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International Interactions
Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations
Volume 48, 2022 - Issue 5
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International Conflict

Why “cheap” threats are meaningful: Threat perception and resolve in North Korean propaganda

Pages 936-967 | Received 29 Oct 2021, Accepted 05 Apr 2022, Published online: 17 Jun 2022

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