Tax competition, imperfect capital mobility and the gain from non-preferential agreements

References

• Banks Jeffrey, and Moorthy Sridhar. 1999. “A Model of Price Promotions with Consumer Search.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 17: 371–399. doi: 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00033-7
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Becker Johannes, and Runkel Marco. 2012. “Even Small Trade Costs Restore Efficiency in Tax Competition.” Journal of Urban Economics 72: 191–95. doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2012.04.006
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bucovetsky Sam, and Haufler Andreas. 2007. “Preferential Tax Regimes with Asymmetric Countries.” National Tax Journal 60: 789–795. doi: 10.17310/ntj.2007.4.06
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Butters Gerard. 1977. “Equilibrium Distribution of Sales and Advertising Prices.” Review of Economic Studies 44: 465–491. doi: 10.2307/2296902
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dasgupta Partha, and Maskin Eric. 1986. “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory.” Review of Economic Studies 53: 1–26. doi: 10.2307/2297588
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Daveyjan Monica. 2014. “Twinned Cities Now Following Different Paths.” New York Times, Jan. 12.
   Google Scholar
• Deneckere Raymond, Kovenock Dan, and Lee Robert. 1992. “A Model of Price Leadership Based on Consumer Loyalty.” Journal of Industrial Economics 40: 147–156. doi: 10.2307/2950506
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Edwards Jeremy, and Keen Michael. 1996. “Tax Competition and Leviathan.” European Economic Review 40: 43–60. doi: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00057-7
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haupt Alexander, and Peters Wolfgang. 2005. “Restricting Preferential Tax Regimes to Avoid Harmful Tax Competition.” Regional Science and Urban Economics 35: 493–507. doi: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2004.07.002
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Janeba Eckhard, and Peters Wolfgang. 1999. “Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains From Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe.” The Economic Journal 109: 93–101. doi: 10.1111/1468-0297.00393
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Janeba Eckhard, and Smart Michael. 2003. “Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?.” International Tax and Public Finance 10: 259–280. doi: 10.1023/A:1023887530597
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Keen Michael. 2001. “Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful.” National Tax Journal 54: 757–62. doi: 10.17310/ntj.2001.4.04
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kishore Kaushal. 2017. “Dynamic Inconsistency and Preferential Taxation of Foreign Capital.” International Tax and Public Finance 24: 381–396. doi: 10.1007/s10797-016-9423-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kishore Kaushal, and Roy Santanu. 2014. “Dynamic Inconsistency and Non-preferential Taxation of Foreign Capital.” Economics Letters 124: 88–92. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.027
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Klemperer Paul. 1995. “Competition when Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics and International Trade.” Review of Economic Studies 62: 515–539. doi: 10.2307/2298075
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Konrad K. 2011. “Search Costs and Corporate Income Tax Competition.” Economics Letters 112: 213–15. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.04.001
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nicolas Marceau, Steeve Mongrain, and Wilson John. 2010. “Why Do Most Countries Set High Tax Rates on Capital?” Journal of International Economics 80: 249–259. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.09.002
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Narasimhan Chakravarthi. 1988. “Competitive Promotional Strategies.” Journal of Business 61: 427–449. doi: 10.1086/296442
   Google Scholar
• Peralta Susana, and Ypersele Tanguy. 2005. “Factor Endowments and Welfare Levels in An Asymmetric Tax Competition Game.” Journal of Urban Economics 57: 258–274. doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2004.10.007
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Peralta Susana, Wauthy Xavier, and Ypersele Tanguy. 2006. “Should Countries Control International Profit Shifting?” Journal of International Economics 68: 24–37. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rosenthal Robert. 1980. “A Model in which Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price.” Econometrica 48: 1575–1579. doi: 10.2307/1912828
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Varian Hal. 1980. “A Model of Sales.” American Economic Review 70: 651–659.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wang Xuejun. 2004. “Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and Gains From Nondiscrimination with Equilibrium Mixed Strategies.” Economics Letters 83: 377–381. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.004
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilson John. 1999. “Theories of Tax Competition.” National Tax Journal 52: 269–304.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilson John. 2005. “Tax Competition With and Without Preferential Treatment of a Highly-mobile Base.” In The Challenges of Tax in a Global Economy, edited by J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazquez and M. Rider, 193–206. New York: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Zodrow George, and Mieszkowski Peter. 1986. “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics 19: 356–370. doi: 10.1016/0094-1190(86)90048-3
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar