Williamsonian modal epistemology, possibility-based

References

• Arregui, Ana. 2005. Backtracking Counterfactuals and Iterated Modalities. Handout.
   Google Scholar
• Brennan, Virginia. 1993. “Root and Epistemic Modal Auxiliary Verbs.” Ph.D. thesis. University of Massachusetts.
   Google Scholar
• Cinque, G. 1999. Adverbs and Functional Heads: A Crosslinguistic Perspective. Oxford Studies in Comparative Syntax. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Coates, Jennifer. 1983. The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries. London: Croom Helm.
   Google Scholar
• Collins, Peter. 2009. Modals and Quasi-Modals in English. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.
   Google Scholar
• DeRose, Keith. 1991. “Epistemic Possibilities.” Philosophical Review 100: 581–605.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Edgington, Dorothy. 2004. “Two Kinds of Possibility.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 78: 1–22.
   Google Scholar
• Edgington, Dorothy. 2008. “Counterfactuals.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108: 1–21.
   Google Scholar
• Edgington, Dorothy. 2007. “On Conditionals.” In Handbook of Philosophical Logic, edited by Gabbay, D. M. & Guenthner, F., Vol. 14, 127–221. Dordrecht: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Edgington, Dorothy. 2011. “Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals.” In Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, 230–241, edited by C. Hoerl, T. McCormack and S. R. Beck. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• von Fintel, Kai. 2012. “Subjunctive Conditionals.” In The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Fara, Delia Graff & Russel, Gillian, 466–477. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• von Fintel, Kai, and Anthony S. Gillies. 2008. “CIA Leaks.” Philosophical Review 117: 77–98.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• von Fintel, Kai, and Sabine Iatridou. 2003. “Epistemic Containment.” Lingistic Inquiry 34: 173–198.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hacquard, Valentine. 2006. “Aspects of Modality.” Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
   Google Scholar
• Hacquard, Valentine. 2009. “On the Interaction of Aspect and Modal Auxiliaries.” Linguistics and Philosophy 32: 279–315.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hacquard, Valentine. 2010. “On the Event Relativity of Modal Auxiliaries.” Natural Language Semantics 18: 79–114.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hale, Bob. 2003. “Knowledge of Possibility and Knowledge of Necessity.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103, 1/20.
   Google Scholar
• Iatridou, Sabine. 2000. “The Grammatical Ingredients of Counteractuality.” Linguistic Inquiry 31: 231–270.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jenkins, C. S. 2008. “Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience.” Philosophical Quarterly 58: 693–701.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Khoo, Justin. 2015. “On Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals.” Philosopher’s Imprint 15(32): 1–40.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kratzer, Angelika. 1977. “What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean.” Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 337–355.
   Google Scholar
• Kratzer, Angelika. 1981. “The Notional Category of Modality.” In Words, Worlds, and Contexts, edited by Eikmeyer, H. J. & Rieser, H., New Approaches in Word Semantics. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
   Google Scholar
• Kratzer, Angelika. 1991. “Modality.” In Semantik: Ein internationales Handbuch der zeitgenössischen Forschung, 639–650, edited by Arnim von Stechow and Dieter Wunderlich. de Gruyter: Berlin/New York.
   Google Scholar
• Kratzer, Angelika. 2012. Modals and Conditionals: New and Revised Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Krödel, Thomas. 2012. “Counterfactuals and the Epistemology of Modality.” Philosopher’s Imprint 12(12): 1–14.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krödel, Thomas. Forthcoming. “Modal Knowledge, Evolution, and Counterfactuals.” In Modal Epistemology after Rationalism, edited by Fischer, R. W. & Leon, F.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David. 1976. “The Paradoxes of Time Travel.” American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 145–152.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, David. 1979. “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.” Nous 13: 455–476.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nanay, Bence. 2011. “Do We See Apples as Edible?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92: 305–322.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nanay, Bence. 2012. “Action-Oriented Perception.” European Journal of Philosophy 20: 430–446.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nanay, Bence. 2013. Between Perception and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nolan, Daniel. 1997. “Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 535–572.
   Google Scholar
• Portner, P. 2009. Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Roca Royes, Sonia. 2011. “Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge.” Logique et analyse 54: 537–552.
   Google Scholar
• Roca Royes, Sonia. Forthcoming. “Similarity and Possibility: An Epistemology of de re Possibility for Concrete Entities.” In Modal Epistemology after Rationalism, edited by Fischer, B. & Leon, F.
   Google Scholar
• Spencer, Jack. Forthcoming. “Able to Do the Impossible.” Mind.
   Google Scholar
• Strohminger, Margot. Forthcoming. “Perceptual knowledge of nonactual possibilities.” Philosophical Perspectives, 29.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Swanson, Eric. 2010. “On Scope Relations between Quantifiers and Epistemic Modals.” Journal of Semantics 27: 529–540.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vaidya, Anand. 2015. “The Epistemology of Modality.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Summer, Edward N. Zalta. chapter http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/modality-epistemology/.
   Google Scholar
• Vetter, Barbara. 2013. “Can’ without Possible Worlds. Semantics for Anti-Humeans.” Philosophers 13: 1–27.
   Google Scholar
• Vetter, Barbara. 2014. “Dispositions without Conditionals.” Mind 123: 129–156.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vetter, Barbara. 2015. Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Vetter, Barbara. Forthcoming. “Counterpossibles (not only) for Dispositionalists.” Philosophical Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Viebahn, Emanuel, and Barbara Vetter. Forthcoming. “How Many Meanings for ‘May’? The Case for Modal Polysemy.” Philosopher’s Imprint.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 1999. “Existence and Contingency.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73: 181–203.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2002. “Necessary Existents.” In Logic, Thought and Language, edited by A. O’Hear, 233–251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2003. “Everything.” Philosophical Perspectives 17: 415–465.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. Forthcoming-a. “Counterpossibles.” In Philosophical Fictionalism, edited by Armour-Garb, Brad & Kroon, Fred.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. Forthcoming-b. “Knowing by Imagining.” In Knowledge through Imagination, edited by Kind, Amy, Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. ms. “Modal Science.” To appear in The Philosophy of Modality: Beyond the Standard Model, edited by Vaidya, Anand & Prelević, Duko. [Internet document].
   Google Scholar