373
Views
3
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Discussion Note

Why Adding Truths Is Not Enough: A Reply to Mizrahi on Progress as Approximation to the Truth

References

  • Bird, Alexander. 2007. “What Is Scientific Progress?” Noûs 41: 64–89. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00638.x
  • Bird, Alexander. 2008. “Scientific Progress as Accumulation of Knowledge: A Reply to Rowbottom.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39: 279–281. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.019
  • Cevolani, Gustavo, and Luca Tambolo. 2013a. “Progress as Approximation to the Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach.” Erkenntnis 78: 921–935.
  • Cevolani, Gustavo, and Luca Tambolo. 2013b. “Truth May Not Explain Predictive Success, But Truthlikeness Does.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44: 590–593.
  • Dellsén, Finnur. 2016. “Scientific Progress: Knowledge Versus Understanding.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56: 72–83. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.01.003
  • Dellsén, Finnur. 2018a. “Scientific Progress, Understanding and Knowledge: Reply to Park.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 49: 451–459. doi: 10.1007/s10838-018-9419-y
  • Dellsén, Finnur. 2018b. “Scientific Progress: Four Accounts.” Philosophy Compass 13: e12525. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12525
  • Festa, Roberto. 2007. “Verisimilitude, Qualitative Theories, and Statistical Inferences.” In Approaching Truth: Essays in Honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto, edited by Sami Pihlström, Panu Raatikainen, and Matti Sintonen, 143–178. London: College Publications.
  • Hansson, Sven Ove. 2017. “Logic of Belief Revision”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/logic-belief-revision/.
  • Kuhn, Thomas Samuel. 1962/1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
  • Kuipers, Theo A. F. 1987. “A Structuralist Approach to Truthlikeness.” In What Is Closer-to-the-Truth?, edited by Theo A. F. Kuipers, 79–99. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
  • Kuipers, Theo A. F. 2000. From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism. On Some Relations Between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
  • Kuipers, Theo A. F., and Gerhard Schurz. 2011. “Belief Revision Aiming at Truth Approximation.” Special Issue of Erkenntnis 75: 151–283. doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9288-9
  • Laudan, Larry. 1978. Progress and Its Problems. Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Mizrahi, Moti. 2017. “Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to the Truth Is Not Enough.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31: 415–419.
  • Mondragón, Damian Islás. 2017. “The Inference Rule of Addition and the Semantic View of Progress: Reply to Mizrahi.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31: 421–425.
  • Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 1987. Truthlikeness. Dordrecht: Reidel.
  • Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 2014. “Scientific Progress as Increasing Verisimilitude.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46: 73–77. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.02.002
  • Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 2015. “Scientific Progress.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/scientific-progress/.
  • Oddie, Graham. 2016. “Truthlikeness.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/achives/win2016/entries/truthlikeness/.
  • Park, Seungbae. 2017. “Does Scientific Progress Consist in Incrasing Knowledge or Understanding?” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 48: 569–579. doi: 10.1007/s10838-017-9363-2
  • Popper, Karl Raimund. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
  • Rowbottom, Darrell P. 2008. “N-Rays and the Semantic View of Scientific Progress.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39: 277–278. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.010
  • Rowbottom, Darrell P. 2010. “What Scientific Progress is Not: Against Bird’s Epistemic View.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24: 241–255. doi: 10.1080/02698595.2010.522407
  • Shan, Yafeng. forthcoming. “A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress.” Philosophy of Science.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.