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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 3-4
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Articles

An Epistemic Puzzle About Knowledge and Rational Credence

Manuel Pérez OteroDepartment of Philosophy, University of BarcelonaCorrespondence[email protected]
ORCID Iconhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0922-169XView further author information
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Pages 195-206 | Published online: 30 Jan 2020

References

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