Feminism, Friendship, and Philosophy

References

• Of course, I have now implicitly generated a meta-question about the appropriateness of using traditional analytic tools of conceptual analysis in order to understand the nature of an area of inquiry that may reject the methodological presuppositions of ‘mainstream’ analytic ethics. Here we have yet another reason for not venturing to undertake such a project.
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• 1989 . Theory of Knowledge, , 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs , NJ : Prentice Hall . I have borrowed the distinction between methodological generalism and methodological particularism from Roderick Chisholm's discussion of the problem of the criterion. See his 6–7. (I would like to thank Richard Fumerton for suggesting that Chisholm's distinction would be helpful to me in the present context.)
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• Hooker , Brad and Little , Margaret , eds. 2000 . Moral Particularism Oxford : Clarendon Press . What I am here calling ‘particularism’ is not to be confused with the view that is now often discussed under that label, i.e., the view that there are no general moral truths or, at least, that there are no general truths that we can come to know. The particularism that I here describe is entirely methodological in nature. For discussions both for and against the other kind of particularism, see
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• For discussion of these difficulties, see my and Thomas Williams’ “We Hold These Truths to be Self-Evident: A Defense of Intuitionism.”
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• Clack , Beverley , ed. 1999 . Misogyny in the Western Philosophical Tradition New York : Routledge . For a small sampling of the invective that male philosophers have directed at women, page through
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• 1994 . Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . The title of Annette Baier's now famous piece, “What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?”, in her 1–17, seems to suggest an endorsement of this meta-ethical feminist tack.
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• Much depends here on the theory of truth that is accepted— there is often some vagueness as to what the status of moral claims is taken to be.
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• Sherwin , Susan . 1988 . “Philosophical Methodology and Feminist Methodology: Are They Compatible?”, in ” . In Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method and Morals 13 – 28 . Toronto : University of Toronto Press . See, for example
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• 2001 . Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 63 : 329 – 46 . I myself regard many of the most well-known attacks on utilitarianism, such as Williams’, to be either misguided or thoroughly opaque. I do, however, ultimately reject utilitarianism or any form of consequentialism as an adequate complete theory of reasons. See my “Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy,”:
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• It is not always clear as to the nature of this objection. In many cases, it seems to be a substantive rather than a methodological point, a point close to the type of particularism, mentioned in footnote 3 above, that I am not discussing. What I am doing here is offering what I take to be a sympathetic rendering of the objection to abstraction or generality.
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• The Metaphysics of Reasons. My view is developed most fully in my
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• By doing so I do not mean to be denying the interest or significance of such an area of study. However, as I made clear at the outset, my project is philosophical and meta-philosophical, and I do not regard psychological generalizations as appropriate objects of philosophical inquiry.
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• Held , Virginia . 1995 . “Feminist Moral Inquiry and the Feminist Future,” in ” . In Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics Edited by: Held , Virginia . 153 – 76 . Boulder , CO : Westview Press . ; 158.
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• As I indicated above, I will not pursue (3), feminist reflective equilibrium, any further than I already have.
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• 1998 . Ingenious Pain New York : Harcourt . For a brilliant literary exploration of this idea, see Andrew Miller's
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• Held , Virginia , ed. 1995 . Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics Boulder , CO : Westview Press . In her “Moral Understandings: Alternative ‘Epistemology’ for a Feminist Ethics,” in 139–52. All page references to Urban Walker in the text are to this work.
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• Of course, she might also reject the label ‘meta-ethics,’ given its suggestion of and association with theory, analysis, abstraction, universalization, etc.
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• The term ‘epistemology’ is used loosely: Urban Walker is not engaged in a discussion of what, if anything, justifies moral beliefs. Given her rejection of moral philosophy as conceived of as the acquisition of moral knowledge, this is not surprising. I would suggest that ‘outlook’ is probably a better term for Urban Walker's purposes. However, I will follow her usage in what follows.
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• Urban Walker agrees with this claim, but for different sorts of reasons than those I offer below. See p. 145.
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• It should be clear that such a view could be a version of any of (1) to (3) in terms of methodology. But it certainly would not be a version of (5), as Urban Walker clearly intends her view to be.
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