Miscalculation, surprise and American intelligence after the cold war

References

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• In a relative sense, the decline of the threat posed by the USSR could heighten American perceptions of the apparent threat to U.S. interests posed by Third World contingencies. In an absolute sense, instability in the “periphery” could mount as the superpowers’ “spheres of influence” recede, leading to an objective increase in the threat posed to American interests by events in the Third World.
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