FOOTNOTES
- Reference to opportunity is necessary, since a man with the ability to do A may try to do A but fail. because he lacks an opportunity to do so. Reference to trying is necessary because a man with the ability and an opportunity to do A may simply forego A-ing. It is not denied that certain human abilities may be displayed (exercised, manifested) without the agent's trying (he may display them in a trance). It is consistent to admit that this may be a fact about the exercise of abilities and still maintain that (5) is the right analysis of (1).
- For the sake of brevity, henceforth I shall omit the “reasonably likely” qualification to (5) which is necessary to account, for the possibility of failure with regard to complex abilities such as the one under discussion. And I shall speak of effort occasionally, in place of “trying”, since it sometimes sounds less clumsy.
- 1965 . The Philosophical Review , LXX : 88 – 95 .
- Swartz , R. , ed. 1965 . Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing New York : Doubleday and Company, Inc. . Reprinted in
- Kaufman's , A. 1970 . “Ability” . In The Nature of Human Action Edited by: Brand , M. 192 – 203 . Glenview : Scott, Foresman and Company . Those who have defended positions similar to mine have made at least two mistakes which I am endeavoring to avoid here. For one thing, they have claimed that all states of human ability are causal states. Secondly, they have claimed that these states are neurophysiological states or the like. The former claim involves a contentious extension of the notion of cause, while the latter imparts neurophysiological information that does not belong in a philosophical analysis of the ordinary man's conception of ability. Both mistakes are found in