(What) Is Feminist Logic? (What) Do We Want It to Be?

References

• Anderson, D. forthcoming. ‘Restricting logical tolerance’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ayim, M. 1995. ‘Passing through the Needle's eye: Can a feminist teach logic?’, Argumentation, 9, 801–20.
   Google Scholar
• Beall, J., and Restall, G. 2000. ‘Logical pluralism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 475–93.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Beall, J., and Restall, G. 2001. ‘Defending logical pluralism’, in Bryson Brown and John Woods (eds.), Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches, pp. 1–22.
   Google Scholar
• Beall, J., and Restall, G. 2006. Logical Pluralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Beaney, M. 2003. ‘Susan Stebbing on Cambridge and Vienna analysis’, in F. Stadtler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-Evaluation and Future Perspectives, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 339–50.
   Google Scholar
• Bondy, P. 2010. ‘Argumentative injustice’, Informal Logic, 30 (3), 263–78.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bowman, M., and Cook, R. forthcoming. ‘The logic of knowing-what-it-is-like’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Burns, S. forthcoming. ‘Values in logic’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Burrow, S. 2010. ‘Verbal sparring and apologetic points: Politeness in gendered argumentation contexts’, Informal Logic, 30 (3), 235–62.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cappelen, H. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Carnap, R. 1959. The Logical Syntax of Language, Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, & Co.
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, D. 2020. ‘What is conceptual engineering and what should it be?’, Inquiry, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1817141
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Collins, P. H. 2002. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis.
   Google Scholar
• Cook, R. 2014. ‘Should anti-realists be anti-realists about anti-realism?’, Erkenntinis, 79, 233–58.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cook, R. unpublished. ‘Perspectival logical pluralism’, unpublished manuscript.
   Google Scholar
• Curthoys, J. 1997. Feminist Amnesia: The Wake of Women's Liberation, London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Eckert, M. forthcoming. ‘Re-centering and genderqueering Val Plumwood's feminist logic’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Eckert, M., and Donahue, C. 2020. ‘Towards a feminist logic: Val Plumwood's legacy and beyond’, in D. Hyde (ed.), Noneist Explorations II: The Sylvan Jungle -- Volume 3 (Synthese Library, 432), Dordrecht: Springer, 424–48.
   Google Scholar
• Frye, M. 1983. The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, Pennsylvania, PA: Crossing Press.
   Google Scholar
• Frye, M. 1996. ‘The necessity of difference: Constructing a positive category of women’, Signs, 21 (3), 991–1010.
   Google Scholar
• Gilligan, C. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gordon-Roth, J. forthcoming. ‘Anna Maria van Schurman and Mary Astell on logic and the equality of the sexes’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Govier, T. 1993. ‘When logic meets politics: Testimony, distrust, and rhetorical advantage’, Informal Logic, 15 (2), 93–104.
   Google Scholar
• Haack, S. 1996. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
   Google Scholar
• Haslanger, S. 2000. ‘Gender and race: (What) are they? (what) do we want them to be?’, Noûs, 34 (1), 31–55.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haslanger, S. 2006. ‘What good are our intuitions: Philosophical analysis and social kinds’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 80 (1), 89–118.
   Google Scholar
• Hass, M. 2002. ‘Fluid thinking: Irigaray's critique of formal logic’, in R. Falmagne and M. Hass (eds.), Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 71–88.
   Google Scholar
• Hjortland, O. 2017. ‘Anti-exceptionalism about logic’, Philosophical Studies, 174 (3), 631–58.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hjortland, O. 2019. ‘What counts as evidence for a logical theory?’, The Australasian Journal of Logic, 16 (7), 250–82.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hundleby, C. 2010. ‘The authority of the fallacies approach to argument evaluation’, Informal Logic, 30 (3), 279–308.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hundleby, C. forthcoming. ‘Argument repair: Teaching interpretation’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Janssen-Lauret, F. 2017. ‘Susan Stebbing, incomplete symbols, and foundherentist meta-ontology’, Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 5 (2), 1–12.
   Google Scholar
• Janssen-Lauret, F. forthcoming. ‘Grandmothers of analytic philosophy: The formal and philosophical logic of christine Ladd-Franklin and Constance Jones’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Jay, N. 1981. ‘Gender and dichotomy’, Feminist Studies, 7 (1), 65–87.
   Google Scholar
• Jenkins, K. 2016. ‘Amelioration and inclusion: Gender identity and the concept of woman’, Ethics, 126 (2), 394–421.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Longino, H. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry, Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lorde, A. 1984. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches, Pennsylvania, PA: Crossing Press.
   Google Scholar
• Mikkola, M. 2011. ‘Ontological commitments, sex and gender’, in Charlotte Witt (ed.), Feminist Metaphysics, Dordrecht: Springer, 67–83.
   Google Scholar
• Moulton, J. 1983. ‘A paradigm of philosophy: The adversary method’, in S. Harding and M. Hintikka (eds.), Discovering Reality, Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 149–64.
   Google Scholar
• Nelson, L., and Nelson, J. 2002. ‘Logic from a Quinean perspective: An empirical enterprise’, in R. Falmagne and M. Hass (eds.), Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 169–90.
   Google Scholar
• Nye, A. 1990. Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic, London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Nye, A. 2002. ‘Saying what it is: Predicate logic and natural kinds’, in R. Falmagne and M. Hass (eds.), Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 191–208.
   Google Scholar
• Olkowski, D. 2002. ‘Words of power and the logic of sense’, in R. Falmagne and M. Hass (eds.), Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 117–29.
   Google Scholar
• Orr, D. 1989. ‘Just the facts Ma'am: Informal logic, gender, and pedagogy’, Informal Logic, 11 (1), 93–104.
   Google Scholar
• Plumwood, V. 1993. ‘The politics of reason: Toward a feminist logic’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71 (4), 436–62. Reprinted in R. Falmagne and M. Hass (eds.) 2002. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 11–44.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Plumwood, V. 2002. ‘Feminism and the logic of alterity’, in R. Falmagne and M. Hass (eds.), Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 45–64.
   Google Scholar
• Popper, K. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, translation by the author of Logik der Forschung, 1935, London: Hutchinson. Republished 2002, London & New York: Routledge Classics.
   Google Scholar
• Priest, G. 2006. Doubt Truth to Be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Priest, G. 2008. An Introduction to Non-classical Logic, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pugliese, N., and Secco, G. forthcoming. ‘Teaching logic from a feminist point of view’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Putnam, H. 1968. ‘Is logic empirical?’, in R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 216–41.
   Google Scholar
• Quine, W. 1951. ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’, Philosophical Review, 60 (1), 20–43.
   Google Scholar
• Quine, W. 1986. Philosophy of Logic, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rentetzi, M. 2010. ‘ “I want to look like a lady, not like a factory worker”: Rose rand, a woman philosopher of the Vienna circle’, in M. Suárez, M. Dorato and M. Rédei (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, Dordrecht: Springer, 223–44.
   Google Scholar
• Rooney, P. 2010. ‘Philosophy, adversarial argumentation, and embattled reason’, Informal Logic, 30 (3), 203–34.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Russell, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy, London: Henry Holt.
   Google Scholar
• Russell, G. 2015. ‘The justification of the basic laws of logic’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44 (6), 793–803.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Russell, G. forthcoming1. ‘From anti-exceptionalism to feminist logic’, Hypatia.
   Google Scholar
• Russell, G. forthcoming2. ‘Social spheres: Logic, ranking, and subordination’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Saint-Croix, C. 2020. ‘Privilege and position: Formal tools for standpoint epistemology’, Res Philosophica, 97 (4), 489–524.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Saul, J. 2006. ‘Gender and race’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 80 (1), 119–43.
   Google Scholar
• Scharp, K. 2013. Replacing Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Seidel, M. 2014. Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Shapiro, S. 2015. Varieties of Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shrewsbury, C. M. 1987. ‘What is feminist pedagogy?’, Women's Studies Quarterly, 15 (3), 6–14.
   Google Scholar
• Strawson, P. 1963. ‘Carnap's views on conceptual systems versus natural languages in analytic philosophy’, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court: La Salle, 503–18.
   Google Scholar
• Tarski, A. 1936. ‘On the concept of logical consequence’, in Tarski 1983, 409–20.
   Google Scholar
• Trettin, K. 1991. Die Logik und das Schweigen: zur antiken und modernen Epistemotechnik, Weinheim: VCH, Acta Humaniora.
   Google Scholar
• Uckelman, S. forthcoming. ‘Silencing voices: Women, (self)-censorship, and logic in the middle ages’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Warren, K. 1988. ‘Critical thinking and feminism’, Informal Logic, 10 (1), 31–44.
   Google Scholar
• Welton, J. 1896. A Manual of Logic, London: W.B. Clive.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, T. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Yap, A. 2010. ‘Feminism and Carnap's principle of tolerance’, Hypatia, 25 (2), 437–54.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yap, A. forthcoming. ‘The logical syntax of prejudice: Oppression and the constitutive a priori’, in A. Yap and R. Cook (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar