THE REFUTATION OF STACE

References

• Stace , W. T. 1934 . “The Refutation of Realism,” . Mind , N.S. XLIII : 145 – 155 . G.E. Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism,” Mind, N.S. XII (1903), 433–453. Both repr. in: George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. C.M. Turbayne (Indianapolis, Ind., and New York, 1970), pp. 85–99, 57–84, resp.
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• Lewis , D. 1965 . “Moore's Realism,” . In Moore and Ryle: Two Ontologists Edited by: Lewis , D. and Addis , L. Iowa City, Ia. , , The Hague C.J. Ducasse, “Moore's Refutation of Idealism,” in Paul A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, 3rd ed. (La Salle, Ill., 1968), pp. 225–251; E.D. Klemke, “Introduction: Did G.E. Moore Refute Idealism?” in E.D. Klemke, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of G.E. Moore (Chicago, 19691, pp. 3–24.
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• Moore , G. E. “A Reply to My Critics,” Edited by: Schilpp . 653 – 654 . op. cit.
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• Moore . “The Refutation of Idealism,” Edited by: Berkeley . 68 – 69 . op. cit., Turbayne. It is unfortunate that Moore never bothered to develop another line of thought in his paper, according to which idealism leads to determinism (“Idealists…must assert that whatever is experienced, is necessarily so…whatever is experienced also must be experienced,” ibid., pp. 67, 71, italics in orig.), for this is incompatible with the defense of free-will which Moore later undertook, in his Ethics (1912).
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• Stace . “The Refutation of Realism,” Edited by: Berkeley . 90 op. cit. Turbayne
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• Ibid., p. 88.
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• Ibid., pp. 91–93.
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• Ibid., pp. 93, 99.
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• Ibid. pp. 92, 98.
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• Ibid., pp. 98–99.
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• Ibid., p. 95.
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• Ibid., pp. 95–96.
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• Ibid., pp. 87–88, 94.
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• Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism,” in Berkeley, op. cit., ed. Turbayne, pp. 74, 78. From Moore's discussion (ibid., pp. 77, 79), it is clear that he favors a doctrine of ‘immanence’ not in the Aristotelian but more in the Humean or Jamesian sense, insofar as the designation of ‘consciousness and introspection’ is concerned. The same holds good for Stace. See also E.D. Klemke, The Epistemology of G.E. Moore (Evanston, Ill., 1969), pp. 111, 115.
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• Stace, “The Refutation of Realism,” p. 96.
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• Ibid., p. 98. Italics in orig.
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• Ibid., p. 86. Italics in orig.
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• KdrV A 641/B 669.
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• Stace, “The Refutation of Realism,” p. 99.
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• On this topic see Karl R. Popper, “A Note on Berkeley as Precursor of Mach and Einstein,” in Berkeley, op. cit., ed. Turbayne, pp. 135, 139.
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• Compare J.S. Mills: “The truth of an opinion is part of its utility…no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful,” On Liberty, any ed., Ch. II, para. 10, as a resolution of the difficulties.
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• In connection with the problems of Idealism, see Peirce's review of Berkeley's Works in the Fraser recension of 1871 (Collected Papers, ed. Burks, 8.7–8.38), and the discussion, “Berkeley and Some Anticipations of Pragmatism,” in H.S. Thayer, Meaning and Action (Indianapolis, Ind., and New York, 1968), Appendix Five, pp. 499–507.
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• For treatment see Thayer, op. cit., pp. 79–132; Fr. Vincent G. Potter, Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals (Amherst, Mass., 1967), and Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 1961). Mention should also be made of the ‘future-orientation’ of Peircean thought, as expressed especially by and in the “maxim” (CP 5.402) and elsewhere (CP 8.191–8.193, quoted in extenso in “Peirce on Pragmatism,” in Thayer, op. cit., Appendix Three, pp. 493–495), and of the fusion of this element with Peirce's “Scotistic realism,” for a full study of which see John F. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism (Seattle, Wash., 1963).
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• Stace, “The Refutation of Realism,” p. 98.
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• Ibid., p. 97. This is a covert attack on (among others) Santayana.
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• Ibid., p. 96.
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• Ibid., pp. 89–91. Note that Stace does “…propose to prove that no proof of the existence of unexperienced objects is possible” (ibid., p. 89, italics in orig.), thus making him very Kantian indeed.
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• As Murphey, op. cit., and Manley H. Thompson in The Pragmatic Philosophy of C.S. Peirce, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1963) show, this aspect of Peirce's philosophy is closely tied to his metaphysical scheme of Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness, which in itself incorporates the Stacean wisdom concerning relational knowledge and epistemic qualities (“The Refutation of Realism,” p. 90) while going beyond it, and at the same time doing justice to ‘common-sense’ as represented by the Moorean position which is Stace's sworn antagonist.
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• For exploration, see Thayer, op. cit., esp. pp. 86–101, 120–132.
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• See my “Against the Logicians: Some Informed Polemics” and “Two Dogmas of Philosophy” (both forthcoming).
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