Coalition dynamics: advances in the study of the coalition life cycle

References

• Andeweg, Rudy B., Lieven De Winter, and Patrick Dumont, eds. (2011). Puzzles of Government Formation. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Andeweg, Rudy B., and Arco Timmermans (2008). ‘Conflict Management in Coalition Government’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinet Governance: Bargaining and the Cycle of Democratic Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 269–300.
   Google Scholar
• Axelrod, Robert. (1970). Conflict of Interest. Chicago: Markham.
   Google Scholar
• Barlow, Nick, and Tim Bale (2021). ‘The United Kingdom: When Coalition Meets the Westminster Model, Who Wins?’, in Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström (eds.), Coalition Governance in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 611–39.
   Google Scholar
• Bäck, Hanna. (2008). ‘Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Formation: Evidence from Swedish Local Government’, Party Politics, 14:1, 71–89.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus, and Patrick Dumont (2011). ‘Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 50:4, 441–78.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus, and Michael Imre (2022a). ‘Populist Radical Parties, Pariahs, and Coalition Bargaining Delays’, Party Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688221136109.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bäck, Hanna, and Patrick Dumont (2007). ‘Combining Large-n and Small-n Strategies: The Way Forward in Coalition Research’, West European Politics, 30:3, 467–501.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bäck, Hanna, Wolfgang C. Müller, Mariyana Angelova, and Daniel Strobl (2022b). ‘Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 55:2, 254–86.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bäck, Hanna, Johan Hellström, Johannes Lindvall, and Jan Teorell (2023). ‘Pre-Electoral Coalitions, Familiarity, and Delays in Government Formation’, West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2200328.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Becher, Michael. (2010). ‘Constraining Ministerial Power: The Impact of Veto Players on Labor Market Reforms in Industrial Democracies, 1973–2000’, Comparative Political Studies, 43:1, 33–60.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Beckman, Tristin, and Petra Schleiter (2020). ‘Opportunistic Election Timing, a Compliment or Substitute for Economic Manipulation?’, The Journal of Politics, 82:3, 1127–41.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bergman, Matthew, Mariyana Angelova, Hanna Bäck, and Wolfgang C. Müller (2023). ‘Coalition Agreements and Governments’ Policy-Making Productivity’, West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2161794.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bergman, Torbjörn, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström (2021a). ‘Coalition Governance in Western Europe’, in Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström (eds.), Coalition Governance in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–14.
   Google Scholar
• Bergman, Torbjörn, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström, eds. (2021b). Coalition Governance in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bergman, Torbjörn, Gabriella Ilonszki, and Wolfgang C. Müller, eds. (2019). Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Black, Duncan. (1987). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Boston: Kluwer.
   Google Scholar
• Browne, Eric C., and Karen A. Feste (1975). ‘Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs: Evidence from European Party Governments, 1945–1970’, American Behavioral Scientist, 18:4, 530–56.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Browne, Eric C., and Mark N. Franklin (1973). ‘Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 67:2, 453–69.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Budge, Ian, and Hans Keman (1990). Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Carroll, Royce, and Gary W. Cox (2007). ‘The Logic of Gamson’s Law: Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations’, American Journal of Political Science, 51:2, 300–13.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carroll, Royce, and Gary W. Cox (2012). ‘Shadowing Ministers: Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments’, Comparative Political Studies, 45:2, 220–36.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ceron, Andrea. (2019). Leaders, Factions and the Game of Intra-Party Politics. Abingdon: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Damgaard, Erik. (2008). ‘Cabinet Termination’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. MüLler, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 301–26.
   Google Scholar
• Däubler, Thomas, Marc Debus, and Alejandro Ecker (2022). ‘Party Campaign Statements and Portfolio Allocation in Coalition Governments’, West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2140397.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Debus, Marc. (2009). ‘Pre-Electoral Commitments and Government Formation’, Public Choice, 138:1–2, 45–64.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• De Marchi, Scott, and Michael Laver (2023). The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• De Swaan, Abram. (1973). Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
   Google Scholar
• De Winter, Lieven, and Patrick Dumont (2008). ‘Uncertainty and Complexity in Cabinet Formation’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinet Governance: Bargaining and the Cycle of Democratic Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 123–57.
   Google Scholar
• Diermeier, Daniel, and Peter van Roozendaal (1998). ‘The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 28:4, 609–26.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dodd, Lawrence C. (1976). Coalitions in Parliamentary Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Druckman, James N. (2008). ‘Dynamic Approaches to Studying Parliamentary Coalitions’, Political Research Quarterly, 61:3, 479–83.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Druckman, James N., and Paul V. Warwick (2005). ‘The Missing Piece: Measuring Portfolio Salience in Western European Parliamentary Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 44:1, 17–42.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dumont, Patrick, Albert Falcó-Gimeno, Indridi H. Indridason, and Daniel Bischof (2023). ‘Pieces of the Puzzle: Coalition Formation and Preference Compatibility’, West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2234236.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dunleavy, Patrick with Simon Bastow (2001). ‘Modelling Coalitions That Cannot Coalesce: A Critique of the Laver-Shepsle Approach’, West European Politics, 24:1, 1–26.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ecker, Alejandro, and Thomas M. Meyer (2020). ‘Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 50:1, 261–80.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ecker, Alejandro, Thomas M. Meyer, and Wolfgang C. Müller (2015). ‘The Distribution of Individual Cabinet Positions in Coalition Governments: A Sequential Approach’, European Journal of Political Research, 54:4, 802–18.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Eichorst, Jason. (2014). ‘Explaining Variation in Coalition Agreements: The Electoral and Policy Motivations for Drafting Agreements’, European Journal of Political Research, 53:1, 98–115.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Falcó-Gimeno, Albert. (2012). ‘Parties Getting Impatient: Time Out of Office and Portfolio Allocation in Coalition Governments’, British Journal of Political Science, 42:2, 393–411.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fernandes, Jorge M., Florian Meinfelder, and Catherine Moury (2016). ‘Wary Partners: Strategic Portfolio Allocation and Coalition Governance in Parliamentary Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 49:9, 1270–300.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fortunato, David. (2019a). ‘The Electoral Implications of Coalition Policy Making’, British Journal of Political Science, 49:1, 59–80.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fortunato, David. (2019b). ‘Legislative Review and Party Differentiation in Coalition Governments’, American Political Science Review, 113:1, 242–7.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fortunato, David. (2021). The Cycle of Coalition. How Parties and Voters Interact under Coalition Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fortunato, David, and Randolph T. Stevenson (2013). ‘Perceptions of Partisan Ideologies: The Effect of Coalition Participation’, American Journal of Political Science, 57:2, 459–77.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Franklin, Mark N., and Thomas T. Mackie (1983). ‘Familiarity and Inertia in the Formation of Governing Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 13:3, 275–98.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gamson, William A. (1961). ‘A Theory of Coalition Formation’, American Sociological Review, 26:3, 373–82.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gianetti, Daniela, and Kenneth Benoit, eds. (2009). Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Giannetti, Daniela, and Michael Laver (2001). ‘Party System Dynamics and the Making and Breaking of Italian Governments’, Electoral Studies, 20:4, 529–53.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Golder, Sona Nadenochek (2006). The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Golder, Sona N. (2010). ‘Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process’, Comparative Political Studies, 43:1, 3–32.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Greene, Zackary, and Matthias Haber (2016). ‘Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses’, British Journal of Political Science, 46:3, 611–32.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Greene, Zackary, Nathan Henceroth, and Christian B. Jensen (2021). ‘The Cost of Coalition Compromise: The Electoral Effects of Holding Salient Portfolios’, Party Politics, 27:4, 827–38.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grofman, Bernard, and Peter van Roozendaal (1997). ‘Review Article: Modeling Cabinet Durability and Termination’, British Journal of Political Science, 27:3, 419–51.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hellström, Johan, and Daniel Walther (2019). ‘How is Government Stability Affected by the State of the Economy? Payoff Structures, Government Type and Economic State’, Government and Opposition, 54:2, 280–308.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hellström, Johan, Torbjörn Bergman, and Hanna Bäck (2021). Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED). Main sponsor: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (IN150306:1). https://repdem.org
   Google Scholar
• Hjermitslev, Ida B. (2020). ‘The Electoral Cost of Coalition Participation: Can Anyone Escape?’, Party Politics, 26:4, 510–20.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Höhmann, Daniel, and Ulrich Sieberer (2020). ‘Parliamentary Questions as a Control Mechanism in Coalition Governments’, West European Politics, 43:1, 225–49.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ibenskas, Raimondas. (2016). ‘Understanding Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe’, British Journal of Political Science, 46:4, 743–61.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Imre, Michael, Alejandro Ecker, Thomas M. Meyer, and Wolfgang C. Müller (2023). ‘Coalition Mood in European Parliamentary Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 53:1, 104–21.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Indridason, Indridi H., and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson (2013). ‘Making Words Count: Coalition Agreements and Cabinet Management’, European Journal of Political Research, 52:6, 822–46.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Klüser, K. Jonathan. (2022). ‘Keeping Tabs Through Collaboration? Sharing Ministerial Responsibility in Coalition Governments’, Political Science Research and Methods. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.31.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Klüser, K. Jonathan, and Christian Breunig (2023). ‘Ministerial Policy Dominance in Parliamentary Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 62:2, 633–44.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Klüver, Heike, and Hanna Bäck (2019). ‘Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance’, Comparative Political Studies, 52:13–14, 1995–2031.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Klüver, Heike, Hanna Bäck, and Svenja Krauss (2023). Coalition Agreements as Control Devices: Coalition Governance in Western and Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Klüver, Heike, and Jae-Jae Spoon (2020). ‘Helping or Hurting? How Governing as a Junior Coalition Partner Influences Electoral Outcomes’, The Journal of Politics, 82:4, 1231–42.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• König, Thomas, Nick Lin, Xiao Lu, Thago N. Silva, Nikoleta Yordanova, and Galina Zudenkova (2022). ‘Agenda Control and Timing of Bill Initiation: A Temporal Perspective on Coalition Governance in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 116:1, 231–48.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krauss, Svenja. (2018). ‘Stability Through Control? The Influence of Coalition Agreements on the Stability of Coalition Cabinets’, West European Politics, 41:6, 1282–304.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krauss, Svenja, and Heike Kluever (2022). ‘Formation and Coalition Governance: The Effect of Portfolio Allocation on Coalition Agreements’, Government and Opposition. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.68.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael (1974). ‘Dynamic Factors in Government Coalition Formation’, European Journal of Political Research, 2:3, 259–70.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael (1986). ‘Between Theoretical Elegance and Political Reality: Deductive Models and Cabinet Coalitions in Europe’, in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Coalition Behaviour in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 32–44.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael (1998). ‘Theories of Government Formation’, Annual Review of Political Science, 1:1, 1–25.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael (1989). ‘Party Competition and Party System Change’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1:3, 301–24.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael (2003). ‘Government Termination’, Annual Review of Political Science, 6:1, 23–40.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael (2008). ‘Governmental Politics and the Dynamics of Multiparty Competition’, Political Research Quarterly, 61:3, 532–6.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Benoit (2003). ‘The Evolution of Party Systems between Elections’, American Journal of Political Science, 47:2, 215–33.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael, and Junko Kato (2001). ‘Dynamic Approaches to Government Formation and the Generic Instability of Decisive Structures in Japan’, Electoral Studies, 20:4, 509–27.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael J., and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1990a). ‘Coalitions and Cabinet Government’, American Political Science Review, 84:3, 873–90.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael J., and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1990b). ‘Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics’, British Journal of Political Science, 20:4, 489–507.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996). Making and Breaking Governments. Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1998). ‘Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival’, American Journal of Political Science, 42:1, 28–54.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laver, Michael J., and Norman Schofield (1990). Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lipsmeyer, Christine S., and Heather Nicole Pierce (2011). ‘The Eyes That Bind: Junior Ministers as Oversight Mechanisms in Coalition Governments’, The Journal of Politics, 73:4, 1152–64.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Luebbert, Gregory M. (1986). Comparative Democracy. Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel. New York: Columbia University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lupia, Arthur, and Kaare Strøm (1995). ‘Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections’, American Political Science Review, 89:3, 648–65.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mair, Peter. (1997). Party System Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Martin, Lanny W. (2004). ‘The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 48:3, 445–61.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, Lanny W., and Randolph T. Stevenson (2001). ‘Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 45:1, 33–50.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2003). ‘Wasting Time? The Impact of Ideology and Size on Delay in Coalition Formation’, British Journal of Political Science, 33:02, 323–32.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2004). ‘Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny’, American Journal of Political Science, 48:1, 13–27.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2005). ‘Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review’, American Political Science Review, 99:1, 93–106.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2008). ‘Coalition Government and Political Communication’, Political Research Quarterly, 61:3, 502–16.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2014). ‘Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy, and the Coalition Compromise’, American Journal of Political Science, 58:4, 979–96.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg (2020). ‘Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 64:2, 325–40.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Martin, Shane, and Richard Whitaker (2019). ‘Beyond Committees: Parliamentary Oversight of Coalition Government in Britain’, West European Politics, 42:7, 1464–86.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mershon, Carol. (2002). The Costs of Coalition. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Merton, Robert K. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
   Google Scholar
• Meyer, Thomas M., Ulrich Sieberer, and David Schmuck (2023). ‘Rebuilding the Coalition Ship at Sea: How Uncertainty and Complexity Drive the Reform of Portfolio Design in Coalition Cabinets’, West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2169512.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Miller, Bernhard. (2010). Der Koalitionsausschuss. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
   Google Scholar
• Miller, Bernhard, and Wolfgang C. Müller (2010). ‘Managing Grand Coalitions: Germany 2005–09’, German Politics, 19:3–4, 332–52.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moury, Catherine. (2013). Coalition Government and the Party Mandate. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Moury, Catherine, and Arco Timmermans (2013). ‘Inter-Party Conflict Management in Coalition Governments: Analyzing the Role of Coalition Agreements in Belgium, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands’, Politics and Governance, 1:2, 117–31.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, Wolfgang C. (2009). ‘Government Formation’, in Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.), Handbook of Comparative Politics. London: Sage, 227–45.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm, eds. (1999). Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm, eds. (2000). Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm (2008). ‘Coalition Agreements and Cabinet Governance’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 159–200.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, Wolfgang C., Kaare Strøm, and Torbjörn Bergman (2008). ‘Coalition Theory and Cabinet Governance: An Introduction’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–50.
