Tweaking the four-component model

References

• Aristotle. (1984). Nicomachean ethics. (D. Ross, Trans.). In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of Aristotle, vol 2. (pp. 1729–1867). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Badhwar, N. (1996). The limited unity of virtue. Noûs, 30, 306–329.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bebeau, M. (2001). Influencing the moral dimensions of professional practice: Implications for teaching and assessing for research integrity. In Proceedings: CR1 Conference on Research Integrity (pp. 179–187). Retrieved from http://ori.dhhs.gov/documents/proceedings_rri.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Bebeau, M., & Thoma, S. (1999). ‘Intermediate’ concepts and the connection to moral education. Educational Psychology Review, 11, 343–360.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bennett, J. (1974). The conscience of Huckleberry Finn. Philosophy, 49, 123–134.
   Google Scholar
• Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). Personality and social intelligence. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
   Google Scholar
• Colby, A., Kohlberg L., & Speicher B., Hewer, A., Candee D., Gibbs, J., & Power, C. (1987). The measure of moral judgment. New York, NY, Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Doris, J. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Greene, J. (2008). The secret joke of Kant’s soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, vol. 3 (pp. 35–79). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F., & Murphy, S. (2000). Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reason. Retrieved from http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Haidt-Moral-Dumfounding-When-Intuition-Finds-No-Reason.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Harman, G. (1999). Moral philosophy meets social psychology: Virtue ethics and the fundamental attribution error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331.
   Google Scholar
• Kamtekar, R. (2004). Situationism and virtue ethics on the content of our character. Ethics, 114, 458–491.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development: The nature and validity of moral stages, 194–195. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row.
   Google Scholar
• Miller, C. (2003). Social psychology and virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics, 7, 365–392.
   Google Scholar
• Minnameier, G. (2010). The problem of moral motivation and the happy victimizer phenomenon: Killing two birds with one stone. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 129, 55–75.
   Google Scholar
• Narvaez, D., & Bock, T. (2002). Moral schemas and tacit judgment or how the defining issues test is supported by cognitive science. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 297–314.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Narvaez, D., & Gleason, T. (2007). The influence of moral judgment development and moral experience on comprehension of moral narratives and expository texts. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 168, 251–276.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Narvaez, D. (2005). The Neo-Kohlbergian tradition and beyond: Schemas, expertise and character. In C. Pope-Edwards, & G. Carlo (Eds.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, vol. 51: Moral motivation through the lifespan (pp. 119–163). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nucci, L. (2002). Goethe’s Faust revisited: Lessons from DIT research. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 315–324.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nunner-Winkler, G., & Sodian, B. (1988). Children’s understanding of moral emotions. Child Development, 59, 1323–1338.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nussbaum, M. (1988). Non-relative virtues: An Aristotelian approach. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 13, 32–53.
   Google Scholar
• Puka, B. (2002). The DIT and the ‘dark side’ of development. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 339–352.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rest, J. (1979). Developing in judging moral issues. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rest, J. (1983). Morality. In J. Flavell, & E. Markman Handbook of child psychology, vol. 3, 4th ed. (pp. 556–629). New York, NY: Wiley.
   Google Scholar
• Rest, J. (1994). Background: Theory and research. In J. Rest, & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development in the professions (pp. 1–26). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
   Google Scholar
• Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M., & Thoma, S. (1999a). Postconventional moral thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
   Google Scholar
• Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M., & Thoma, S. (1999b). A Neo-Kohlbergian approach: The DIT and schema theory. Educational Psychology Review, 11, 291–324.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S., & Bebeau, M. (2000). A Neo-Kohlbergian approach to morality research. Journal of Moral Education, 29, 381–395.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Russell, D. (2009). Practical intelligence and the virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sabini, J., & Silver, M. (2005). Lack of character? Situationism critiqued. Ethics, 115, 535–562.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sreenivasan, G. (2002). Errors about errors: Virtue theory and trait attribution. Mind, 111, 47–68.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thoma, S. (2002). An overview of the Minnesota approach to research in moral development. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 225–245.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thoma, S., & Bebeau, M. (2013). Moral motivation and the four component model. In K. Heinrichs, F. Oser, & T. Lovat (Eds.), Handbook of moral motivation: Theories, models, applications (pp 49–67). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense.
   Google Scholar
• Thoma, S., Derryberry, W. P., & Crowson, H. M. (2013). Describing and testing an intermediate concept measure of adolescent moral thinking. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 10, 239–252.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Walker, L. (2002). The model and the measure: An appraisal of the Minnesota approach to moral development. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 353–367.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar