References
- Alston, William. 1988. “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 257–299.10.2307/2214077
- Boyle, Matthew. 2009. “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 133–164.10.1111/phpr.2008.78.issue-1
- Boyle, Matthew. 2011. ““Making up Your Mind” and the Activity of Reason.” Philosophers’ Imprint 11 (17): 1–24.
- Boyle, Matthew. 2013. “Active Belief.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 ( supplemental issue): 119–147.
- Christensen, David. 2010. “Higher-Order Evidence1.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 185–215.10.1111/phpr.2010.81.issue-1
- Feldman, Richard. 2001. “Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation.” In Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, edited by Matthias Steup, 77–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195128923.001.0001
- Foley, Richard. 2001. Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511498923
- Hedden, Brian. 2015. “Time-Slice Rationality.” Mind 124 (494): 449–491.10.1093/mind/fzu181
- Hieronymi, Pamela. 2013. “Believing at Will.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 ( supplemental issue): 149–187.
- Hieronymi, Pamela. Minds That Matter. Manuscript.
- Holton, Richard. 2014. “Intention as a Model for Belief.” In Rational and Social Agency, edited by Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe, 12–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794515.001.0001
- Lawlor, Krista. 2013. “Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation.” Inquiry 57 (1): 1–27.
- Moran, Richard. 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nagel, Thomas. 1969. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nefsky, Julia and Sergio Tenenbaum. “Extended Agency and the Problem of Diachronic Autonomy.” Manuscript.
- Paul, Sarah. 2015. “Doxastic Self-Control.” American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2): 145–158.
- Pettit, Philip and Michael Smith. 1996. “Freedom in Belief and Desire.” The Journal of Philosophy 93(9): 429–449, p. 488.10.2307/2940892
- Raz, Joseph. 2011. From Normativity to Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.001.0001
- Shah, Nishi. 2002. “Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism.” The Monist 85 (3): 436–445.
- Shah, Nishi. 2003. “How Truth Governs Belief.” Philosophical Review 112 (4): 447–482.10.1215/00318108-112-4-447
- Shah, Nishi, and J. David Velleman. 2005. “Doxastic Deliberation.” Philosophical Review 114 (4): 497–534.10.1215/00318108-114-4-497
- Tenenbaum, Sergio. 1999. “The Judgment of a Weak Will.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 875–911.10.2307/2653561
- Titelbaum, Michael. 2013. Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weatherson, Brian. 2008. “Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.” Journal of Philosophy 105: 540–569.10.5840/jphil2008105932
- Williams, Bernard. 1973. “Deciding to Believe.” In Problems of the Self, 136–151. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511621253
- Williams, Bernard. 2006. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
![Supercharge Your Next Research Paper: Research and write your next paper with Jenni AI.]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/112444/Skyscraper-humanities.png"})