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Philosophical Psychology Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 2
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Article

Objective and epistemic gradability: Is the new angle on the Knobe effect empirically grounded?

Tomasz ZyglewiczInstitute of Philosophy, Warsaw University, Warsaw, PolandCorrespondence[email protected]
ORCID Iconhttp://orcid.org/0000-0002-5656-3561View further author information
ORCID Icon &
Bartosz MaćkiewiczInstitute of Philosophy, Warsaw University, Warsaw, PolandORCID Iconhttp://orcid.org/0000-0002-9460-5742View further author information
ORCID Icon
Pages 234-256 | Received 19 Dec 2017, Accepted 20 Jun 2018, Published online: 07 Nov 2018

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