Modal science

References

• Artemov, Sergei, Jennifer Davore, and Anil Nerode. 1997. Modal Logics and Topological Semantics for Hybrid Systems. Technical Report MSI 97-05. Cornell University.
   Google Scholar
• Bird, Alexander. 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Chisholm, Roderick. 1973. “Parts as Essential to Their Wholes.” Review of Metaphysics 26: 581–603.
   Google Scholar
• Cussens, James. 2014. “Probability and Statistics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, edited by M. R. Antognazza. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Advance online publication.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 1970. “Mental Events.” In Experience and Theory, edited by L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, 79–101. London: Duckworth.
   Google Scholar
• Davoren, Jen, and Rajeev Goré. 2002. “Bimodal Logics for Reasoning about Continuous Dynamics.” In Advances in Modal Logic. Vol. 3, edited by F. Wolter, H. Wansing, M. de Rijke, and M. Zakharyaschev, 91–111. London: World Scientific.10.1142/5114
   Google Scholar
• Dorr, Cian, and Jeremy Goodman. Forthcoming. “Diamonds Are Forever.” Noûs.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Field, Hartry. 1980. Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Fine, Kit. 1978. “Model Theory for Modal Logic: Part I – The De Re/De Dicto Distinction.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 7: 125–156.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fine, Kit. 1994. “Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.” Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1–16.10.2307/2214160
   Google Scholar
• Fine, Kit. 2006. “Relatively Unrestricted Quantification.” In Absolute Generality, edited by A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano, 20–44. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fritz, Peter. 2013. “Modal Ontology and Generalized Quantifiers.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 42: 643–678.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gibson, James. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
   Google Scholar
• Gunawardena, Jeremy. 2009. “Models in Systems Biology: The Parameter Problem and the Meanings of Robustness.” In Elements of Computational Systems Biology, edited by H. Lodhi and S. Muggleton, 21–48. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
   Google Scholar
• Hellman, Geoffrey. 1989. Mathematics Without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kim, Jaegwon. 1993. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511625220
   Google Scholar
• Kment, Boris. 2012. “Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals.” Philosophical Review 121: 573–609.10.1215/00318108-1630930
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kment, Boris. 2014. Modality and Explanatory Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Kratzer, Angelika. 1977. “What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean.” Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 337–355.10.1007/BF00353453
   Google Scholar
• Kratzer, Angelika. 2012. Modals and ConditionalsNew and Revised Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234684.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David. 1968. “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–126.10.2307/2024555
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Linnebo, Øystein. 2013. “The Potential Hierarchy of Sets.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 6: 205–228.10.1017/S1755020313000014
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Loewer, Barry. 2001. “Determinism and Chance.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32: 609–620.10.1016/S1355-2198(01)00028-4
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lyon, Aidan, and Mark Colyvan. 2008. “The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces.” Philosophia Mathematica 16: 227–243.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mackie, Penelope. 2006. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/0199272204.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Malament, David. 1982. “Review of Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism by Hartry Field.” Journal of Philosophy 79: 523–534.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Maudlin, Tim. 2007. “What Could Be Objective about Probabilities?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38: 275–291.10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.04.006
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Müller, Thomas. 2011. “Tense or Temporal Logic.” In The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by L. Horsten and R. Pettigrew, 324–350. London: Continuum.
   Google Scholar
• Nolte, David. 2010. “The Tangled Tale of Phase Space.” Physics Today 63 (4): 33–38.10.1063/1.3397041
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Parsons, Charles. 1983. Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Plantinga, Alvin. 1983. “On Existentialism.” Philosophical Studies 44: 1–20.10.1007/BF00353411
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Portner, Paul. 2009. Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Prior, Arthur. 1956. “Modality and Quantification in S5.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 21: 60–62.10.2307/2268488
   Google Scholar
• Prior, Arthur. 1967. Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243113.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Putnam, Hilary. 1967. “Mathematics Without Foundations.” The Journal of Philosophy 64: 5–22.10.2307/2024603
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Quine, Willard van Orman. 1953. “Reference and Modality.” In From a Logical Point of View, edited by Willard Van Orman Quine, 139–159. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Quine, Willard van Orman. 1966. “Three Grades of Modal Involvement.” In The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, edited by Willard Van Orman Quine, 156–174. New York: Random House.
   Google Scholar
• Roca-Royes, Sonia. Forthcoming. “Similarity and Possibility: An Epistemology of De Re Possibility for Concreta.” In Modal Epistemology after Rationalism, edited by B. Fischer and F. Leon.
   Google Scholar
• Salmon, Nathan. 1982. Reference and Essence. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Salmon, Nathan. 1989. “The Logic of What Might Have Been.” The Philosophical Review 98: 3–34.10.2307/2185369
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Salmon, Nathan. 1993. “This Side of Paradox.” Philosophical Topics 21: 187–197.10.5840/philtopics199321219
   Google Scholar
• Sider, Ted. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Stalnaker, Robert. 2012. Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Strogatz, Steven. 2001. Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos: With Applications to Physics, Biology, Chemistry, and Engineering. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
   Google Scholar
• Strohminger, Margot. 2015. “Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities.” Philosophical Perspectives 29: 363–375.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Studd, James. 2013. “The Iterative Conception of Set.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 42: 697–725.10.1007/s10992-012-9245-3
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vetter, Barbara. 2016. “Williamsonian Modal Epistemology, Possibility-Based.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2006. “Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts.” In Philosophical Issues, Volume 16: Philosophy of Language, edited by E. Sosa and E. Villanueva, 310–333. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2007a. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.10.1002/9780470696675
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2007b. “How Probable is an Infinite Sequence of Heads?” Analysis 67: 173–180.10.1093/analys/67.3.173
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2013a. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552078.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy. 2013b. Identity and Discrimination. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.10.1002/9781118503591
   Google Scholar
• Woodward, James. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar