References
- A version of this paper was given as the Presidential address to the annual conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, at Brisbane, August 1971. I am extremely grateful to Mr. Harry Beran who has tirelessly commented upon a number of drafts. He does not accept many of the theses advanced, but the paper is greatly improved as a result of his criticisms.
- Prentice Hall, 1966, Chapter 6.
- Grice , H. P. 1961 . “The Causal Theory of Perception” . In Aristotelian Society Proceedings Vol. 35 ,
- 1963 . Journal of Philosophy , LX
- A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge 1968, Chapter 7.
- It should perhaps be noted that if tryings are identical with physical processes in the brain, then the agent might deliberately bring a certain brain-process into existence by trying to move his arm, but the brain-process might not be the effect of the trying because it was identical with the trying. If means are always causes of their ends, then this trying would not be a means of producing this brain-process. I am uncertain whether or not the concept of a means should be extended to cover this sort of case. It is clear, however, that means are never the effects of their ends.
- 1964 . “The Descriptive Element in the Concept of Action” . Journal of Philosophy , LXI : 616
- See my Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge 1963, Chapter 6.
- See again Chapter 6 of Belief, Truth and Knowledge, where, however, the discussion is confined to intellectual as opposed to practical principles.
- Chapter 7, Section 5.
- 1965 . “Basic Actions” . American Philosophical Quarterly , 2