Advanced search
Publication Cover
Philosophical Psychology Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 2
Submit an article Journal homepage
842
Views
6
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Article

The experience machine and the expertise defense

Guido LöhrInstitute of Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, GermanyCorrespondence[email protected]
ORCID Iconhttp://orcid.org/0000-0002-7028-3515View further author information
ORCID Icon
Pages 257-273 | Received 02 May 2016, Accepted 10 Jul 2018, Published online: 02 Nov 2018

References

  • Alexander, J., Mallon, R., & Weinberg, J. (2009). Accentuate the negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(2), 297–314.
  • Bengson, J. (2013). Experimental attacks on intuitions and answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(3), 495–532.
  • Bentham, J. (1789). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1907.
  • Chalmers, D. J. (2015). Why isn’t there more progress in philosophy? Philosophy, 90(1), 3–31.
  • De Brigard, F. (2010). If you like it, does it matter if it’s real? Philosophical Psychology, 23(1), 43–57.
  • Dennett, D. C. (2006). Higher-order truths about chmess. Topoi, 25(1–2), 39–41.
  • Driver, J. (2014 Winter). The history of utilitarianism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/.
  • Feltz, A., & Cokely, E. (2012). The philosophical personality argument. Philosophical Studies, 161(2), 227–246.
  • Hindriks, F., & Douven, I. (2018). Nozick’s experience machine: An empirical study. Philosophical Psychology, 31(2), 278–298.
  • Horvath, J. (2010). How (Not) to react to experimental philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 23(4), 447–480, special issue Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Part 2.
  • Horvath, J., & Wiegmann, A. (2016). Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 10, 2701–2726.
  • Kolber, A. (1994). Mental statism and the experience machine. Bard Journal of Social Sciences, 3(3–4), 10–17.
  • Machery, E. (2012). Expertise and intuitions about reference theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 27(1). Retrieved from http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/3482
  • Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2004). Semantics, cross cultural style. Cognition, 92, 1–12.
  • Mill, J. S. (1861/1975). Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Bobbs–Merrill.
  • Mizrahi, M. (2015). Three arguments against the expertise defense. Metaphilosophy, 46(1), 52–64.
  • Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Nozick, R. (1989). The examined life. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
  • Schulz, E., Cokely, E., & Feltz, A. (2011). Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1722–1731.
  • Schulz, E., Cokely, E. T., & Feltz, A. (2011). Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1722-1731. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.007
  • Sumner, L. W. (1996). Welfare, happiness, and ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  • Sytsma, J., & Machery, E. (2010). Two conceptions of subjective experience. Philosophical Studies, 151(2), 299–327.
  • Weijers, D. (2011). The experience machine objection to hedonism. In M. Bruce & S. Barbone (Eds.), Just the arguments (pp. 229–231). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Weijers, D. (2013). Intuitive biases in judgements about thought experiments: The experience machine revisited. Philosophical Writings, 41(1), 17–31.
  • Weijers, D. (2014). Nozick’s experience machine is dead, long live the experience machine! Philosophical Psychology, 27(4), 513–535.
  • Weijers, D., & Schouten, V. (2013). An assessment of recent responses to the experience machine objection to hedonism. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 47(4), 461–482.
  • Weinberg, J. (2007). How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31, 318–343.
  • Weinberg, J. M., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2001). Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29(1/2), 429-460.
  • Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Order Reprints Request Corporate Permissions

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

Request Academic Permissions

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.

Supercharge Your Next Research Paper: Research and write your next paper with Jenni AI.

Related research

People also read lists articles that other readers of this article have read.

Recommended articles lists articles that we recommend and is powered by our AI driven recommendation engine.

Cited by lists all citing articles based on Crossref citations.
Articles with the Crossref icon will open in a new tab.