(Ignoring) the Prosperity Playbook

References

• Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.” In Handbook of Economic Growth, edited by P.Aghion and S. Durlauf, 385–472. London, UK: Elsevier.
   Google Scholar
• Calomiris, C., and S. Haber. 2014. Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (16):386–405. doi:10.1111/ecca.1937.4.issue-16.
   Google Scholar
• Haber, S., H. Kline, N. Maurer, and K. Middlebrook. 2008. Mexico since 1980. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Haber, S., and V. Menaldo. 2011. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” American Political Science Review 105 (1):1–26. doi:10.1017/S0003055410000584.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haber, S., and A. Musacchio. 2013. “These are the Good Old Days: Foreign Entry and the Mexican Banking System.” Working Paper #18713. National Bureau of Economic Research.
   Google Scholar
• Haber, S., D. North, and B. Weingast, eds. 2008. Political Institutions and Financial Development. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Haber, S., A. Razo, and N. Maurer. 2003. The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Keefer, P., and R. Vlaicu. 2007. “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (4):804–21. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00282.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laeven, L., and F. Valencia. 2008. “Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database.” IMF Working Paper. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
   Google Scholar
• Levi, M., and V. Menaldo. 2015. “The New Economic Institutionalism in Historical Perspective.” In Routledge Handbook on Political Institutions, edited by J.Gandhi and R. Ruiz, 15–30. New York, NY: Routledge Press.
   Google Scholar
• Menaldo, V. 2016a. “The Fiscal Roots of Financial Underdevelopment.” The American Journal of Political Science 60 (2):456–71. doi:10.1111/ajps.12240.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Menaldo, V. 2016b. The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• North, D. C., and B. R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” The Journal of Economic History 49 (4):803–32. doi:10.1017/S0022050700009451.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• North, D. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York, NY: Norton.
   Google Scholar
• North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• North, D., J. J. Wallis, and B. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Posner, R. A. 2005. “Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (2):57–73. doi:10.1257/0895330054048704.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss. 1981. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.” American Economic Review 21 (3):393–410.
   Google Scholar
• The Economist. 2015. “Banking in Mexico: A Light in the Darkness.” In The Economist, June 27, 61–62. </bib
   Google Scholar
• Weingast, B. R. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” The American Political Science Review 91 (2):245–63. doi:10.2307/2952354.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, O. E. 1979. “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.” The Journal of Law & Economics 22 (2):233–61. doi:10.1086/466942.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar