Higher-order free logic and the Prior-Kaplan paradox

References

• Bacon, Andrew. 2014.“Radical Anti-Disquotationalism.” MS.
   Google Scholar
• Bacon, Andrew. 2011. “Vagueness at Every Order.” MS.
   Google Scholar
• Bradwardine, Thomas. 2010. Insolubilia. Leuven: Peeters.
   Google Scholar
• Church, Alonzo. 1976. “Comparison of Russell’s Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 41 (4): 747–760.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davies, Martin. 1981. Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
   Google Scholar
• Divers, John. 2006. Possible Worlds. Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Dorr, Cian. 2012. “Propositional Profusion and the Liar.” MS.
   Google Scholar
• Glanzberg, Michael. 2001. “The Liar in Context.” Philosophical Studies 103 (3): 217–251.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harris, J. H. 1982. “What’s So Logical about the ‘logical’ axioms?” Studia Logica 41 (2–3): 159–171.
   Google Scholar
• Kaplan, David. 1977. “Demonstratives.” In Themes from Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, 481–563. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kaplan, David. 1995. “A Problem in Possible Worlds Semantics.” In Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman, and Nicholas Asher, 41–52. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kripke, Saul A. 2011. “A Puzzle about Time and Thought.” In Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I, edited by Saul A. Kripke. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David K. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
   Google Scholar
• McDaniel, Kris. 2009. “Ways of Being.” In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David John Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• McGee, Vann. 2000. “Everything.” In Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, edited by Gila Sher and Richard L. Tieszen, 54–78. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Myhill, John. 1979. “A Refutation of an Unjustified Attack on the Axiom of Reducibility.” In Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume, edited by Bertrand Russell and G. W. Roberts, 81–90. Humanities Press.
   Google Scholar
• Parsons, Charles. 1974. “The Liar Paradox.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4): 381–412.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Prior, A. N. 1956. “Modality and Quantification in S5.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (1): 60–62.
   Google Scholar
• Prior, A. N. 1961. “On a Family of Paradoxes.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2 (1): 16–32.
   Google Scholar
• Prior, A. N. 1977. Worlds, Times, and Selves. Duckworth.
   Google Scholar
• Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. 1960. The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams.
   Google Scholar
• Rayo, Agustín, and Gabriel Uzquiano. 1999. “Toward a Theory of Second-Order Consequence.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (3): 315–325.
   Google Scholar
• Rayo, Agustín, and Timothy Williamson. 2003. “A Completeness Theorem for Unrestricted First-Order Languages.” In Liars and Heaps, edited by J. C. Beall. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Russell, Bertrand. 1908. “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.” American Journal of Mathematics 30 (3): 222–262.
   Google Scholar
• Sher, Gilar, and Richard L. Tieszen. eds. 2000. Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Slater, B. H. 1986. “Prior’s Analytic.” Analysis 46 (2): 76–81.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Smith, Nicholas J. J. 2006. “Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox.” The Monist 89 (1): 178–202.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tarski, Alfred. 1936. “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.” In Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, edited by A. Tarski, 152–278. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tucker, Dustin, and Richmond H. Thomason. 2011. “Paradoxes of Intensionality.” Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3): 394–411.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Uzquiano, Gabriel. 2015. “A Neglected Resolution of Russell’s Paradox of Propositions.” Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2): 328–344.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 1988. “Equivocation and Existence.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (n/a): 109–127.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 1998. “Bare Possibilia.” Erkenntnis 48 (2/3): 257–273.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2003. “Everything.” Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1): 415–465.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar