REFERENCES
- James G. March and Johan P. Olsen , Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations ( Bergen , Norway : Universitetsvorlaget , 1976 ), p. 11 .
- Notable examples include: Loch K. Johnson , America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society ( New York : Oxford University Press , 1989 ); Bob Woodward , Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987 ( New York : Simon & Schuster , 1987 ); Joseph Persico , Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey: From the OSS to the CIA ( New York : Viking Penguin , 1990 ); Ray S. Cline , The CIA Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey ( Washington , DC : Acropolis Books Press , 1991 ). Casey is considered as someone who caused the politicization of the Agency, and the debate has largely centered on his controversial measures. Additionally, due to a series of failed covert actions, his era has been hitherto examined mainly through legal lenses, while putting particular emphasis on the legality and control of the secret agency's activities in a democracy. See, for instance, Richard Shultz, Jr., “Covert Action and Executive–Legislative Relations: The Iran-Contra Crisis and Its Aftermath,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 449–482. Furthermore, his controversial management style and personality led political scientists to focus almost exclusively on his part in producing politicized intelligence to the effect of neglecting flawed organizational aspects of the analysis process which characterized the agency even prior to his arrival.
- Organizational culture is a set of values and norms that pervade military and intelligence organizations to the point of changing individual belief systems and creating shared perceptions. On the organizational model see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow , Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, , 2nd ed. ( New York : Longman , 1999 ), pp. 143 – 196 ; Lynn Eden , Whole World On Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation ( Ithaca , NY : Cornell University Press , 2004 ), p. 50 .
- Such questions as whether the CIA should be divided along regional or functional lines have received a great deal of attention. See Sherman Kent , Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press , 1949), pp. 116–147. Another question often dealt with is the coordination problem: Bruce D. Berkowitz, “Intelligence in the Organizational Context: Coordination and Error in National Estimates,” Orbis, Vol. 29, Fall 1985, pp. 571–596. Even Amy Zegart's work on 9/11 has looked only at adaptation failures rather than examine how organizational culture actually shapes intelligence estimates. See Amy Zegart, “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 33–60; and Amy Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, Spring 2005, pp. 78–111. Finally, another strand of intelligence literature dealing with organizational aspects concentrated on control and monitoring mainly of the intelligence agency's covert activities. See Barry Goldwater, “Congress and Intelligence Oversight,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 1983, pp. 16–21; Glenn P. Hastedt, Controlling Intelligence (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1991).
- Richard K. Betts , “Strategic Intelligence Estimates: Let's Make Them Useful,” Parameters , Vol. 10 , December 1980 , pp. 20 – 26 ; Richard Betts, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimates, revised ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993).
- See, for instance, his classic work, Robert Jervis , Perception and Misperception in International Politics ( Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press , 1976 ).
- Roberta Wohlstetter , Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision ( Stanford , CA : Stanford University Press , 1962 ) and Ephraim Kam , Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective ( Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press , 1988 ). Richard K. Betts , “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” in Klaus Knorr , ed., Power, Strategy, and Security ( Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press , 1983 ).
- Joseph Persico , Casey: The Lives and Secrets , p. 385 .
- Melvin Goodman, “Testimony in the Robert Gates Hearings,” in United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Robert M. Gates: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, on nomination of Robert M. Gates, to be Director of Central Intelligence, United States Senate Hearings, p. 143.
- See Uri Bar-Joseph , Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States ( University Park , PA : Pennsylvania State University Press , 1994 ), p. 33 .
- Graham Fuller, “Testimony in the Robert Gates Hearings,” p. 161.
- Robert Jervis , “Hypothesis on Misconception,” World Politics , Vol. 20 , April 1968 , p. 478 .
- For an elaborate analysis of the development of Casey's “good versus evil” belief system, see Joseph Persico, Casey: The Lives and Secrets, Chapters 1 and 2.
- Marci McDonald , “Would You Believe…Iranian Moderates? (When Will the CIA Get Smart?),” Washington Monthly , Vol. 19 , No. 10 , March 1987 , p. 45 .
- Robert Gates , From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York : Simon & Schuster , 1996), p. 299.
- Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross , Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment ( Englewood Cliffs , NJ : Prentice-Hall , 1980 ), pp. 45 – 62 ; see also Robert Jervis, “Representativeness in Foreign Policy Judgments,” Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 1986, pp. 483–505.
- Horton claims that Casey was so influenced by a story of one of the businessmen that he kept a plane waiting on the course in Mexico, just in case the regime fell . John Horton , “Mexico, the Way of Iran?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence , Vol. 1 , No. 2 , 1986 , pp. 91 – 95 .
- Robert Jervis “What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence , Vol. 1 , No. 1 , 1986 , p. 33 .
- Bob Woodward , Veil , pp. 85 , 453 .
- Richard Betts , “Politicization of the Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” in Richard Betts and Thomas Mankhen , eds., Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael Handel ( London : Frank Cass , 2003 ), p. 70 .
- The only account of this claim is Bob Woodward , Veil , pp. 124 – 129 . See also Claire Sterling , The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism ( New York : Holt, Rinehart, and Winston , 1981 ).
- An address by William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Dallas Council on World Affairs, Dallas, Texas, 18 September 1985. Current Policy, No. 761, United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., November 1985. According to Casey, the measures of deceit were employed by Lenin and Stalin and by many other Soviets throughout history, but had reached at his time a new threshold of sophistication.
- Jack S. Levy , “Misperception and the Causes of Wars: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” World Politics , Vol. 36 , October 1983 , pp. 79 – 80 .
- Marci McDonald , “Would You Believe,” p. 48.
- Richard Betts , Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning ( Washington , DC : Brookings Institution , 1982 ), pp. 103 – 104 .
- Bob Woodward , Veil , pp. 124 – 129 .
- Harold Wilensky , Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry ( New York : Basic Books , 1961 ), p. 38 .
- Bob Woodward , Veil , pp. 209 – 211 .
- Casey valued greatly her analysis on a variety of issues, especially on Latin American and Soviet affairs. Ibid., p. 212.
- Joseph Persico , Casey: The Lives and Secrets , p. 482 .
- Yaakov Vertzberger , The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking ( Stanford , CA : Stanford University Press , 1990 ), pp. 234 , 256 .
- Bob Woodward , Veil , p. 412 .
- Harold Wilensky , Organizational Intelligence , p. 48 .
- Bob Woodward , Veil , pp. 206 – 207 .
- Douglas MacEachin testimony in the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings on the Nomination of Robert M. Gates, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, September–October 1991, Vol. II, p. 271.
- Ibid., pp. 223–225.
- Ibid.
- Bob Woodward , Veil , pp. 202 – 208 .
- Yaakov Vertzberger , The World in Their Minds , pp. 210 – 211 .
- Bob Woodward , Veil , pp. 124 – 129 .
- Ibid., pp. 398–399.
- Significantly, only in 1986 were discussions held in SOVA regarding possible changes in the Soviet Union's defense expenditures. See the CIA's Website www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/russia/enter.html. See also digital National Security Archives at “Gorbachev: Steering the USSR Into the 1990s” CIA Intelligence Appraisal, July 1987. As late as February 1988, then–Deputy Director Gates noted that that Soviet Union's aggressive objectives abroad had not changed. See Raymond Garthoff , The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War ( Washington , DC : Brookings Institution Press , 1994 ), p. 340 .
- Glenn P. Hastedt , “CIA's Organizational Culture and the Problem of Reform,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence , Vol. 9 , No. 3 , Fall 1996 , p. 199 .
- Yaakov Vertzberger , The World in Their Minds , p. 196 .
- Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn , The Social Psychology of Organizations ( New York : Wiley , 1966 ), p. 66 .
- Ibid., p. 196.
- Indeed, the estimates proved helpful in his organizational effort. Casey personally presided over the biggest buildup of the Intelligence Community since the Agency's inception. Casey more than doubled the total intelligence budget, pushing it toward an estimated $24 billion in 1986. With annual increases of up to twenty percent a year, the growth of the CIA's spending power outstripped the Pentagon's. Casey went on a hiring spree, boosting manpower by one-third, returning it to the highs of the Vietnam era. See Marci McDonald, “Would You Believe,” p. 12.
- Woodward alludes that the new all-weather satellite Lacrosse demanded heavy investments, which were partly justified by Casey to Reagan by the Soviet expansionism. Bob Woodward, Veil, pp. 402–403.
- Marci Mcdonald , “Would You Believe,” p. 38 .
- Ibid., p. 40.
- Yaakov Vertzberger , The World in Their Minds , p. 217 .
- For instance, in order to consolidate his position in Washington politics and without any national security rationale, Casey decided to share intelligence information with the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick. Bob Woodward, Veil, pp. 212, 290.
- Ibid., p. 208.
- Harold Wilensky , Organizational Intelligence , p. 67 .
- Loch K. Johnson , “Cloaks and Gowns: The CIA in the Groves of Academe,” in Stephen Cimbala , ed., Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society ( New York : Transnational , 1987 ), pp. 104 – 105 .
- Harold Wilensky , Organizational Intelligence , pp. 62 – 63 ; Yaakov Vertzberger , The World in Their Minds , p. 200 .
- Yaakov Vertzberger , The World in Their Minds , p. 195 .
- Ibid., pp. 212–213.
- Ibid., p. 212.
- Harold Wilensky , Organizational Intelligence , p. 62 .
- Typically, intelligence officers will assert that the big questions require an enhancement of the intelligence gathering effort (“more data,” not “more thinking”).
- Robert Jervis , “What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” p. 117 . Jervis conducted his research on the CIA during the eighties, Casey's period. So his conclusions about the empiricism of the organization must particularly hold for the CIA during Casey's tenure.
- Marci McDonald , “Would You Believe,” p. 15 .
- Robert Gates , From the Shadows , pp. 204 – 205 .
- Ibid. , p. 206 ; Markus Wolf , Man without a Face ( New York : Random House , 1997 ), p. 275 .
- A claim along these lines can be found in Deborah Welch Larson , “Truman and the Berlin Blockade: The Role of Intuition and Experience in Good Foreign Policy Judgment,” in Deborah Welch Larson and Stanley A. Renshon , eds., Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application ( Boston : Rowman and Littlefield , 2003 ), pp. 127 – 152 .
- The tendency of intelligence officers to attach higher severity to threats on which they have a lot of information may not necessarily reflect organizational biases but rather a common general inclination in human inference to overvalue “salient” evidence. Certain social psychologists note that conspicuous evidence is generally accorded importance exceeding its inferential value. Logically consequential but perceptually innocuous data is accorded less. See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross , Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment ( Englewood Cliffs , NJ : Prentice Hall , 1980 ); Shelley Taylor and Susan Fiske , “Salience, Attention and Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomenon,” in Leonard Berkowitz , ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , Vol. 11 ( New York : Academic Press , 1978 ).
- Bob Woodward , Veil , p. 351 .
- Ibid., p. 407 ; Uri Bar-Joseph , Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States , p. 42 .
- Robert Jervis , “Improving the Intelligence Process: Informal Norms and Incentives,” in Alfred C. Maurer , Marion D. Tunstall , and James M. Keagle , eds., Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder , CO : Westview Press , 1985), pp. 114–115.
- Robert Jervis , “What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” p. 120.
- Robert Gates , “From the Shadows,” pp. 208–209.
- Robert Jervis , “What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” p. 119.
- Robert Jervis , “Improving the Intelligence Process,” p. 36.
- Ibid., p. 76.
- Papers are short because they are to be published in the National Intelligence Daily (NID), which is modeled like a newspaper with short articles.
- Robert Jervis , “Improving the Intelligence Process,” p. 35.
- Ibid.
- Ibid. The practice was initiated by Casey's predecessor Stansfield Turner.
- Ibid., p. 32.
- Robert Jervis , “What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?,” p. 116.
- See, for example , Bob Woodward , Veil , pp. 376 – 377 .
- Robert Jervis , Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War ( Ithaca , NY : Cornell University Press , 2010 ), Chapter 2 and Conclusion .
- On the operational code, see Alexander George , “The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System,” in Lawrence Falkowski , ed., Psychological Models and International Politics ( Boulder , CO : Westview Press , 1979 ).
- Richard K. Betts , Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security ( New York : Columbia University Press , 2007 ), pp. 53 – 65 .