The Changing Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus

REFERENCES

• The intellectual frame of reference for the Islamic State in addition to al-Qaeda itself includes some key texts. Those texts are The Management of Savagery (Tawwahush) and Strategic Plan to Improve the Political Position of the Islamic State in Iraq (Khouta Istrategiyah li Ta’ziz al-Mawqif alSiyasi lil Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-Irak). See Ahmed S. Hashim, “From Al-Qaida Affiliate to the Rise of the Islamic Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),” Policy Report, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, December 2014, p. 9.
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• Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is also called Abu Duaa, Amir al-Mu’minin Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or Ibrahim Awwad al-Badri al-Samarri. The Islamic State is sometimes called Dawlat al-Islamiyah fi Iraq wa’l-Sham, DAESH, ISIS, ISIL, or IS.
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• Jihadist narratives respecting Judgment Day do not necessarily follow commentaries approved by the four orthodox schools of Sunni scholar-jurisprudence.
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• He was also known as Samir Abd Muhammed al-Khlifawi, sometimes pretentiously called the “Lord of the Shadows.” That phrase likely derives from a Saddam era maxim of Iraqi intelligence officers who were told by Saddam that they should recruit a “shadow in every house.” Al-Khlifawi was killed in January 2014.
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• The Spiegel story is a little suspect as the same basic information was disseminated into the public domain some months earlier on 15 June 2014 when The Guardian described very similar information as having been downloaded from memory sticks seized in a June raid that killed the then second in command of the Islamic State, Abu Bilawi. See “How an Arrest in Iraq Revealed Isis’s $2bn Jihadist Network,” The Guardian, 15 June 2014.
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• Some groups within ISIS are more cohesive fighting as distinct entities, such as Abu Hanif’s Jamaat, made up primarily of fighters from Dagestan. The strength of ISIS is in the Anbar and Nineveh provinces of Iraq where it runs training camps. Between 2012 and 2013, more than 600 Sunni militants escaped Iraqi prisons in a series of jailbreaks that buttressed the number of ISIS fighters. See “Anatomy of Militant Groups Reveals Iraq’s Different Challenges,” The National UAE, 12 February 2014. See also, “Escaped Inmates From Iraq Fuel Syrian Insurgency,” The New York Times, 12 February 2014.
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• Many of these prisoners were genuine criminal sociopaths using the ISIS rubric to mask criminal enterprise. See “Self-Funded and Deep Rooted: How ISIS Makes its Millions” CNN 7 October 2014. See also “ISIS Making Millions Daily Off Crime, Terror,” CBS News 23 October 2014, and Yochi Dreazen, “ISIS Uses Mafia Tactics to Fund Its Own Operations Without Help From Persian Gulf Donors,” Foreign Policy, 17 June 2014.
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• This is in part due to systematic efforts by the Islamic State to organize prison breaks that have sometimes freed hundreds of prisoners at a time, “Anatomy of Militant Groups Reveals Iraq’s Different Challenges,” The National UAE, 12 February 2014. See also “Escaped Inmates From Iraq Fuel Syrian Insurgency,” The New York Times; “The Islamic State Creates a New Type of Jihadist: Part Terrorist, Part Gangster,” The Washington Post, 20 December 2015, “Is the Islamic State a Government or a Criminal Gang? The Answer Will Determine How We Fight,” The Washington Post, 2 December 2015; and “The Islamic State’s Crime Connection,” The Crime Report, 21 November 2015, available at http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/articles/2015-11-the-islamic-states-crime-connection, accessed 20 February 2016.
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• Following Zarqawi’s 2006 martyrdom in Hibhib the remnants of his organization, under the uninspired leadership of Abu Omar Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, were nearly defeated by Intelligence–Special Operations Fusion Cells under U.S. Admiral William H. McRaven that accelerated the operational tempo beyond the ability of the Zarqawi organization to respond.
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• “Seeking To Combat Daesh Really?” Cf2 R, 8 January 2015. The IS is divided into Wilayats, including a number in Africa and areas not contiguous with IS core territories. The Wilayats are divided into Sections (Qawati), which include cities that generally retain their official names.
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• The Caliphate now includes tribal confederations of the Aneza, Shammar, Aqaydat, and al-Jabbur, which were divided by the former border between Syria and Iraq. See Haian Dulhan, “Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising,” Syria Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2014, p. 18.
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• See “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State,” Spiegel Online International, 18 April 2015.
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• The courier system used by al-Qaeda was essentially a four-cornered model with separate courier networks for administrative, operational, media (propaganda), and executive communication. See Seth G. Jones, “Al-Qaeda Terrorism in Afghanistan,” in The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden’s Death, Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 386.
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• “Daesh’s Organizational Structure,” Al Jazeera Center For Studies, 4 December 2014.
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• See Ahmed S. Hashim, “From Al-Qaida Affiliate To the Rise of the Islamic Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),” p. 8.
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• It appears that most Saddam-era Ba’athist intelligence officers now serving al-Baghdadi are from Iraq’s western Anbar province, while most of the Ba’athist army officers are from Mosul. See “Saddam Hussein’s former officers find home leading Islamic State,” Tribune Wire Reports, 9 August 2015.
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• Currently all al-Baghdadi’s core leadership are Iraqi and there is no evidence of significant numbers of Syrian Ba’ath intelligence or military officers playing any important role in the Islamic State. See “The Islamic State’s Baathist Roots,” Al-Monitor, 24 April 2015.
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• See Derek Jones, Understand the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations, Joint Special Operations University JSOU Report 12–3, April 2012, p. 83.
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• These include the Naqshbandi Army (Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshbandi or JRTN), the Islamic Army of Iraq, 1920 Revolution Brigades, and Ansar al-Sunna. See “Conquer, Control: The IS Group’s Structure and Strategy,” al-Araby, 3 April 2015. Within the Syrian space there are several instances of ISIS simply absorbing whole militant groups such as Jamaat Ansar al-Islam. See Michael Knight, “ISIL’s Political-Military Power in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 2014. See also Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy Vol. 21, No. 4, 2014, pp. 69–83.
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• Daw’ah Offices, Sharia Institutes, and Hisb’ah Police are administratively all under the Islamic State’s Sharia Department. See “Al-Khansa Brigade,” TRAC Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium undated, available at http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/al-khansaa-brigade, accessed 2 January 2016.
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• Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, “ISIS Governance In Syria,” Middle East Security Report 22, Institute for the Study of War, July 2014, pp. 14–16.
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• Active deception operations maintain ambiguity with key personnel regularly changing their noms de guerre and locations.
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• See Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah “The Structure of the Islamic State (ISIS),” Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs, 8 September 2014, available at http://jcpa.org/structure-of-the-islamic-state/, accessed 21 October 2015; also Richard Barrett, The Islamic State, The Soufan Group, October 2014, available at http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf, accessed 20 November 2015. Sahar Pirzada, “Tracing the Islamic State’s DNA,” Criterion Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1 August 2015. The Security and Intelligence Council also uses compartmented Amniyat (Security Units) to conduct investigations and engage in operations inside Syria. See “Profile of the Islamic State’s Leader in Syria: Abu Ali al-Anbari,” The Syrian Intifada, 25 September 2015, available at https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/25/profile-of-the-islamic-states-leader-in-syria-abu-ali-al-anbari/, accessed 22 February 2016.
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• “How Saddam’s Men Help Islamic State Rule,” Reuters Investigates, 11 December 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/, accessed 20 February 2016.
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• “How ISIS Picks Its Suicide Bombers,” The Daily Beast, 16 November 2015, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/16/how-isis-picks-its-suicide-bombers.html, accessed 19 February 2016.
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• Aymenn al-Tamimi “The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2015, available at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/447/html, accessed 18 November 2015. See also “Syria Feature: How the Islamic State Established Itself Inside the Country—The Secret Files,” EA Worldview 19 April 2015, and Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology,” Research Notes, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, No. 29, January 2016. See also Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S Yayla, “The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence Apparatus,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2017, pp. 2–16.
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• See Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, ISIS Governance in Syria, Middle East Security Report 22, Institute for the Study of War, Washington DC (2014). See also: “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State,” Spiegel Online International, 18 April 2015.
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• Once the IS was established additional informants could, if necessary, be coerced using blackmail regarding the person’s past indiscretions. This results in a lower value informant who will provide just enough information to stay out of trouble and/or fabricate information for the same reason.
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• The category of selectees tended to be young men who needed money, opponents of the existing regime who were also in conflict with other rebel organizations, and former Ba’athist intelligence officers. See “ISIS Owes More to the Kremlin than the Koran,” The Times (London), 24 April 2015.
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• “Profile of the Islamic State’s Leader in Syria: Abu Ali al-Anbari,” The Syrian Intifada, 25 September 2015, available at https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/25/profile-of-the-islamic-states-leader-in-syria-abu-ali-al-anbari/, accessed 22 February 2016.
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• See Malcom W. Nance, “ISIS Forces That Now Control Ramadi Are Ex-Baathists Saddam Loyalists,” The Intercept, 3 June 2015.
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• Muhammed al-‘Ubaydi, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price, “The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenge of the Islamic State,” The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2014, p. 74.
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• Both Hafez and Bashar Assad utilized the tribes to counterbalance the appeal of the Syrian Ikhwan in Syria’s urban areas. See Haian Dukham, “Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising,” Syria Studies Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 15.
