Intelligence Reform in Brazil: A Long, Drawn-Out Process

REFERENCES

• Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz eds., Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), pp. 4–6.
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• The argument and data on civil-military relations in Brazil is found in Thomas Charles Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: A Reassessment,” Journal of Politics in Latin America, February 2014, pp. 107–138.
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• Alfred Stepan Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 16.
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• Ibid., p. 27.
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• See Thomas Bruneau and Kenneth Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies,” in Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil–Military Relations (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 154–155.
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• This political creativity is a central focus of Alfred P. Montero's Brazil: Reversal of Fortune (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2014.) He criticizes authors whose analyses do not include this creativity.
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• Correio Brasiliense, 9 March 2002.
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• Celso Lafer “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” Daedalus, Spring 2000, p. 231.
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• Ibid., p. 215.
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• Brasília: Presidência da República, 2002. Also worth noting is that, at least in the English version of his memoir, Fernando Henrique Cardoso highlights diplomacy, cooperation, understanding, and the like, and makes not a single reference to any “hard” security or defense issue. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, with Brian Winter, The Accidental President of Brazil: A Memoir (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).
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• Ministério da Defesa, Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (Brazil: Governo Federal. Brasília, 2008), p. 8.
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• Ibid., p. 6.
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• Luis Bitencourt and Alcides Costa Vaz Brazilian Strategic Culture (Miami: Florida International University Applied Research Center, 2009), p. 4.
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• “Brazilians Upbeat About Their Country, Despite Its Problems,” in Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project, available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/09/22/brazilians-upbeat-about-their-country-despite-its-problems/, accessed 9 July 2013, pp. 17–18.
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• I have dealt with the general issue of incentives in Thomas C. Bruneau, “Civilians and the Military in Latin America: The Absence of Incentives,” Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2013, pp. 143–160.
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• For the most complete discussion of this story see Priscilla Carlos Brandão Antunes, SNI & ABIN: Uma Leitura da Atuação dos Serviços Secretos Brasileiros ao Longo do Seculo XX (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2002.) For an excellent review of the process in English see Marco Cepik and Priscila Antunes, “Brazil's New Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Vol. 16, No. 3, Fall 2003, pp. 349–373.
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• The resulting document is Congresso Nacional, Seminário Atividades de Inteligência no Brasil: Contribuições para a Soberania e a Democracia. Brasília 6 e 7 de novembro de 2002 (Brasília: Gráfica-Abin, 2003).
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• Joanisval Brito Gonçalves “The Spies Who Came from the Tropics: Intelligence Services and Democracy in Brazil,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2014, p. 592. He goes into great length on this topic in his unpublished paper “A Land without Commissions of Inquiry: Effect Mechanisms of Control and Accountability in Brazil,” Brasília 2012.
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• Albert Fishlow Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), p. 23.
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• Heavily does not mean exclusively and, for that matter, the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency (CSIS) has extensive foreign “liaisons.”
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• We already addressed the issue of effectiveness, in addition to democratic civilian control, in “Introduction: Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” in Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, pp. 1–26. More recently we have elaborated a framework for analysis of control and effectiveness. See Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei eds., The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 26–38.
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• Author's interview with Ambassador Celso Amorim, Brasília, 7 February 2011.
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• Joanisval Brito Gonçalves “The Spies Who Came From the Tropics,” p. 582. On p. 598 he provides more details on these intelligence failures.
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• I conveyed this hopeful and positive opinion in two publications. They are as follows: Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2011, pp. 602–630, and Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter 2011–2012, pp. 656–691.
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• See Brazil Constitution of 1988, revised 2014, available at https://www.constituteproject.org/search?.lang=en, accessed 22 January 2015.
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• For a compendium of laws which apparently support this assertion see ABIN, Salvaguarda de Assuntos Sigilosos: Proteção ao Conhecimento. Serie Coletanea de Legislação; No. 4 (Brasília: Grafica ABIN, October, 2006).
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• See http://www.planejamento.gov.br/ministerio.asp?.index=8&ler=s1154. Órgão/Unidade Orçamentária/GND for the details. Accessed 22 January 2015. The budget data on ABIN is on p. 15, Colégio Pedro II is on p. 23, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte is on p. 28, and the Ministry of Sport is on p. 73.
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• See Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” for a discussion of these requirements.
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• Joanisval Brito Gonçalves “The Spies Who Came From the Tropics,” pp. 581–582. In his chapter, “Brasil, Serviços Secretos e Relações Internacionais: Conhecendo um Pouco Mais Sobre o Grande Jogo,” in Edison Benedito da Silva Filho and Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, eds., Defesa Nacional para o Século XXI: Política Internacional, Estratégia e Tecnologia Militar (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2012) he noted that Brazil is the only member of the BRICS in which security and defense are secondary considerations. See p. 295.
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• Marco Cepik and Christiano Ambros “Intelligence, Crisis, and Democracy: Institutional Punctuations in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2014, p. 537.
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• Marco Cepik “Structural Change and Democratic Control of Intelligence in Brazil,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz eds., Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness.
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