Ex Ante and Ex Post Control over Courts in the US States: Court Curbing and Political Party Influence

References

• Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bartels, Brandon L., and Christopher Johnston. 2020. Curbing the Court: Why the Public Constrains Judicial Independence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures.” American Political Science Review 89 (1):62–73. doi: 10.2307/2083075.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2012. “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics.” Perspectives on Politics 10 (3):571–97. doi: 10.1017/S1537592712001624.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bell, Lauren C., and Kevin M. Scott. 2006. “Policy Statements of Symbolic Politics? Explaining Congressional Court-Limiting Attempts.” Judicature 89 (4):196–201.
   Google Scholar
• Bendor, Jonathan, Ami Glazer, and Thomas H. Hammond. 2001. “Theories of Delegation.” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (1):235–69. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.235.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Blackley, Keith. 2019. “Court Curbing in the State House: Why State Legislators Attack Their Courts.” Justice System Journal 40 (4):269–85. doi: 10.1080/0098261X.2019.1650678.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bonica, Adam, and Michael J. Woodruff. 2015. “A Common-Space Measure of State Supreme Court Ideology.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 31 (3):472–98. doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewu016.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bonneau, Chris W., Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman, and Paul Wahlbeck. 2007. “Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (4):890–905. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00287.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brace, Paul, Melinda Gann Hall, and Laura Langer. 2001. “Placing State Supreme Courts in State Politics.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 1 (1):81–108. doi: 10.1177/153244000100100106.
   Google Scholar
• Broockman, David E. 2014. “Mobilizing Candidates: Political Actors Strategically Shape the Candidate Pool with Personal Appeals.” Journal of Experimental Political Science 1 (2):104–19. doi: 10.1017/xps.2014.3.
   Google Scholar
• Burnett, Craig M., and Lydia Tiede. 2015. “Party Labels and Vote Choice in Judicial Elections.” American Politics Research 43 (2):232–54. doi: 10.1177/1532673X14548477.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, Tom S. 2009. “The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (4):971–89. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, Tom S. 2011. The Limits of Judicial Independence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dahl, Robert A. 1957. “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker.” Role of the Supreme Court Symposium, No. 1: 279–95.
   Google Scholar
• Desmarais, Bruce A., Raymond J. La Raja, and Michael S. Kowal. 2015. “The Fates of Challengers in U.S. House Elections: The Role of Extended Party Networks in Supporting Candidates and Shaping Electoral Outcomes.” American Journal of Political Science 59 (1):194–211. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12106.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fite, Katherine B., and Louis Baruch Rubinstein. 1937. “Curbing the Supreme Court–State Experiences and Federal Proposals.” Michigan Law Review 35 (5):762–87. doi: 10.2307/1281831.
   Google Scholar
• Goelzhauser, Greg. 2018. “Classifying Judicial Selection Institutions.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 18 (2):174–92. doi: 10.1177/1532440018764342.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hack, Jonathan S. 2022. “Why Do Lawmakers Seek to Sanction State Courts?” Journal of Legislative Studies 28 (2):278–297.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Handberg, Roger, and Harold F. Hill. Jr. 1980. “Court Curbing, Court Reversals, and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court versus Congress.” Law & Society Review 14 (2):309–22. doi: 10.2307/3053315.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hanssen, F. Andrew. 2004. “Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts.” The Journal of Legal Studies 33 (2):431–73. doi: 10.1086/421572.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harvey, Anna, and Barry Friedman. 2006. “Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 1987–2000.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31 (4):533–62. doi: 10.3162/036298006X201922.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hassell, Hans J. G. 2016. “Party Control of Party Primaries: Party Influence in Nominations for the US Senate.” The Journal of Politics 78 (1):75–87. doi: 10.1086/683072.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Holmes, Lisa M., and Jolly A. Emrey. 2006. “Court Diversification: Staffing the State Courts of Last Resort through Interim Appointments.” Justice System Journal 27 (1):1–13.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Howard, Robert M., and Amy Steigerwalt. 2012. Judging Law and Policy: Courts and Policymaking in the American Political System. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Ignagni, Joseph, and James Meernik. 1994. “Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions.” Political Research Quarterly 47 (2):353–71. doi: 10.1177/106591299404700207.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Leonard, Meghan E. 2016. “State Legislatures, State High Courts, and Judicial Independence: An Examination of Court-Curbing Legislation in the States.” Justice System Journal 37 (1):53–62. doi: 10.1080/0098261X.2015.1024568.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
   Google Scholar
• Mark, Alyx, and Michael A. Zilis. 2018. “Blurring Institutional Boundaries: Judges’ Perceptions of Threats to Judicial Independence.” Journal of Law and Courts 6 (2):333–53. doi: 10.1086/695743.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 3 (2):243–77.
   Google Scholar
• McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 75 (2):431–82. doi: 10.2307/1073179.[Mismatch]McCarty
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McLeod, Aman. 2009. “Differences in State Judicial Selection.” In Exploring Judicial Politics, ed. Mark C. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press, 10–30.
   Google Scholar
• McLeod, Aman. 2012. “The Party on the Bench: Partisanship, Judicial Selection Commissions, and State High-Court Appointments.” Justice System Journal 33 (3):262–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nelson, Michael J., Rachel Paine Caufield, and Andrew D. Martin. 2013. “OH, MI: A Note on Empirical Examinations of Judicial Elections.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 13 (4):495–511. doi: 10.1177/1532440013503838.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nichols, Curt, Dave Bridge, and Adam M. Carrington. 2014. “Court Curbing via Attempt to Amend the Constitution: An Update of Congressional Attacks on the Supreme Court from 1955–1984.” Justice System Journal 35 (4):331–43. doi: 10.1080/0098261X.2013.875863.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Oklahoma Republican Party Platform. 2013. “Republican Party Platform: III. State, G. State Agencies, All Levels of Government, Section 10.”
   Google Scholar
• Shor, Boris, and Nolan McCarty. [2011] 2020. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 105 (3):530–51. https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId = doi:10.7910/DVN/AP54NE.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Squire, Peverill. 2017. “A Squire Index Update.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 17 (4):361–71. Data link doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1532440017713314.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tecklenburg, H. Chris. 2020. Congressional Constraint and Judicial Responses: Examining Judiciary Committee Court Curbing and the Court Structuring Bills. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave McMillan.
   Google Scholar
• Walz, Matthew, and Andrew Foote. 2020. “Keeping the Left at Bay: Delegate Selection System Choice in US Democratic Presidential Nominations.” Electoral Studies 67 (October):102217. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102217.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar