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Policy Studies Volume 35, 2014 - Issue 3
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Original Articles

Shock and awe: the effects of disinformation in military confrontation

Matthew T. ClementsEconomics Department, St. Edward's University, Austin, TX, USACorrespondence[email protected]
Pages 211-220 | Received 05 Jan 2012, Accepted 14 Aug 2013, Published online: 03 Mar 2014

References

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