137
Views
0
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Original Articles

Sex, Disorder and Perversion

Pages 203-229 | Published online: 02 Sep 2009

References

  • Catechism of the Catholic Church, Geoffrey Chapman, London: 1994, a2357ff.
  • ‘Sexual Perversion’ in Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol 75, no. 3; September 1997, p.360.
  • Gagnon, J. and Simon, W. (eds.) Sexual Deviance (1967), New York: Harper and Row, p.1.
  • See his ‘Plain Sex’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, No. 3 (Spring 1977), pp. 267–287.
  • The term ‘episodes’ here is meant to cover experiences, activities, fantasies, etc., i.e., all those encounters which could conceivably be sexual.
  • This model in fact is a concatenation of two separate models: the reproductive organs model, and the reproductive function model. Nothing essential is missed by treating them as a single model.
  • Apologies to Woody Allen. I must confess serious personal doubts about this scenario, however. It seems to me—and also to the general Catholic tradition—that there is something of profound and even mystical significance about our actual sexual constitution, about the way in which our sexuality and sexual pleasure is intimately connected with reproduction, the way in which it involves both union and separation, giving and receiving, the way in which the pleasure and union of sex is connected with new life, birth and parenthood. But none of this casts doubt on the conceptual point made here, viz. that sex and reproduction are not conceptually but only contingently connected.
  • See Alan Soble's Sexual Investigations New York University Press, New York: 1996, pp. 124–127.
  • For more on the need to separate sexuality and reproduction see Sara Ann Ketchum's ‘The Good, the Bad and the Perverted: Sexual Paradigms Revisited’ in Alan Soble's (ed.) The Philosophy of Sex (1980), Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield.
  • ‘Sexual Experiences’ in Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 1967, p.93.
  • ‘Plain Sex’, p. 269.
  • Exactly how this is to work from the point of view of physiology, erection, lubrication, etc. need not concern us here. The point is that there is no principled reason why this should or could not occur.
  • Exactly why Taylor wants to insist on contact with a ‘fleshy’ object remains a mystery to me: surely the existence of virtually any form of fetishism is enough to suggest the inadequacy of his definition? For the usual fetishist there is nothing particularly fleshy about women's underwear, red shoes, satin sheets, etc.
  • Taylor, ibid., p. 91.
  • Of course if Taylor just means by a ‘thrilling sensation’ what I have been describing as a sexual sensation then I have no gripe with the above claim. But it is hard to see that this is what he does mean. What he in fact seems to be after is a physical-contact criterion for sexual experiences: desire is sexual if it is desire for physical contact and sensation is sexual if it is located in the genitals. Neither of these, I hope to have shown, are necessary.
  • Sexual Investigations, p. 129.
  • Ruddick in ‘Sexual Morality’ in Rachels, J. (ed) Moral Problems, Harper & Row, New York: 1975; Gray in ‘Sex and Sexual Perversion’ in Journal of Philosophy Vol. 75, No. 1 April 1978.
  • Robert Gray, ibid., p. 159.
  • Journal of Philosophy Vol. 66, No.1, January 1969.
  • Nagel, pp.11–12.
  • Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this difficulty. I do not pretend to deal with it fully here, and also take it that a good deal more needs to be said about what suitability to function really amounts to. But I hope that there is enough here to suggest at least what form an appropriate and convincing answer would take. The function that is spoken of here is a general biological/psychological matter, and refers to a biological or psychological and not a merely numerical norm.
  • Thanks to Tom Martin and Ward Jones for bringing this objection to my attention, and thanks also to Samantha Vice for helping me to see how to answer it.
  • I owe a good deal of this paper to many discussions many years ago with my friend Dr. Graham Williams. He won't approve of its subsequent development, and I happily grant that all errors are mine only. Many thanks to the students and staff of the Rhodes University Philosophy Department, especially Ward Jones, for guiding my efforts.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.