References
- See Margaret Cowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 19451952, vol. I: Policy Making, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974, for the excellent official history.
- Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to "The Peloponnesian War" trns. Richard Crawley, rev. edn., New York: Free Press, 1996, p. 43.
- The U.S. Government was mindful of how its (World War I) war loans had not been repaid in the 1920s, it was at the peak of its relative influence over Britain, and some of its members harbored vague millennial hopes for the Intel-nationalization of atomic energy. These and other factors were not well comprehended in contemporary Britain. London's view was that the British Empire literally had bankrupted itself for the common cause (before the forced U.S. entry into the war), and that as a full cofounder of what became the Manhattan Project it was entitled morally and legally to a full share in the Project's outcome. The Anglo-American "special relationship" did not look very special in 1945 and 1946.
- Michael Quintan, Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, London: Royal United Services Institution, 1997, p. 19.
- George Robertson (Secretary of State for Defence), The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, London: The Stationery Office, July 1998, p. 5-9.
- George Robertson (Secretary of State for Defence), The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999, London: The Stationery Office, July 1998, p. 17 (emphasis added).
- For reasons outlined in Colin S. Gray: Modem Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, and "Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past-with GPS," Review of International Studies, vol. 25, no. 5 (December 1999), pp. 161-182.
- The Secretary of State for Defence, Defence White Paper, 1999, Cm 4446, London: The Stationery Office, December 1999.
- Robertson, Strategic Defence Review, p. 17.
- For programmatic history on the evolution of the British nuclear force posture until the early 1990s, see Robert S. Noms, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. V; British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, ch. 3.
- Reportedly adapted from U.S. W76 nuclear warhead design. Ibid., pp. 117-120.
- Robertson, Strategic Defence Review, p. 19. The Government has explained that "the submarines are routinely at a 'notice to fire' measured in days rather than the few minutes' quick reaction alert sustained throughout the Cold War. Their missiles are de-targeted," Robertson, Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, p. 5-2.
- British missile body holdings of Trident II DS total 58, a number judged "sufficient to maintain a credible deterrent." Robertson, Strategic Defence Review, p. 18.
- Ibid.
- See Robertson, Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, p. 5-3, fig. 1, "United Kingdom Nuclear Stockpile data."
- Robertson, Strategic Defence Review, p. 18.
- Ibid.
- See Noms et al.. Nuclear Weapons Databook, p. 112.
- "During the Review, consideration was given to more radical de-alerting measures, such as taking submarines off deterrent patrol, and removing warheads from their missiles and storing them separately ashore." Robertson, Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, p. 5-5.
- See Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977, ch. 2.
- "Ending continuous deterrent patrols would create new risks of crisis escalation if it proved necessary to sail a Trident submarine in a period of rising tension or crisis." Robertson, Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, p. 5-5.
- Robertson, Strategic Defence Review, p. 20.
- As described in "An International 'Norm' Against Nuclear Weapons," briefing presented by Colin S. Gray, March 7, 2000.
- See Colin S. Gray, The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment, Camberley, UK: Staff College, 1996; and Michael O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.