References
- Kenneth PyIe, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1992.
- See Peter J. Woolley and Mark S. Woolley, "Japan's Sea Lane Defense Revisited," Strategic Review, vol. XXIV, no. 4 (Fall 1996): pp. 49-58.
- It is probable that Chinese hardliners consider Japanese nuclear weapons development to be inevitable and that the ongoing Chinese nuclear modernization reflects this belief (Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999, pp. 109, 113-138). Thus, if and when Japan does construct a nuclear deterrent force, Chinese reaction is likely to be characterized more by bluster than by substantive policy change.
- Jose T. Altamonte, "The Changing Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region," in David G. Timberman, ed., The Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations, New York: Asia Society, 1998.
- Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, report 105-581 (Declassified version), 105th Cong., 2d sess, 1999.
- See Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- Morihiro Hosokawa, "Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed? Reforming the Alliance," Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 4 (July/August 1998), p. 5.
- <DOI>014959301753228894</DOI>
- The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1987, p. 20.
- The Joint Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1989, pp. 5-6.
- Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983, February 8, 1982, p. 1-14.
- "No other nation poses a military threat to the United States or its allies even remotely comparable to that posed by Soviet forces. Still, there are a number of 'lesser' threats that forces designed against the largest threats are not necessarily equipped to deal with.... Direct Soviet aggression against the United States and its allies is the 'worst-case' threat to U.S. and allied security. Low-intensity conflict, however, has been the most common form of conflict for the United States in the post-World War II era. Such conflict-in the form of insurgency, terrorism, and subversion-threatens U.S. interests around the globe," in Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990, Executive Summary, p. 7.
- The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990, p. 28.
- Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, January 1992, p. 59.
- Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, February 1994, p. 8.
- "Over the longer term, hostile states possessing long-range ballistic missiles could directly threaten American cities in an attempt to deter or otherwise restrain the United States from pursuing political, diplomatic, or military initiatives designed to resolve a crisis. With weapons of mass destruction, even small-scale ballistic missile threats to the United States would raise dramatically the potential costs and risks of military operations, undermining conventional superiority and threatening the credibility of U.S. regional security strategy," in Aspin, Annual Report, 1994, p. 53.
- The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997, pp. 5-6.
- White House, National Security Strategy, 1997, p. 12.
- Hughes, "Global Threats and Challenges," p. 13.
- Hughes, "Global Threats and Challenges"; Tenet, "Current and Future Worldwide Threats," February 2, 1999; Tenet, "Worldwide Threat in 2000," February 2, 2000; Wilson, "Military Threats and Security," February 2, 2000.
- Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA, "Adaptive Enemies: Dealing with the Strategic Threat After 2010," Strategic Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 5-14, 11-12.
- Garrity, Why the Gulf War, p. 87.
- Defense Science Board, "Joint Operations Superiority," p. 90.
- Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA, "America's Army in Transition: Preparing for War in the Precision Age," Army Issue Paper no. 3, U.S. Army War College, November 1999, p. 23.
- Lt. Col. RH. Liotta, USAF, "A Strategy of Chaos," Strategic Review, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 19-30.
- Russell Travers, "A New Millennium and a Strategic Breathing Space," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 97-114.
- Dunlap, "Preliminary Observations," in Matthews, Challenging the United States, p. 8.
- Jasper Becker, "PLA Newspaper Details Strategies to 'Liberate' Taiwan," Hong Kong South China Morning Post, Internet version in English, PTS transcribed text for FBIS dated and posted March 20, 2000, p. 3.
- William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, "New Defense Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare," prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 3, 1998. Available in Defense Issues, vol. 13, no. 13 http://vww.defenselink.mil/speeches/]998/tl9980203-secdef.html.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010," May 1997, p. 15.
- Patrick M. Hughes, Lt. Gen. USA, Director DIA, "Global Threats and Challenges: the Decades Ahead," prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/sl9990202-hughes.html, p. 5.
- George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security," February 2, 2000, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_020200.html; Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015," statement for the record to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 16, 1999; Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Military Threats and Security Challenges Through 2015," Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2000.
- John C. Cannon, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, remarks to the Smithsoman Associates' Campus on the Mall, "The CIA in the New World Order: Intelligence Challenges Through 2015," February 1, 2000, http://vww.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_ 020200smithson.html.
- Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, online version available at http://www.digital.library.upenn. edu/oup-public/books/0195118162.pdf, p. 5.
- For more discussion of information warfare, see Zhalmay Khalilzad and John White, eds., The Changing Role of Information Warfare, RAND Strategic Appraisal Series, Santa Monica, CA 1999.
- Richard J. Harknett and the JCISS Study Group, "The Risks of a Networked Military," Orbis (Winter 2000), pp. 127-143; E. Anders Eriksson, "Information Warfare Hype or Reality?" The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 1999), pp. 57-64; Bradley Graham, "Military Grappling with Guidelines for Cyber Warfare," The Washington Post (November 8, 1999), pp. Al, AlO; Stephen Green, "Threat of Electromagnetic War Has Long Worried U.S. Military Leaders," San Diego Union-Tribune (November 13, 1999); Wilson et al., "Defense in the Information Age."
- Harknett, "Risks of a Networked Military."
- According to news reports, the Pentagon did consider exploiting Serbia's reliance on computer systems to interrupt military transmissions and civilian services during the conflict in Yugoslavia. Although planners explored cyberwarfaie as an option in simulations, they did not engage in this emerging gray zone of attack, because cyberdisruption poses "nettlesome legal, ethical, and practical problems." The Defense Department's top legal office determined that employing computer-based methods of attack could leave the United States open to charges of war crimes unless the networks targeted were of military necessity, collateral damage was minimized, and indiscriminate attacks were avoided (Graham, "Military Grappling with Guidelines," p. Al.) The Yugoslav military claims that the United States did engage in electronic methods and that it countered successfully in kind despite technologic inferiority. One military-issued report contends that the Yugoslav intelligence effectively infiltrated U.S. systems and learned American plans, targets, and timelines in advance of the attacks. A Serbian military leader is quoted as saying that airpower and computers will determine future conflicts: Ground forces will only meet to negotiate, talk, sign ceasefires, or capitulate ("Army Colonel Boasts About Successes Against NATO," Belgrade Tanjung Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian [November 10, 1999], FBIS translation.)
- Eriksson, "Information Warfare," p. 58.
- George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, "Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 2, 1999," http://www.senate.gavr armed_services/hearings/1999/c990202.htm; Hughes, "Global Threats and Challenges."
- Green, "Threat of Electromagnetic War"; also. Senate Hearings have been held on the issue: Hearing of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, "Electromagnetic Pulse Threats to U.S. Military and Civilian Infrastructure," 106th Congress, October 7, 1999, transcript available online at http://commdocs.house.gov/ committees/security/has280010.000/has280010_0f.htm.
- William Graham, prepared statement hearing on "Electromagnetic Pulse Threats to U.S. Military and Civilian Infrastructure," pp. 24-25; Lowell Wood, prepared statement hearing on "Electromagnetic Pulse Threats to U.S. Military and Civilian Infrastructure," p. 33.
- Dunlap, "Preliminary Observations," in Matthews, Challenging the United States, p. 5.
- Paul van Ripen and Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," Parameters, vol. 27, no. 3 (Winter 1997), pp. 4-14.
- van Ripen and Scales, "Preparing for War," p. 5.
- Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 22-35.
- Lawrence Freedman, "The Changing Forms of Military Conflict," Survival, vol. 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998-1999), pp. 39-56.
- Defense Science Board, "Joint Operations Superiority," p. 107.
- Ralph Peters, "The Human Terrain of Urban Operations," Parameters, vol. 30, no. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 12.
- Peters, "Human Terrain," p. 4.
- See Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations, RAND online, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1132.
- Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. II, p. 335.
- Garrity, Why the Gulf War Still Matters, p. 88.
- Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 89.
- Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. II, p. 335.
- Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. II, p. 345.
- Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, p. 62.
- James Hider, "U.S. Troops 'Pelted' with Stones by Kosovska Mitrovica Serbs," Paris AFP (North European Service) in English (February 20, 2000), FBIS transcribed text.
- Joseph Siniscalchi, Colonel, USAF, Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy, Occasional Paper No. 3, Center for Strategy and Technology, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College Air University, March 1998, p. 23.
- In a wargame known as Eligible Receiver conducted in 1997, "hackers" from the National Security Agency demonstrated that it was possible to access and tamper with power grids and overload 911 systems in a number of cities; they also reportedly gained "superiority-level" access to dozens of military networks, disrupting e-mail and phone traffic [Steve Goldstein, "Pentagon Planners Gird for Cyber Assault," Philadelphia Inquirer (December 1, 1999), p. I].
- See, for example, Garrity, Why the Gulf War.
- Siniscalchi, Non-Lethal Technologies, p. 24.
- Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 610.
- Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 624.
- The threat of use of weapons of mass destruction may generate economic leverage. Used to attack plants and animals, the destructive power of pathogens is an asymmetric weapon. Plant and animal pathogens used against agricultural targets would create both economic devastation and the possibility that a criminal group might seek to exploit such an attack for economic advantage (Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat in 2000").
- Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat."
- Walpole, "National Intelligence Estimate on the Ballistic Missile Threat," p. 3.
- Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat."
- Gannon, "The CIA in the New World Order."
- The White House, "A National Security Strategy," p. 19.
- Committee on National Security, "The Defend America Act of 1996: Report," House of Representatives, May 16, 1996.
- Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "A Word from the Chairman," Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 1999), pp. 1, 4-5.
- Rebecca K. Graeves, "Russia's Biological Weapons Threat," Orbis, vol. 43, no. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 479-492.
- "For countries with the ability to package and deliver nuclear and biological materials, it should also take little to deter us where the stakes for the United States are limited. This means that a very small arsenal of weapons of mass destruction could have great value, given the possessor would have to threaten only a few U.S. targets to make the U.S. costs of opposing the adversary greater than those of refraining." Richard K. Betts, "What Will It Take To Deter the United States?," Parameters, vol. 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995-1996), pp. 70-79.