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• “How Saddam’s Men Help Islamic State Rule,” Shafaaq News: Daily Events In Iraq, 12 December 2015, available at http://english.shafaaq.com/stories/16975-how-saddam%E2%80%99s-men-help-islamic-state-rule.html, accessed 20 February 2015.
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• Jordan has been operationally active in Iraq for more than a decade, even setting aside the historical enmity between King Hussein and Saddam. The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab Zarqawi for example, as a Jordanian national was targeted by the Jordanian services prior to his 2006 death in Hibhib. Jordan’s well-developed networks in Iraq provide some entrée into the Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus and are among the most significant threats to al-Baghdadi. See “How Jordanians Hunted Down their Hated Son,” The Guardian, 10 June 2006. See also Shane Harris, “The Mouse That Roared,” FP Report, 12 September 2014, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/12/the-mouse-that-roars/, accessed 22 February 2016.
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• For example, the Islamic State has bartered oil for electricity with the Assad regime by allowing oil from eastern Syria to be sold to the Assad government which the Assad regime reciprocates by allowing some regime-controlled electrical generating stations to continue supplying electricity to some Islamic State–held territories. See “‘It’s God’s Gift.’ Islamic State Fills Coffers with Iraqi Government Cash,” The Guardian, 21 April 2015.
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• Christoph Reuter, “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State,” Spiegel Online International, 18 April 2015.
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• Ibid.
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• “Islamic State Ascendant—Iraq Struggles to Tackle the Proto-Caliphate,” Janes Terrorism & Security Monitor, 1 September 2014.
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• “Tunneling through the Triangle of Death, Islamic State Aims at Baghdad from South,” Reuters, 4 August 2014.
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• Islamic State fighters infiltrated the city in groups of two or three entering in non-descript sedans. See “How Islamic State’s Win in Ramadi Reveals New Weapons, Tactical Sophistication and Prowess,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 May 2015. In Ramadi members of the Sunni Dulaims tribe affiliated with Anbar-based IS elements to help secure the city.
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• Jack Moore, “ISIS Sleeper Cells and Double Agents Helped Capture Ramadi,” Newsweek Europe, 19 May 2015.
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• The IS managed to do this around the system’s spam triggers. Threat Tactics Report: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID), November 2014, p. 5, available at https://drakulablogdotcom3.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/trisa_threat_tactics_rpt_isil_141101-cdr-137271.pdf, accessed 20 November 2015.
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• “Islamic State Uses Downloadable Apps to Hide Attack Plans, Recruit Followers,” The Washington Times, 28 June 2015. Apparently both Surespot and Kik were popular among IS operatives.
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• The IS is generally following the process outlined in Abu Bakr Naji’s treatise The Management of Savagery (Ida’rat al-Tawahhush). See “Islamic State Ascendant—Iraq Struggles to Tackle the Proto-Caliphate” Janes Terrorism & Security Monitor, 1 September 2014.
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• “Officials: Islamic State Tightens Grip on Capital of Iraq’s Anbar Province,” The Washington Post, 16 May 2015.
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• Ibid.
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• Matthew Barber, “New ISIS Leaks Reveal Particulars of al-Qaida Strategy,” Syria Comment, 12 January 2014, available at http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/new-isis-leaks-reveal-particulars-of-al-qaida-strategy/, accessed 18 August 2015.
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• “How ISIS Picks Its Suicide Bombers,” The Daily Beast, 16 November 2015, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/16/how-isis-picks-its-suicide-bombers.html, accessed 19 February 2016. Abu Suleyman al-Firansi heads the Amn al-Kharji currently headquartered in al-Bab in the Aleppo District. See “Is This Frenchman running ISIS Terror Network in the West?,” The Daily Beast, 1 May 2016, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/01/is-this-frenchman-running-isis-terror-networks-in-the-west.html, accessed 2 May 2016.
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• “Islamic State Reportedly has 40 Cells in Lebanon,” Jane’s Terrorism Watch Report, 15 September 2014. Note also that Roumieh prison is little more than a Sunni Salafi-Jihadi fiefdom. See “Lebanon ISIS Problem is Spinning out of Control,” New York magazine, 13 November 2015.
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• “Captured Fighter Details Islamic State’s Turkey Connections,” Al-Monitor, 17 June 2015.
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• In a rough sense these two sites parallel the idea of a Mission Center approach recently deployed by the CIA.
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• “From French Soldier to ISIS Spymaster,” The Daily Beast, 24 October 2016.
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• “Raids Spread across France and Belgium Amid Manhunt for Suspects,” The Washington Post, 16 November 2015.
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• Al-Anbari was killed in a November 2015 drone strike. See “Eulogy to Abu Nabil al-Anbari: Islamic State Leader in Libya,” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, 7 January 2016, available at http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/eulogy-to-abu-nabil-al-anbari-islamic-state, accessed 25 January 2016.
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• See “Islamic State Leader Baghdadi Sends Iraqi Commander to Tighten Grip on New Libya Stronghold,” The Telegraph, 20 January 2016. See also “Top IS Commanders ‘Taking Refuge’ in Libya,” BBC News, 3 February 2016, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35486158 (accessed 10 February 2016), see also “Senior Islamic State fighters are Relocating to Libya Says Official,” Intelnews 4 February 2016, available at http://intelnews.org/2016/02/04/01-1855/ (accessed 10 February 2016).
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• In point of fact the Bayats are fungible, depending on any monies supplied by the Islamic state to the affiliate and the changing status of the Islamic State. See Clint Watts and William McCants, “Experts Weigh in (Part 2): What is the Future of al-Qaida and the Islamic State,” Brookings Middle East Politics and Policy, No. 24, 28 January 2016.
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• IS social media platforms operate through AskFM, Whatsapp, Tumblr, Instagram, FB, Soundcloud, and Twitter. The Islamic State does emphasize continuing communication security campaigns intended to indoctrinate fighters in security awareness. For example, Restraining Media (Himlat Takeen Ialami) warnings instruct fighters on how to limit the intelligence value of their metadata digital trail.
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• He was killed in a drone strike in Raqqa in August 2015.
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• See “Defeating ISIL in the Information Environment,” Small Wars Journal, 22 October 2015, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/defeating-isil-in-the-information-environment-0, accessed 1 November 2015.
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• Iraqi Shi’a militia, with a couple of exceptions, along with the Syrian National Defense Forces are Islamic State SIGINT targets with the least ability to exercise effective countermeasures.
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• “Experts: IS Skilled at Gathering Intelligence Adjusting Tactics,” Voice of America, 29 May 2015.
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• “Abu Luqman … Changing the Name with Changing the Mission Entrusted to Him by ISIS,” Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently 13 April 2015, available at http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/, accessed 25 May 2015. Also in the larger context of false documentation see Guide to Islamic State Document Hoaxes, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, 24 December 2015, and “Islamic State has Tens of Thousands of Blank Passports,” Jerusalem Post, 21 December 2015.
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• Richard Barrett, The Islamic State, p. 13.
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• Khalil Ezzeldeen, “Caliphate Question—Islamic State’s Impact on the Jihadist Community,” Janes Intelligence Review, 1 August 2014.
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• See Jared Cohen, “Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 6, 2015, pp. 52–58.
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• Threat Tactics Report: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, p. 14. This includes the radio station al-Bayan, and media outlets al-Furgan, al-Hayat, al-Irisaam, and al-Jabha al-Islamiya in addition to the monthly magazine Dabiq. Radio al-Bayan addresses IS fighters directly and broadcasts in Mosul, Raqqa, Anbar and via the Internet. Al-Furgan has technical proficiency in filming executions of non-Syrians. Al-Hayat television broadcasts discussions with IS leadership representatives. Additionally, Ajnad channel produces IS propaganda products and A’tesam channel aggregates reporters from Syria, Iraq, and Libya to cover battles in those venues. See also “ISIS … Academic Media or Mass Stupidity,” Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, 7 July 2015, available at http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/, accessed 1 August 2015.
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• Khalil Ezzeldeen, “Islamic State Approaches First Anniversary,” Janes Intelligence Review, 1 July 2015.
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• The United States and the Russian Republic are concomitantly trying to track down the recruiters. The Russians, for example, are using software called “LaPlace’s Demon” to monitor social networks, looking for communication signatures that comport with Islamic State recruiters. “New Russian Tracking Software to Hunt for ISIL’s Online Recruiters,” TRAC Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, 13 October 2015, available at http://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/new-russian-software-hunt-isils-online-recruiters, accessed 1 November 2015.
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• “How Foreign Fighters Joining ISIS Travel To The Islamic State Group’s ‘Caliphate,’” International Business Times, 3 March 2015.
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• This can lead to infighting between factions. Syria Is Being Slaughtered Silently, for example, reported factional disputes that caused Abu Talha al-Kuwaiti, who headed the His’bah Police in Raqqa, to flee with his supporters after a Governor of Raqqa, Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, was executed by the IS. See “ISIS Barbarians Face Their Own Internal Reign of Terror,” Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, 12 February 2015, available at http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/, accessed 15 February 2016.
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• This is likewise an obvious entrée for Islamic State adversary organizations to mount counterintelligence operations against the IS by exploiting the interstices between militias absorbed by the IS particularly in Syria. To paraphrase David Cohen, a U.S. official, the Islamic State cannot be a clandestine Caliphate. The Caliphate is not the product of a shared political culture with a common political frame of reference.
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