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ARTICLES

Was Olof Palme Killed by an Intelligence Agency?

Pages 119-147 | Published online: 04 Dec 2010

REFERENCES

  • Robert Dalsjö , Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of “Neutral” Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West (Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press, 2006) .
  • Erik Magnusson , Palmerapporten. Förhören och dokumenten kring mordet på statsministern (Förlags AB Wiken/Tempus, 1989), pp. 20, 35, 76, 301; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta. Konspirationsteorier om morden på John F. Kennedy och Olof Palme. (Stockholm: Ordfront Förlag, 2006), pp. 175–177, 231 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow: The Killing of Olof Palme (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 43; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta (Stockholm: Fisher et Co, 1998), p. 75; Erik Magnusson, Palmerapporten, pp. 54–56; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 173, 192–234; Swedish Department of Justice, Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1999:88, p. 465 ff; hereafter referred to by its official index SOU 1999:88.
  • The 1999 Commission stated that allegations against the police force were poorly investigated, but there was little to substantiate them; SOU 1999:88, pp. 975–976. However, the “police track” falls outside the delimitations of this study .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow; Lars Borgnäs, En iskall vind drog genom Sverige. Mordet på Olof Palme (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2006); H.H.A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger, The Murder of Olof Palme. A Tale of Assassination, Deception, and Intrigue (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004); Ruth Freeman, Death of a Statesman: The Solution of the Murder of Olof Palme (London: Hale, 1989).
  • Robert M. Clark , Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004), p. 43; John P. Sullivan and James J. Wirtz, “Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 19–20 .
  • Jerome K. Clauser and Sandra M. Weir , Intelligence Research Methodology (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence School, 1975), pp. 362–363; Richard J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), p. 95 ff .
  • David B. Tinnin and Dag Christensen , The Hit Team (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 57–58 .
  • Jan Olsson and Ulf Åsgård , Mordet på Olof Palme. Brottsanalys. Gärningsmannaprofil, quoted in SOU 1999: 88, p. 847 ff .
  • Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Joint Publication 3-05, 2003), p. II-4 .
  • Cf. Richards J. Heuer Jr. , Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, pp. 31–50 .
  • Aaron J. Klein , Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 3–8, 109–133, 152–156, 171–181, 203–208, 242; Simon Reeve, One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge operation “Wrath of God” (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000), pp. 162–169, 184–185; David B. Tinnin and Dag Christensen, The Hit Team, pp. 39–42, 53–58, 62–80 .
  • Principles concerning aspects beyond the immediate area of operation were omitted. William McRaven (see Reference 15) includes “purpose,” i.e., a strategic aim, and the Field Manual (see Reference 24) “objective” resembling “simplicity” as a tactical aim. “Maneuver” (avoiding enemy strengths and attacking weak points) is included in the Field Manual's general principles; a hit team does not “maneuver” in a traditional sense, but is dependent on finding and exploiting a weak spot, which in this particular context is considered an aspect of simplicity .
  • Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, pp. I-5–I-6 .
  • William H. McRaven , Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995) .
  • Robert S. Frost , The Growing Imperative to Adopt “Flexibility” as an American Principle of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999). Accessed at http://www. strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=350 on 29 April 2008 .
  • Iran: Terror Database, accessed at http://www.iran.org/news/WSJe_960610.html on 6 March 2008; Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back, pp. 157–170; Simon Reeve, One Day in September, pp. 175–183; Peter Stiff, Warfare by Other Means South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s (Alberton: Galago, 2001); Truth and Reconciliation Commission, accessed at http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/index.htm on 6 March 2008 .
  • John Dinges and Saul Landau , Assassination on Embassy Row (New York; Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 139–142, 150–164; John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: The Free Press, 2004), pp. 128–130; Iran: Terror Database.
  • Aaron J. Klein , Striking Back, pp. 3–8 .
  • U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, an Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, S. Rep. No. 94-465 (1975), pp. 71–90, 181–190 .
  • Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin , The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), pp. 358–362 .
  • John Dinges and Saul Landau , Assassination on Embassy Row, pp. 139–142; John Dinges, The Condor Years, pp. 74–81, 126–127, 130–131, 176–177. DINA's frequent use of untrained local accomplices may less reflect operational considerations than Contreras's (head of DINA) wish to be “a capo of an international anticommunist alliance.”
  • Peter Stiff , Warfare by Other Means, pp. 266–268; Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Iran: Terror Database .
  • Department of the Army, Headquarters, Field Manual 23–35 Combat Training with Pistols and Revolvers (Washington, DC, 1988), pp. 2–18 .
  • Peter Stiff , Warfare by Other Means, pp. 92–95, 120, 254–265, 349–351 .
  • John Dinges and Saul Landau , Assassination on Embassy Row, pp 150–164; John Dinges, The Condor Years, pp. 128–130 .
  • Robert S. Frost , The Growing Imperative to Adopt “Flexibility” as an American Principle of War, p. 16 .
  • Ibid., p. 6; note the statement on “maneuver” above .
  • James W. Clarke , American Assassins: The Darker Side of Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982) .
  • Cf. the notions on distance in John L. Plaster, The Ultimate Sniper (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2006), pp. 163–165 .
  • U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, pp. 4–7, 13–37, 198 ff., 256 ff .
  • Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin , The Sword and the Shield, pp. 355–362, 380–389; Peter Stiff, Warfare by Other Means, pp. 96–100, 260–263, 339–340, 349–351. See also Boris Volodarsky, The KGB's Poison Factory: From Lenin to Litvinenko (S. Yorkshire, UK: Zenith Press, 2009) .
  • Cf. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin , The Mitrokhin Archive II. The KGB and the World (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 173; John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row; John Dinges, The Condor Years; Iran: Terror Database; Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back, pp. 221–222; Simon Reeve, One Day in September, pp. 205–208; Truth and Reconciliation Commission .
  • John Dinges , The Condor Years, pp. 69, 214–229.
  • Aaron J. Klein , Striking Back, pp. 184–198; Simon Reeve, One Day in September, pp. 190–199; David B. Tinnin and Dag Christensen, The Hit Team, pp. 88–140, 148–154 .
  • Max Holland , “The Propagation and Power of Communist Security Services Dezinformatsiya,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 1–31 .
  • Cf. James W. Clarke , American Assassins.
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 1–4 .
  • Erik Magnusson , Palmerapporten, p. 95. Author's translation .
  • The northern edge of Gotland was a restricted area to foreign citizens because of coastal artillery installations nearby. Furthermore, post-operation exfiltration from Fårö and Gotland proper in the middle of the Baltic Sea might have been difficult .
  • Tore Forsberg , Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner (Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 2003), p. 397; Erik Magnusson, Palmerapporten, pp. 10–11, 92–96, 118–123, 227–229 .
  • Tore Forsberg , Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, p. 397; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta (Stockholm: Fisher et Co, 1998), pp. 116–117; Erik Magnusson, Palmerapporten, pp. 117–122, 227–229, 341–342, 345–346; SOU 1999:88, pp. 189–190 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 6, 196–208; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 168, 229–230. According to Bondeson, the Iraqi ambassador's revelations caused Palme to unwittingly walk into a trap, meeting an alleged informer. Nothing supports this claim; obviously spontaneous decisions placed Palme at the murder site, and it is unlikely that he would arrange such a meeting close to midnight in a narrow alley, accompanied by his wife .
  • Erik Magnusson , Palmerapporten, pp. 10, 122–123; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 168, 229–230; SOU 1999:88, pp. 188–189 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 6–8; Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, pp. 397–398; Hannu Tapani Klami, Mordet på Olof Palme, p. 11; SOU 1999:88, pp. 147–148, 161, 854–855; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 168–169 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, p. 59; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 67–68, 117; SOU 1999:88, pp. 169–171, 190–193, 253–255 .
  • For a description, see the sketch in Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta; Jan Bondeson, Blood on the Snow, pp. x–xi .
  • Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, p. 404; Hannu Tapani Klami, Mordet på Olof Palme, pp. 26, 33–35; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 65–66; SOU 1999:88, pp. 162–167; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, p. 178 .
  • Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, p. 398; Hannu Tapani Klami, Mordet på Olof Palme, pp. 26, 35–37; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 66–67; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, p. 169; SOU 1999:88, pp. 148, 167–169.
  • Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, p. 398; Hannu Tapani Klami, Mordet på Olof Palme, pp. 30–39; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, p. 66, 74–76, 252; SOU 1999:88, pp. 157–159; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 218–222 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 8–15, 23–24, 42–45; Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, p. 398; Hannu Tapani Klami, Mordet på Olof Palme, p. 9, 37–39; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 69–72, 89–95 258–259; SOU 1999:88, pp. 149, 158–160; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 169–170 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 52–54; Hannu Tapani Klami, Mordet på Olof Palme, p. 11; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 22, 44, 84–90, 256; SOU 1999:88, pp. 151–158, 204 ff .
  • Der Spiegel, “Grosse Männer, grosse Mörder,” No. 9, 1996, pp. 162–164 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, p. 55; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, p. 93; SOU 1999:88, pp. 244–246 .
  • Lars Borgnäs , En iskall vind drog genom Sverige, pp. 394–455; SOU 1999:88, pp. 247–252 .
  • SOU 1999:88, pp. 247–248 .
  • Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, p. 129 .
  • SOU 1999:88, p. 246 .
  • Jan Bondeson, Blood on the Snow, pp. 161–162; SOU 1999:88, pp. 398–403 .
  • SOU 1999:88, pp. 407–408 .
  • Kelly E. Riddle, The Art of Surveillance (Austin, TX: Thomas Investigative Publications, 2003), pp. 65–70 .
  • SOU 1999:88, p. 195 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 25–36, 55; SOU 1999:88, pp. 20, 35, 46–49, 55, 76, 102, 134–141, 244–245, 301, 370–371; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 173–174, 210–216 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 60, 75; Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, p. 399 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 88–111; Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, pp. 399–406; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 52–63, 144 ff.; Erik Magnusson, Palmerapporten, pp. 17–32, 41–43, 78, 102, 294, 252, 307–322; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 175–177 .
  • Ingemar Krusell , Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 76–79 .
  • Jan Olsson and Ulf Åsgård, Mordet på Olof Palme. Brottsanalys. Gärningsmannaprofil, quoted in SOU 1999:88, pp. 852–853, 860, 905–907 .
  • The investigation of Christer Pettersson is described in chapter 6 of the 1999 Commission report SOU 1999:88, pp. 703–842 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 112 125; Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, pp. 403–409; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 177–181.
  • Although no clear implication of guilt, the link between amphetamine use and random violent crime has been established in previous studies; cf. Sam Wright and Hilary Klee, “Violent Crime, Aggression, and Amphetamine: What Are the Implications for Drug Treatment Services?” in Drugs: Education, Prevention, and Policy, Vol. 8, 2001, pp. 73–90 .
  • Jan Bondeson , Blood on the Snow, pp. 125–157; Tore Forsberg, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner, pp. 404–417; Hannu Tapani Klami, Mordet på Olof Palme, p. 11–13, 23–25, 36–37, 134–136; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 173–250; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 181–187 .
  • For a review, cf. Jan Bondeson, Blood on the Snow, pp. 76–87, 158–174; Ingemar Krusell, Palmemordets nakna fakta, pp. 93–121; SOU 1999:88, p. 217 ff., pp. 271–424; Erik Åsard, Det dunkelt tänkta, pp. 187–188 .
  • Kelly E. Riddle , The Art of Surveillance, pp. 19–21 .
  • See note 43 .
  • U.S. Department of Justice, Selection and Application Guide to Personal Body Armor (NIJ Guide 100-01, 2001), pp. 34–35 .
  • SOU 1999: 88, p. 872 .
  • See notes 32 and 33 .

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