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Optimization
A Journal of Mathematical Programming and Operations Research
Volume 66, 2017 - Issue 12
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Original Articles

The modeling of coalition for environmental protection within co-utility framework

Pages 2193-2209 | Received 14 Jul 2016, Accepted 07 Jul 2017, Published online: 11 Aug 2017

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