Facing the mirror: A relativist account of immune nonconceptual self-representations

References

• Bermúdez, J. L. (1998). The paradox of self-consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chastain, C. (1975). Reference and context. In K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science vol. 7. Language, mind, and knowledge (pp. 194–269). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Clapin, H. (2002). The philosophy of mental representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Coliva, A. (2012). Which key to all mythologies about the self? In S. Prosser & F. Recanati (Eds.), Immunity to error through misidentification: New essays (pp. 22–45). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139043274
   Google Scholar
• Conway, M. A., & Loveday, C. (2015). Remembering, imagining, false memories & personal meanings. Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 574–581.10.1016/j.concog.2014.12.002
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cummins, R. (1996). Representations, targets, and attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cummins, R. (2010). The world in the head. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Dennett, D. (1978). Brainstorms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• De Vignemont, F., & Fourneret, P. (2004). The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(1), 1–19.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• de Vignemont, F., & Haggard, P. (2008). Action observation and execution: What is shared? Social Neuroscience, 3, 421–433.10.1080/17470910802045109
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (1999). A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 735–808.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dretske, F. (1999). Machines, plants and animals: The origins of agency. Erkenntnis, 51, 523–535.10.1023/A:1005541307925
   Google Scholar
• Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. J. McDowell (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Frith, C. (1992). The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
   Google Scholar
• Gallagher, S. (2012). Multiple aspects in the sense of agency. New Ideas in Psychology, 30, 15–31.10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain, 119, 593–609.10.1093/brain/119.2.593
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Georgieff, N., & Jeannerod, M. (1998). Beyond consciousness of external reality: A “who” system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 465–477.10.1006/ccog.1998.0367
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goldman, A. (2009). Mirroring, simulating and mindreading. Mind & Language, 24, 235–252.10.1111/mila.2009.24.issue-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haugeland, J. (1991). Representational genera. In W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart (Eds.), Philosophy and connectionist theory (pp. 61–89). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
   Google Scholar
• Heck, R. (2000). Nonconceptual content and the “space of reasons”. Philosophical Review, 109, 483–523.10.1215/00318108-109-4-483
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Heck, R. (2007). Are there different kinds of content? In B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind (pp. 117–138). Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Herschbach, M. (2012). Mirroring versus simulation: On the representational function of simulation. Synthese, 189, 483–513.10.1007/s11229-011-9969-6
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hindriks, K. V., Wiggers, P., Jonker, C. M., & Haselager, W. F. G. (2007). Towards a computational model of the self-attribution of agency. In P. Olivier & C. Kray (Eds.), AISB’07: Artificial and ambient intelligence; proceedings of the AISB annual convention (pp. 350–356). Newcastle: Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour.
   Google Scholar
• Hurley, S. (1997). Nonconceptual self-consciousness and agency: Perspective and access. Communication and Cognition, 30, 207–248.
   Google Scholar
• Hurley, S. (2006). Making sense of animals. In S. Hurley & M. Nudds (Eds.), Rational animals? (pp. 139–171). Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Jacob, P. (2008). What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind & Language, 23, 190–223.10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00337.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jeannerod, M. (1994). Motor representations and reality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 229–245.10.1017/S0140525X0003435X
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jeannerod, M., & Pacherie, E. (2004). Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind & Language, 19, 113–146.10.1111/mila.2004.19.issue-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan (pp. 481–563). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kirsch, D. (1990). When is information explicitly represented? Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, 1, 340–365.
   Google Scholar
• Lau, H. C., Rogers, R. D., & Passingham, R. E. (2007). Manipulating the experienced onset of intention after action execution. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 81–90.10.1162/jocn.2007.19.1.81
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720–725.10.3928/0048-5713-19951201-07
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Marcel, A. (2003). The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action. In J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and self-awareness: Issues in philosophy and psychology (pp. 48–93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Meeks, R. (2006). Why nonconceptual content can’t be immune to error through misidentification. European Review of Philosophy, 6, 81–100.
   Google Scholar
• Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. (2009). Modulating the sense of agency with external cues. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 1056–1064.10.1016/j.concog.2009.05.004
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Musholt, K. (2011). Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content. Philosophical Studies, 163, 649–672.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Musholt, K. (2015). Thinking about oneself: From nonconceptual content to the concept of a self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/9780262029209.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Pacherie, E. (2012). The phenomenology of joint action: Self-agency vs. joint-agency. In A. Seemann (Ed.), Joint attention: New developments (pp. 343–389). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Peacocke, C. (2002). Postscript: The relations between conceptual and nonconceptual content. In Y. H. Gunther (Ed.), Essays on nonconceptual content (pp. 318–322). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Perry, J. (1977). Frege on demonstratives. The Philosophical Review, 86, 474–497.10.2307/2184564
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Perry, J. (1986). Thought without representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 60, 137–166.10.1093/aristoteliansupp/60.1.137
   Google Scholar
• Perry, J. (1993). The problem of the essential indexical and other essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Prosser, S., & Récanati, F. (Eds.). (2012). Immunity to error through misidentification: New essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139043274
   Google Scholar
• Proust, J. (2003). Perceiving intentions. In J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and self-awareness: Issues in philosophy and psychology (pp. 96–320). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Raftopoulos, A., & Muller, V. C. (2006). The phenomenal content of experience. Mind and Language, 21, 187–219.10.1111/mila.2006.21.issue-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ramsey, W. M. (2007). Representation reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511597954
   Google Scholar
• Recanati, F. (2007). Perspectival thought: A plea for (moderate) relativism. Oxford: Clarendon.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.001.0001
   Google Scholar
• Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi, L. (1996). Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 131–141.10.1016/0926-6410(95)00038-0
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008). Beyond the comparator model: A multifactorial two-step account of agency. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 219–239.10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Toribio, J. (2008). State versus content: The unfair trial of perceptual nonconceptualism. Erkenntnis, 69, 351–361.10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tulving, E. (1993). What is episodic memory? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2, 67–70.10.1111/cdir.1993.2.issue-3
   Google Scholar
• Vosgerau, G. (2009). Mental representation and self-consciousness: From basic self-representation to self-related cognition. Paderborn: Mentis.
   Google Scholar
• Wade, K. A., Garry, M., Don Read, J., & Lindsay, D. S. (2002). A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 597–603.10.3758/BF03196318
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wegner, D. M., & Sparrow, B. (2004). Authorship processing. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences (3rd ed., pp. 1201–1209). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, C. (2012). Reflections on François Recanati’s “Immunity to error through misidentification: What it is and where it comes from”. In S. Prosser & F. Recanati (Eds.), Immunity to error through misidentification: New essays (pp. 247–280). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139043274
   Google Scholar