The disciplining role of repeated elections: some experimental evidence

References

• Abramowitz , A. 1980 . A comparison of voting for U.S. senators and representatives in 1978 . American Political Science Review , 74 : 633 – 640 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Alesina , A. and Cukierman , A. 1990 . The politics of ambiguity . Quarterly Journal of Economics , 105 : 829 – 850 .
   Google Scholar
• Austen-Smith , D. and Banks , J. 1989 . “ Electoral accountability and incumbency ” . In Models of strategic choice in politics , Edited by: Ordeshook , P. Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan Press .
   Google Scholar
• Barro , R. 1973 . The control of politicians: an economic model . Public Choice , 14 : 19 – 42 .
   Google Scholar
• Collier , K. , McKelvey , R. , Ordeshook , P. and Williams , K. 1987 . Retrospective voting: an experimental study . Public Choice , 53 : 101 – 130 .
   Google Scholar
• Downs , A. 1957 . An economic theory of democracy , New York : Harper and Row .
   Google Scholar
• Ferejohn , J. 1986 . Incumbent performance and electoral control . Public Choice , 14 : 19 – 42 .
   Google Scholar
• Ferejohn , J. 1990 . “ Information and the electoral process ” . In Information and democratic processes , Edited by: Ferejohn , J. and Kuklinski , J. Urbana : University of Illinois Press .
   Google Scholar
• Figlio , D. 2000 . Political shirking, opponent quality, and electoral support . Public Choice , 103 : 271 – 284 .
   Google Scholar
• Fudenberg , D. and Levine , D. 1998 . The theory of learning in games , Cambridge : MIT Press .
   Google Scholar
• Harrington , J. 1993 . Economic policy, economic performance, and elections . American Economic Review , 83 : 27 – 42 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kalt , J. and Zupan , M. 1984 . Capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics . American Economic Review , 74 : 279 – 300 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kau , J. and Rubin , P. 1979 . Self-interest, ideology and logrolling in congressional voting . Journal of Law and Economics , 22 : 365 – 385 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lott , J. 1987 . Political cheating . Public Choice , 52 : 169 – 186 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lott , J. 1990 . Attendance rates, political shirking, and the effect of post-elective office employment . Economic Inquiry , 28 : 133 – 150 .
   Google Scholar
• Lott , J. and Bronars , S. 1993 . Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives . Public Choice , 76 : 125 – 149 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lott , J. and Davis , M. 1992 . A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature . Public Choice , 74 : 461 – 484 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lott , J. and Reed , W. 1989 . Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians . Public Choice , 61 : 75 – 96 .
   Google Scholar
• McKelvey , R. and Ordeshook , P. 1985a . Elections with limited information: a fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources . Journal of Economic Theory , 36 : 55 – 85 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McKelvey , R. and Ordeshook , P. 1985b . Sequential elections with limited information . American Journal of Political Science , 29 : 480 – 512 .
   Google Scholar
• McKelvey , R. and Ordeshook , P. 1986 . Information, electoral equilibria and the democratic ideal . Journal of Politics , 48 : 480 – 512 .
   Google Scholar
• Milgrom , P. 1981 . Good news and bad news: representation theorems and applications . The Bell Journal of Economics , 12 : 380 – 391 .
   Google Scholar
• Morton , R. 1993 . Incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence . American Political Science Review , 87 : 382 – 392 .
   Google Scholar
• Parker , G. and Powers , S. 2002 . Searching for symptoms of political shirking: congressional foreign travel . Public Choice , 110 : 173 – 191 .
   Google Scholar
• Peltzman , S. 1984 . Constituent interest and congressional voting . Journal of Law and Economics , 27 : 181 – 210 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reed , W. 1989 . Information in political markets: a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing . Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , 5 : 355 – 373 .
   Google Scholar
• Rogoff , K. 1990 . Equilibrium political budget cycles . American Economic Review , 80 : 21 – 36 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rogoff , K. and Sibert , A. 1988 . Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles . Review of Economic Studies , 55 : 1 – 16 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stokes , D. and Miller , W. 1962 . Party government and the saliency of Congress . Public Opinion Quarterly , 26 : 531 – 546 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar