“Middle Power Blues”: Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War

NOTES

• A summary of Canada's recent activities in these areas is offered in Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership,” International Journal 52 (1997): 183–196; for an in-depth analysis see Myriam Gervais and Stéphane Roussel, “De la séurité de l'Etat celle de l'individu: l'évolution du concept de sécurité au Canada (1990–1996),” Etudes internationales 29 (1998): 25–52. On peacebuilding, see Charles-Philippe David and Martin Bourgeois, “Le Canada et la consolidation de la paix: une nouvelle approche pour la politique étrangère canadienne,” forthcoming in Etudes internationales 29 (1998).
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• Ferry de Kerckhove, “Canada's Response to Current Challenges,” in Jim Hanson, ed., World 2000: Conflict, Chaos or Civilization? (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), 70.
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• Andrew Cooper, “ln Search of Niches: Saying ‘Yes’ and Saying ‘No’ in Canada's International Relations,” Canadian Foreign Policy 3 (1995): 1–14; Evan Potter, “Niche Diplomacy and Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 52 (1997): 38.
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• Canadian diplomat J. Hyndman, “A Time for Middle Powers,” The New Federation 3 (1989): 28, quoted by Fen Osler Hampson, “A New Role for Middle Powers in Regional Conflict Resolution?” in Brian Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 191.
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• Combining these arguments, Allen Sens wrote: “[NATO's] expansion could also provide Canada with an opportunity to engage in such ‘soft’ security roles as human rights monitoring, advising, and peacekeeping training, which rely more on expertise, with which Canada is well endowed, and less on military capabilities, of which Canada has fewer and fewer.” See Sens's “Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance,” International Journal 50 (1995): 698–699. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim R. Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 22.
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• Kim Richard Nossal, quoted by Geoffrey Hayes, “Middle Powers in the New World Order,” Behind the Headlines 51 (1993–1994): 12.
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• Jocelyn Coulon, Les Casques bleus (Montréal: Fides, 1994), 272. Our translation.
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• Hampson, ibid.; Joseph T. Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping (Toronto: Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), 23–26.
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• Ulf Lindell and Stefan Persson, “The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Literature Overview,” Cooperation and Conflict 2 (1986): 79–84; Robert O. Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy 1 (1971): 161–182.
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• Lindell and Persson, 81; Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 194–195.
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• Quoted by James Eayrs, “Le Canada, puissance de premier plan,” Perspectives internationales 4 (1975): 22. See also John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).
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• Michael Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? (Downsview: Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1984), 3–8.
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• See Bernard Wood, “Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions,” in Cranford Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 70–107; David R. Mares, “Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement,” International Studies Quartely 32 (1988): 453–471; David R. Mares, “Mexico's Foreign Policy as A Middle Power: The Nicaragua Connection, 1884–1986,” Latin American Research Review 23 (1988): 81–107.
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• Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, ibid. See also David R. Black and Heather A. Smith, “Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 26 (1993): 745–774; Hayes, ibid. It should also be noted that some writers challenge the proposition that Middle Powers are behaving differently than other states. See Laura J. Neak, Beyond the Rhetoric of Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Middle States in International Politics. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1991.
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• Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23 (1969): 296.
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• George Liska, “The Third World,” in America and the World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 409–423.
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• Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 24–25. This is not to say that these roles are the exclusive preserve of Middle Powers, but only that Middle Powers frequently rely on these strategies.
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• Lindell and Persson; Keohane.
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• Handel.
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• We find attempts to systematize what a Middle Power policy is in these diplomats' memoirs and comments on current affairs. See in particular John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle Aged Power; John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World order 1943–1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979 and 1982); Lester B. Pearson, Mike, Vol. II—Memoirs 1948–1957: The International Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). See also J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935–1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982).
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• This point must be made with some caution, however, for the concept of a Middle Power and the related policies were essentially developed and applied by the Department of External Affairs. It appears to have exerted far less influence at the Department of National Defence, which was partially responsible for the implementation of security policy. Examples of this policy are therefore found primarily in the diplomatic sphere.
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• See Douglas Murray, “Canada,” in Douglas Murray and Paul Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994 [3rd. Edition]), 57–94, for an excellent overview.
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• In this sense, Canada's position may be compared with that of a number of Small and Middle Powers in Central and Eastern Europe. On these states, see Allen Sens, “The Security of Small States in Post-Cold War Europe,” in David G. Haglund, ed., From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 229–252.
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• John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Pence; Escott Reid, Time of Fear ad Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947–1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); Tom Keating, Canada and World order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993).
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• See in particular Michael Tucker, “Canada and the Test-Ban Negotiations (1955–1971),” in Kim R. Nossal, ed., An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of john W. Holmes (Toronto: CIIA, 1982), 115–140. See also Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament 1945–1988 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 359–362.
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• H. Gordon Skilling, “The Helsinki Process,” in Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds., Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 135–158.
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• According to some writers, the ideological and normative dimensions play an important role in defining the attitudes of Middle Powers. For example, in their study of Middle Powers, Cranford Pratt et al. focus on what they postulate as these States' shared view of the world. See for example Cranford Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism: The North South Dimension (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). See also Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 27.
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• Michel Fortmann, “Le Canada et le maintien de la paix,” in André P. Donneur and Jean Pariseau, eds., Regards sur le système de défense du Canada (Toulouse: Presses de I'Institut d'Études Politiques de Toulouse—Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur l'Armée, 1989), 105. Our translation.
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• Jockel, 13–23.
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• Peacekeeping, mediation, and conflict resolution operations could be conducted only with the approval of the Great Powers, and only when the Great Powers were not directly involved. Lyndon B. Johnson's reaction to Pearson's criticism of the U.S. bombing of Vietnam in 1965 is a case in point.
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• We exclude here peacemaking operations conducted unilaterally by one or another of the Great Powers, with or without a UN mandate.
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• Christopher Layne best makes the argument that the current preponderance the U.S. enjoys in the strategic international system will not last and will have to deal with strong, rising, multipolar trends, in “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,” International Security 22 (1997): 86–124; see also his “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17 (1993): 5–51.
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• Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996).
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• John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
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• Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Between A New World Order and None: Explaining the Re-Emergence of the United Nations in World Politics,” Occasional Paper, York University Center for International and Strategic Studies, No. 29, March 1995.
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• Brad Roberts, U.S. Security in an Uncertain Era (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 120–149.
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• James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 169–179.
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• Charles William Maynes, “Relearning Intervention,” Foreign Policy 98 (1995): 96–115.
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• Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1995 [2nd edition]).
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• Keating, 19.
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• Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 144–162.
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• See David Dewitt, “Cooperative Security: A Canadian Approach to the Promotion of Peace and Security in the Post Cold-War Era,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 23 (1994): 11–18.
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• Government of Canada, Canada in the World. Government Statement (Ottawa, 1995), 25. See also the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (Ottawa, November 1994).
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• Joseph Nye, Bound to Lad: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Felipe Femandez-Armesto, Millenium (New York: Bantam, 1995).
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• Axworthy.
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• Government of Canada, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations (Ottawa, September 1995).
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• Isabelle Desmartis and Manon Tessier, “Une capacité de réaction rapide pour l'ONU,” Le maintien de la paix, Bulletin No. 18 (September 1995).
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• James Fergusson and Barbara Levesque, “The Best Laid Plans: Canada's Proposal for a United Nations Rapid Reaction Capability,” International Journal 52 (1997): 119.
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• See Stéphane Roussel, “Amère Amérique… L'OTAN et l'intérêt national du Canada,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 22 (1993): 35–42.
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• Sens, “Saying Yes to Expansion,” 698.
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• Keating, 237.
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• Keating, 238–240; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 155–156.
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• John Kirton, “The Diplomacy of Concert: Canada, The G7 and the Halifax Summit,” Canadian Foreign Policy 3 (1995): 63–79.
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• Bob Lawson, “Towards a New Multilateralism: Canada and the Landmine Ban,” Behind the Headlines 54 (1997): 18–23.
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• “Table-ronde sur le Processus d'Ottawa pour le bannissement des mines antipersonnel” (Ottawa, DFAIT, 5 December 1997).
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• Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 116–143.
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• Jocelyn Coulon, La dernière Croisade: La guerre du Golfe et le rôle caché du Canada (Montreal: Méridien, 1992), 71–76.
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• See André P. Donneur and Stéphane Roussel, “Le Canada: quand l'expertise et la crédibilité ne suffisent plus,” in Alex Mcleod and Stéphane Roussel, eds., Intérêt national et responsabilités internationales: Six Etats face au conflit en ex-Yougoslavie (Montreal: Guérin, 1996), 143–160, for a detailed analysis.
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• See Debates of the House of Commons, Vol. 133, No. 193, 30 November 1994, 8479; 1 December 1994, 8550; 9 December 1994, 8881; 3 May 1995, 12110–12111; 30 May 1995, 13002.
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• In February 1993, a Senate Committee recommended that the government be more selective in its peacekeeping commitments. See Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993).
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• Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, “Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World,” international Journal 50 (1995): 370–400.
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