References
- Berger, J. (forthcoming). Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology. 10.1080/09515089.2013.771241.
- Block, N. (2011). The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct. Analysis, 71, 419–431.
- Lau, H., & Brown, R. (forthcoming). The emperor's new phenomenology? The empirical case for conscious experience without first-order representations. In A.Pautz & D.Stoljar (Eds.), Festschrift for Ned Block. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. M. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(8), 365–373.
- Levine, J. (2001). Purple haze: The puzzle of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenthal, D. M. (1983). Reductionism and knowledge. In L. S.Cauman, I.Levi, C.Parsons, & R.Schwartz (Eds.), How many questions?: Essays in honor of Sidney Morgenbesser (pp. 276–300). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
- Rosenthal, D. M. (1993). Thinking that one thinks. In M.Davies & G.Humphreys (Eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and philosophical essays (pp. 197–223). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenthal, D. M., & Lau, H. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends in Cognitive Science, 15(8), 365–373.
- Vendler, Z. (1972). Res cogitans. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.