Intelligence and U.S. National Security Policy

REFERENCES

• See David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4, Spring 1983; also, Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2003).
   Google Scholar
• Albert D. Wheelon “CORONA: A Triumph of American Technology,” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, eds., Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), p. 38; also, Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, “The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974” (Washington, DC: History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, 1992); also, Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., CORONA: America's First Satellite Program (Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995).
   Google Scholar
• See Joan Bird and John Bird, CIA Analyses of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Collections, 2014).
   Google Scholar
• Maxwell, D. Taylor Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1960).
   Google Scholar
• Principally, William E. Colby with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989). See also, Frank Leith Jones, Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
   Google Scholar
• See Michael Russell Rip and James M. Hasik, The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002).
   Google Scholar
• See Laurence R. Newcome Unmanned Aviation: A Brief History of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004).
   Google Scholar
• See Terry Terriff, The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 236. Terriff suggests that concerns about the difficulty of controlling nuclear escalation led not only to arms control negotiations but also to increased emphasis on conventional capabilities.
   Google Scholar
• The Defense Department's Office of Systems Analysis called attention to many factors that vitiated presumed Warsaw Pact superiority but the public assumption that was shared by most involved in military planning and weapons acquisition was that NATO had a clear numerical inferiority. See Prepared Statement of Alain C. Enthoven, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis, in U.S. Congress, 93rd Congress, 2d session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad and Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Hearings, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Hearings, 7 March–4 April 1974 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 78–89.
   Google Scholar
• See Robert R. Tomes, U.S. Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973–2003 (New York: Routledge, 2007); also George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, eds., Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999); also, Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 1994), especially pp. 1–38.
   Google Scholar
• Albert Wohlstetter “Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era,” Orbis, Vol. 17, No. 4, Winter 1974, p. 1125.
   Google Scholar
• William J. Perry “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4, Fall 1991, pp. 69–70.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ibid., p. 77.
   Google Scholar
• See, for instance, Warren Bass, “How the U.S. Stumbled Into the Drone Era,” The Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2014.
   Google Scholar
• See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002); also, Eliot A. Cohen, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, September 2004; also, Barry D. Watts, “The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011).
   Google Scholar
• See Mary C. FitzGerald, “Marshal Ogarkov On Modern War: 1977–1985” (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1986); also, Dima P. Adamsky, “Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, April 2008.
   Google Scholar
• Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen “Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report” reprinted in Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 226.
   Google Scholar
• See Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).
   Google Scholar
• The best discussion of the relationship between foreign intelligence and law enforcement can be found in David S. Kris, National Security Investigations and Prosecutions, 2nd ed. ([Eagan, MN]: West, 2012).
   Google Scholar
• See Gary Bernstein and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005); also, Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Presidio Press, 2005).
   Google Scholar
• See Charles Dueffler, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2009).
   Google Scholar
• Tommy Franks, with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004); Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).
   Google Scholar
• Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Penguin, 2013), p. 163.
   Google Scholar
• The extent to which reasonable roles and operational mission exist for nuclear weapons has been extensively debated; see Karl A. Lieber and Daryl Grayson Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security Vol. 30, No. 4, Spring 2006; by the same authors, “The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 6, November/December 2009. See also Jan Lodal, “The Counterforce Fantasy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2, March/April 2010; also, Jeffrey S. Lantis et al., “Correspondence: the Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3, Winter 2006/2007; also Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters, Autumn 2009; Bradley A. Thayer and Thomas M. Skypek, “Reaffirming the Utility of Nuclear Weapons,” Parameters, Winter–Spring 2013.
   Google Scholar
• See Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), p. 7.
   Google Scholar
• Tim Weiner Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
   Google Scholar