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Canadian Journal of Philosophy Volume 46, 2016 - Issue 4-5: Williamson on Modality
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Articles

Williamson on necessitism

Jeremy GoodmanDepartment of Philosophy, NYU, New York, NY, USA.Correspondence[email protected]
Pages 613-639 | Received 14 Jun 2016, Published online: 19 Jul 2016

References

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  • Fritz, Peter, and Jeremy Goodman. Forthcoming-a. “Counterfactuals and Propositional Contingentism”. Unpublished.
  • Goodman, Jeremy. 2016. “The Case for Necessitism.” DPhil thesis, University of Oxford.
  • Goodman, Jeremy. Forthcoming-a. “Consequences of Conditional Excluded Middle.” Unpublished.
  • Goodman, Jeremy. Forthcoming-b. “Matter and Mereology.” Unpublished.
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  • Jager, Thomas. 1982. “An Actualistic Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23: 335–349.
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  • Sider, Theodore. Forthcoming. “On Williamson and Simplicity in Modal Logic.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy ( online encyclopedia).
  • Westerståhl, Dag. 2011. “Generalized Quantifiers.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2011 edition.
  • Williamson, Timothy. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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