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Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad Volume 37, 2008 - Issue 138
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Original Articles

Información estratégica en la negociación colectiva: evidencia empírica para el mercado continuo español

Strategic information in the collective bargaining: empirical evidence for the spanish continuous market

Ana María Sabater MarcosUniversidad Miguel HernándezCorrespondence[email protected]
,
Joaquina Laffarga BrionesUniversidad de Sevilla
&
Antonio RubiaUniversidad de AlicanteCorrespondence[email protected]
Pages 315-352 | Received 10 Jun 2007, Accepted 14 Apr 2008, Published online: 15 Jan 2014

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