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ARTICLES

Special Operations and the Intelligence System

Pages 575-592 | Published online: 21 Aug 2006

REFERENCES

  • For more details on SOF organization and missions, see Special Operations Forces Posture Statement at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/sof/index.html [CSA]
  • CIA paramilitary operations are conducted by Military Special Projects (MSP), formerly known as Special Activities Staff. The group reportedly recruits heavily, if not almost exclusively, from U.S. military special operations units. [CSA]
  • Bill Gertz , “ Congress to Restrict Use of Special Ops, ” The Washington Times , 13 August 2003 .
  • Col. John Jogerst , “ What's So Special about Special Operations? Lessons from the War in Afghanistan, ” Aerospace Power Journal , Summer 2002. [CSA]
  • For details, see USSOCOM Posture Statement . [CSA]
  • The SOCs include SOCCENT (Central Command), SOCEUR (European Command), SOCSOUTH (Southern Command), SOCPAC (Pacific Command), SOCKOR (US Forces Korea), and SOCJFCOM (Joint Forces Command), with the last SOC and command being concerned with doctrine and training development. It is unclear whether Northern Command will have an assigned SOC. [CSA]
  • Detailed organizational and doctrine are in U.S. Army Field Manual FM 34-36 , Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. [CSA]
  • Air Force Doctrine Document 35 , Special Operations , 16 January 1995 .
  • Anthony H. Cordesman , The Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 August 2002 , p. 71 .
  • For a similar argument, see Carl Conetta , Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to Combat al-Qaeda and the New Terrorism , The Project on Defense Alternatives , June 2002 .
  • Anthony H. Cordesman , The Lessons of Afghanistan , p. 21. [CSA]
  • For a somewhat contrarian view, see Anthony H. Cordesman , The Lessons of Afghanistan , p. 70 . He argues that the value of HUMINT may be “exaggerated” at times due to the time required to establish functioning HUMINT networks . [CSA]
  • Kabul , 22 July 2002 , Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) .
  • A detailed list of the some of the most recent projects is in the USSOCOM Posture Statement . [CSA]
  • Dawn S. Onley , “ Net-Centric Goal: A Different Military ,” Government Computer News , 10 November 2003 .
  • John Ferris , “ A New American Way of War? C4ISR in Operation Iraqi Freedom, A Provisional Assessment ,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies , Spring/Summer 2003 . [CSA]
  • For a fuller discussion of this point, see Stephen Biddle , Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy , U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute , Carlisle Barracks , PA , November 2002 , pp. 32 – 46 . Cordesman, p. 21, has a similar assessment .
  • Anthony H. Cordesman , The Lessons of Afghanistan , p. 18 . [CSA]
  • David A. Fulghum , “ Hi-Tech Reassessed ,” Aviation Week & Space Technology , 10 November 2003 , p. 29 .
  • Eric L. Dahlstrom , From Reconnaissance to Surveillance: Intelligence Transformation in the New Millennium , unpublished paper , National Defense University , undated , p. 3 .
  • David A. Fulghum , “ Hi-Tech Reassessed .” p. 29 . [CSA]
  • Joe Marrafro , Scientific and Technical Intelligence Officer Program, “Intelligence Lessons Learned: An Unofficial Quick Look,” PowerPoint presentation, 7 May 2002. For an overall assessment of the use of UAVs, see Judy D. Chizek, Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ( Washington , D.C. : Congressional Research Service ), updated 17 January 2003 .
  • Norman Friedman , Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War ( Annapolis , MD : Naval Institute Press , 2003 ), p. 170 .
  • Joe Marrafro , “Intelligence Lessons Learned.” [CSA]
  • Ibid. [CSA]
  • Robert K. Ackerman , “ Technology Empowers Information Operations in Afghanistan ,” Signal Magazine , March 2002 .
  • Ibid. Quote is from Brig. Gen. Dennis C. Moran, USA, Director of command, control, communications and information systems (J-6) at CENTCOM. [CSA]
  • Col. Bruce Burda , Air Force Special Operations Command , “ Operation Enduring Freedom: Lessons Learned, ” at www.dtic.mil/ndia/2003solic/burda.pdf
  • Anthony H. Cordesman , The Lessons of Afghanistan , p. 46 . [CSA]
  • Col. Bruce Burda , “ Operation Enduring Freedom. [CSA]
  • Air Force Doctrine Document 35 , Special Operations , 16 January 1995 .
  • Shahram Chubin , Jerrold D. Green , Andrew Rathmell , Conference Proceedings: Terrorism and Asymmetric Conflict in Southwest Asia , RAND, 2002, p. 3.
  • Marian Wilkinson , “ How US Kept Australians In The Dark ,” Sydney Morning Herald , 21 November 2003 . [CSA]
  • LTC(R) William Fleser , “ Operational Net Assessment: Implications and Opportunities for SOF, ” Special Warfare 15/4 ( December 2002 ), pp. 12 – 17 . [CSA]
  • Ibid. , p. 14 . [CSA]
  • For a more positive assessment and review of ongoing developments, see Norman Friedman , Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War , pp. 108 – 120 . Also , David A. Fulghum , “Hi-Tech Reassessed,” and Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 November 2003 , p. 20 . [CSA]
  • For a detailed doctrinal explanation, see Department of Defense, Joint Publication JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations , 28 October 1992 .
  • James Kitfield , “ Chasing Terrorists Into All the Dark Places ,” National Journal , 15 November 2003. Even with the potential shift in command relationships, however, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASDSOLIC) stresses that regional commands typically will remain the supported commands. [CSA]
  • JP3-05 . [CSA]
  • For a series of reports dealing with the significant problems faced in establishing intelligence cells for JTFs in earlier operations, see U.S. Joint Forces Command, Universal Joint Lessons Learned, undated . [CSA]
  • For the DSB proposal, see Federation of American Scientists at www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsbbrief.ppt . [CSA]
  • For examples of such criticism, see William M. Arkin , The Los Angeles Times, 27 October 2002, and David Isenberg, “P2OG Allows Pentagon to Fight Dirty,” Asia Times, 5 November 2002. In this era of conspiracy theories, there are of course several Websites charging that the group is intended to coordinate a secret US plan to launch terrorist operations against either its own citizens or against the rest of the world. [CSA]
  • JP 3-05 . [CSA]
  • Ibid . [CSA]
  • Although focusing on the conventional portion of the Iraqi war, the 3rd Infantry Division's After Action Report notes a number of issues in coordination with both SOF and CIA as 3rd ID elements advanced . [CSA]
  • AOs for other active duty Special Forces Groups are: 1st: Asia and Pacific; 3rd: most of Sub-Saharan Africa; 7th: Latin America and Caribbean; and 10th: Europe . [CSA]
  • “Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse” (Letter Report, 05/15/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-85) . [CSA]
  • Juan O. Tamayo , “ Hunt For Bin Laden Is Not Likely To Intensify, ” Miami Herald , 15 December 2003 .
  • General Accounting Office, Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program , September 2003 , p. 18 .
  • Ibid. , p. 3 . [CSA]
  • Ibid. , p. 8 . [CSA]
  • Robert D. Kaplan , “ Think Global, Fight Local, ” The Wall Street Journal , 19 December 2003 , p. A14 . [CSA]
  • Interview: Lieutenant General James T. Conway, “We've Always Done Windows,” Proceedings , November 2003 , p. 33 .
  • Stephen J. Hedges , “ Special Forces Get Bigger Role, ” Chicago Tribune , 21 December 2003 . [CSA]
  • “SOF Legislator,” Special Operations Technology, at http://www.special-operations-technology.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=582. White House Statement of 7 February 2005, President Bush's FY 2006 Defense Budget .
  • As an example of efforts to increased SOF personnel, the Army has begun direct recruitment for Special Forces personnel instead of using its previous standards of recruiting only experienced NCOs. Although the Army leadership has expressed satisfaction with the results thus far, a previous experiment with a similar policy in the 1980s was dropped, evidently due to poor outcomes . [CSA]
  • DSB. [CSA]
  • Dawn S. Onley , “ Net-Centric Goal: A Different Military, ” Government Computer News , 10 November 2003 . Remark is by Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation .

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