   Google Scholar
• Narud, Hanne Marthe, and Henry Valen (2008). ‘Coalition Membership and Electoral Performance’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 369–402.
   Google Scholar
• Pedrazzani, Andrea, and Francesco Zucchini (2023). ‘Dying, Surviving Death, and Reincarnating: Differences in Government Replacements and Their Explanation’, West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2193492.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Plescia, Carolina, and Sylvia Kritzinger (2022). ‘When Marriage Gets Hard: Intra-Coalition Conflict and Electoral Accountability’, Comparative Political Studies, 55:1, 32–59.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Plescia, Carolina, Alejandro Ecker, and Thomas M. Meyer (2022). ‘Do Party Supporters Accept Policy Compromises in Coalition Governments?’, European Journal of Political Research, 61:1, 214–29.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Raabe, Johannes, and Eric Linhart (2015). ‘Does Substance Matter? A Model If Qualitative Portfolio Allocation and Application to German State Governments between 1990 and 2010’, Party Politics, 21:3, 481–92.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Riker, William H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Saalfeld, Thomas. (2008). ‘Institutions, Chance and Choices: The Dynamics of Cabinet Survival’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 327–68.
   Google Scholar
• Saalfeld, Thomas. (2009). ‘Intra-Party Conflict and Cabinet Survival in 17 West European Democracies, 1945–1999’, in Daniela Gianetti and Kenneth Benoit (eds.), Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments. London: Routledge, 169–96.
   Google Scholar
• Sagarzazu, Iñaki, and Heike Klüver (2017). ‘Coalition Governments and Party Competition: Political Communication Strategies of Coalition Parties’, Political Science Research and Methods, 5:2, 333–49.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schleiter, Petra, and Edward Morgan-Jones (2009). ‘Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets’, American Political Science Review, 103:3, 496–512.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schleiter, Petra, and Cristina Bucur (2023). ‘Assembly Dissolution Powers and Incumbency Advantages in Coalition Formation’, West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2165356.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• So, Florence (forthcoming). ‘Serious Conflicts with Benign Outcomes? The Electoral Consequences of Conflictual Cabinet Terminations’, American Political Science Review.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strøm, Kaare. (1994). ‘The Presthus Debacle: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in Norway’, American Political Science Review, 88:1, 112–27.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strøm, Kaare. (2008). ‘Communication and the Life Cycle of Parliamentary Democracy’, Political Research Quarterly, 61:3, 537–42.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strøm, Kaare, and Benjamin Nyblade (2007). ‘Coalition Theory and Government Formation’, in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 782–802.
   Google Scholar
• Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. (2008). Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Strøm, Kaare, and Stephen M. Swindle (2002). ‘Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution’, American Political Science Review, 96:3, 575–91.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tavits, Margit. (2008). ‘The Role of Parties’ Past Behavior in Coalition Formation’, American Political Science Review, 102:4, 495–507.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thies, Michael F. (2001). ‘Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments’, American Journal of Political Science, 45:3, 580–98.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thürk, Maria, and Svenja Krauss (2023). ‘The Formalisation of Minority Governments’, West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2157994.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Timmermans, Arco. (2006). ‘Standing Apart and Sitting Together: Enforcing Coalition Agreements in Multiparty Systems’, European Journal of Political Research, 45:2, 263–83.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern (1953). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Warwick, Paul V. (1992). ‘Economic Trends and Government Survival in West European Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 86:4, 875–87.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Warwick, Paul V. (1994). Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Warwick, Paul V. (2012). ‘Dissolvers, Disputers, and Defectors: The Terminators of Parliamentary Governments’, European Political Science Review, 4:2, 263–81.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Warwick, Paul V., and James N. Druckman (2001). ‘Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments’, British Journal of Political Science, 31:04, 627–49.
   Google Scholar
• Warwick, Paul V., and James N. Druckman (2006). ‘The Portfolio Allocation Paradox: An Investigation into the Nature of a Very Strong But Puzzling Relationship’, European Journal of Political Research, 45:4, 635–65.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar