 36, Stefan Gosepath notes that Weber's initial definition of Zweckrationalität in Economy and Society 1.2 allows for weighing ends against each other.
- Diggins . The Promise of Pragmatism 242
- 1994 . Practical Reasoning about Final Ends New York : Cambridge University Press . The material in this section revisits some points made in my Section 23.
- The Quest for Certainty, LW , 4 222 – 28 . See, for example,124, TOV 40–50, LW 13:226–36
- 1939 . New Leader 205 – 6 . First published in October 21, reprinted in PW
- Diggins . The Promise of Pragmatism 272
- TOV Dewey develops this notion of an end-in-view in HNC.
- 1996 . Towards Justice and Virtue Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . By itself, then, the context-embeddedness of deliberation does not rule out, for example, natural-law views of human ends, which might simply hold that all rational ends-in-view are contextualized specifications of essential human goods. That abstractions are allowed and indeed indispensable despite contextuality is well argued by Onora O'Neill in
- HNC 187 – 88 . 274, MW 14:
- Aristotle . Nichomachean Ethics 1139a35—b4. For good reason, Dewey departs from Aristotle in suggesting that even productive actions may be treated as activities valuable for their own sake: see HNC 271, MW 14:186.
- HNC 269 MW 14:184.
- 1995 . Philosophy & Public Affairs , 24 : 108 – 41 . See my “Beyond Good and Right: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism,”:
- HNC 226 MW 14:156.
- HNC 226 MW 14:156.
- 1992 . Practical Reasoning about Final Ends 327 – 52 . I develop these distinctions more at length in Section 7, and interpret the relevant text of Aristotle in “Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 30:
- HNC 236 MW 14:162.
- HNC 223 – 24 . MW 14:154–55
- Practical Reasoning about Final Ends I argue this point in Part 4.
- HNC 232 MW 14:159.
- 1991 . Truth and the End of Inquiry Oxgord : Oxford University Press . Cf. C.J. Misak, Chapter 1.
- Putnam , Hilary . 1995 . Pragmatism Oxford : Blackwell . Cf. Lecture 1.
- Rorty , Richard . 1982 . The Consequences of Pragmatism Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press . See, e.g.
- Dewey . 1908 . Ethics MW 5: 259.
- HNC 287 MW 14:198.
- HNC 293 MW 14:202.
- HNC 283 MW 14:196.
- Nicomachean Ethics See my “Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle” for an interpretation of the along these lines.
- Cahn , Steven M. , ed. 1977 . New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey 149 – 71 . Hanover : University Press of New England . I modify the sort of interpretive suggestion made by James Rachels in “Dewey and the Truth about Ethics,” in
- 1995 . Dewey's Ethical Thought Ithaca : Cornell University Press . Dewey himself was hostile to the linguistic turn of mid-century Anglo-American philosophy. Cf. Jennifer Welchman, 1.
- Honneth , Axel . 1998 . “Between Proceduralism and Teleology: An Unresolved Conflict in Dewey's Moral Theory,” . Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society , 34 : 689 – 711 .
- Dewey's reluctance to admit any role for ultimate ends thus explains why he was not able to embrace the sort of “constructive ethical pragmatism” for which I argue in “Beyond Good and Right.”
- The tensions mentioned in this paragraph are well set out by Diggins.
- Cullity , Garrett and Gaut , Berys , eds. 1997 . Ethics and Practical Reason 81 – 99 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . I am indebted to Elijah Millgram for the thought in this paragraph. See also James Dreier, “Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality,” in
- Practical Reasoning about Final Ends I develop the case against the presuppositions of this worry in Sections 20 and 29, in the course of defending the importance of coherence.
- The Promise of Pragmatism Dewey's tendency to proceduralism is emphasized by, e.g., Diggins, and Honneth, “Between Proceduralism and Teleology.”
- The Promise of Pragmatism 331 – 42 . I draw my description of Lippmann from Diggins, esp.
- PW 33
- Ibid., 35.
- Putnam . Pragmatism 69 – 70 .
- Dewey . Logic , 160 LW 12:162; emphasis Dewey's.
- Welchman . Dewey's Ethical Thought note 5.
- Dewey . 1945 . Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude New York : Rhinehart . [1917]), 7; as quoted in Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, 262f.
- 1996 . Ethics , 106 This pair of distinctions is well laid out by J. David Velleman, “The Possibility of Practical Reason,”: 694–726, note 721. Velleman's lucid article spurred my thinking at many points, often ones at which I disagree with him.
- Diggins . 1938 . The Promise of Pragmatism , 227 citing Dewey, Experience and Nature, 87–89, and The Logic of Inquiry (New York, 8.
- Practical Reasoning about Final Ends I say “truth” rather than “truths” or “true beliefs” in order to signal that the idea of truth has some structure, to which I will come shortly. The aim is not a quantitative one of amassing atomistic truths. The role of this end is rather that of orienting and regulating than of describing something to be maximized. For parallel reasons, I would speak of “the good” rather than “good actions.” On the regulative function of final ends, see my Section 7.
- Diggins . The Promise of Pragmatism Cf. 229. I give conceptual (not textual) grounds, below, for thinking that a good Deweyan would not elide truth with that of which the evidence warrants the assertion.
- 1978 . Meaning and the Moral Sciences 279 – 328 . Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul . Cf., e.g., Hilary Putnam, “Realism and Reason,” in 123–40; Donald Davidson, “The Structure and Content of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990):
- Truth and the End of Inquiry. This point is well set out by C.J. Misak in
- Velleman . “The Possibility of Practical Reason,” note 706. Velleman is confident that truth, otherwise understood, can serve as a substantive end for theoretical reasoning. He does not, however, explain his alternative interpretation of truth.
- Pragmatism In 20f., Putnam suggests that this combination of anti-scepticism and fallibilism is pragmatism's most distinctive feature.
- Dewey . Logic , 178 LW 12:179; emphasis Dewey's.
- Practical Reasoning about Final Ends esp. Chapters 4 and 10.
- Broadie , Sarah . 1991 . Ethics with Aristotle New York : Oxford University Press . Cf. 198.1 criticize Broadie's view in Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, 194, 217.
- See note 9 above.
- N.E. I defend this interpretation of the in “Degrees of Finality and the Highest Good in Aristotle.”
- I defend this judgment in “Beyond Good and Right.”
- Practical Reasoning about Final Ends That the specification could have been undertaken in a practical setting, and not just in the philosopher's armchair, I argue in Section 32.
- Putnam , Hilary . 1981 . Reason, Truth, and History 134 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press .
- Practical Reasoning about Final Ends I here aim to close a gap in the argument of at p. 267.
- Reason, Truth, and History. My thoughts in this paragraph owe a long-term debt to Putnam's
- Horwich , Paul . 1990 . Truth Oxford : Basil Blackwell . See, e.g.
- Brandom , Robert B. 1994 . Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . xiv and passim.
- See my “Beyond Good and Right.”
- Cohen , Joshua . 1986 . “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy,” . In Ethics Edited by: Bohman , J. and Rehg , W. Vol. 97 , 349 – 82 . See, e.g., (October: 26–38; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); David Estlund, “Who's Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strategic/deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence,” Texas Law Review 71 (1993): 1437–77; and my “Democratic Intentions,” in Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997)
- I defend this claim in “Democratic Deliberation about Final Ends,” in progress.
- Dewey . Logic , 178 LW 12:179.
- 1908 . Ethics Compare Dewey's view of the social good as the “substance” of the most inclusive good: e.g., MW 5:261.
- Dewey . PP 208
- Putnam . Pragmatism 72 – 74 .
- Diggins . The Promise of Pragmatism 193
- Ibid., 192.
- I argue this point in “Democratic Intentions.”
- 1996 . American Political Science Review , 90 : 1 – 15 . Mark E. Warren makes this case persuasively in “Deliberative Democracy and Authority,”:
- Practical Reasoning about Final Ends Chapter 8.
- Dewey's Ethical Thought In 185–89, Welchman argues that the plumbing of emotional responses is the principal role of imaginative rehearsal, which hence was intended to respond to Lippmann's charge that pragmatism made insufficient place for the emotions. She concludes, partly on this basis, that imaginative rehearsal is not the only method of deliberation that Dewey recognizes.
- Honneth . 1932 . Ethics Cf. “Between Proceduralism and Teleology,” citing the LW 7:163,165f.
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